Information Dominance, Part 13: The Warrior Princess

We review the following seven-year-old article in its entirety: The Chinese Army Spy and Condoleezza Rice, by Charles R. Smith, Wednesday, Jan. 24, 2001.

Condoleezza Rice, national security adviser to President Bush, has recently granted an interview to virtually every reporter but me. Perhaps it is because I keep asking her questions about the Chinese spy in her past.

Rice has impeccable credentials. She worked for the elder George Bush in the White House, handling Russian issues. She is a distinguished fellow at the Hoover Institution and former provost of Stanford University. Rice is very close to former Clinton Secretary of Defense William Perry. Rice worked with Perry and the Clinton administration during her term at Stanford. The Clinton White House once mentioned her as being on the short list for secretary of state.

Yet it is her years at Stanford working with Perry that have rendered Rice silent. While working at Stanford, she became involved in the most successful Chinese army penetration of the Clinton Defense Department. She will not answer questions about her relationship with Chinese spy Hua Di.

Hua Di was born into a family of prominent Communist officials. He studied missiles in Russia and worked for the Chinese army missile program for 24 years. In 1984, he went to work for the China International Trust and Investment Co. (CITIC), a firm then part-owned by the Chinese army.

Hua defected to the United States in 1989 after the Tiananmen Square crackdown on student democracy demonstrators. He went to work as a researcher at Stanford's Center for International Security and Arms Control. There he met Rice and the Stanford Center co-directors, former Secretary of Defense William Perry and political science professor John Lewis.

There are two things that I find exceptionally interesting about this particular scandal. One is the role of this Professor Lewis.

In 1994, Hua used his contacts at Stanford, in Beijing and inside the Clinton Defense Department with then-Secretary Perry to obtain a secure fiber-optic communication system for the Chinese army. In 1994, Hua contacted an old friend in the Chinese army then working for Gen. Ding Henggao, a close friend of Perry.

In fact, Perry and Ding's relationship spans three administrations. Perry reportedly met Gen. Ding in the late 1970s during the Carter administration. By 1994, Perry ran the U.S. Defense Department, and Ding had risen to command the Chinese army military research bureau COSTIND, or the Commission on Science Technology and Industry for National Defense. COSTIND, according to the General Accounting Office, "oversees development of China's weapon systems and is responsible for identifying and acquiring telecommunications technology applicable for military use."

Hua Di teamed in 1994 with Stanford Dr. John Lewis, Secretary of Defense Perry, and Gen. Ding of the Chinese Army to buy an advanced AT&T fiber-optic communications system for "civilian" use inside China. The communications system slipped past U.S. exports laws as a joint U.S.-Chinese commercial venture called Hua Mei. The Chinese part of the venture was run by a newly formed firm named Galaxy New Technology.

There is a government report on this scandal that makes interesting reading regarding what the Communist Chinese got through this operation: GAO report GAO/NSIAD-97-5.

Of course, this was one of many related scandals which happened during the Clinton Administration. Clinton was systematically loosening controls on the export to China of sensitive technology with military applications, and China was systematically feeding money into Democratic campaign coffers -- but, that's another story.

Hua Di described himself as the "matchmaker" between the Chinese Army and Lewis during an interview for the Far Eastern Economic Review. Hua arranged for Gen. Ding's wife, Madam Nie Li, to head the joint project as the Chinese co-chairman.

Stanford's Lewis, himself a board member of the project, located Adlai Stevenson III, the former Democrat senator from Illinois, to lead the American side. According to the Far Eastern Economic Review, Lewis had Defense Secretary Perry write a personal letter on his behalf to U.S. government officials, favoring the export to China.

In Information Dominance, Part 11, I quoted the following background on Professor Lewis:

John Lewis is the William Haas Professor of Chinese Politics, emeritus, and an FSI senior fellow by courtesy. He is an expert on Chinese politics, U.S.-China relations, China's nuclear weapons program, and U.S. policy toward Korea. He founded and directed the Center for East Asian Studies, in 1969-1970; the Center for International Security and Arms Control (now the Center for International Security and Cooperation, or CISAC) from 1983 to 1991; and the Northeast Asia-United States Forum on International Policy (now APARC), from 1983 to 1990. He currently directs CISAC's Project on Peace and Cooperation in the Asian-Pacific Region.

As we return to our article, it is important to keep in mind that Dr. Lewis had impeccable credentials regarding not just China, but Chinese politics and the Chinese nuclear weapons program -- so much so that he was an advisor on the Clinton Administration's payroll when it came to China.

With Perry's blessing, Hua Di and Lewis contracted AT&T to ship the secure communication systems directly to a Chinese Army unit using Galaxy New Technology as a front. AT&T officials who sold most of the equipment and software were adamant that there was no need to check the Chinese firm since the "civilian" Madam Nie Lie led it.

Yet, the so-called "civilian" firm was actually packed with Chinese army officers and experts. Madam Nie Lie was not only the wife of Gen. Ding Henggao; she was actually Lt. Gen. Nie Lie of the Chinese Army.

Another member of New Galaxy Technology, according to a Defense Department document, was Director and President "Mr. Deng Changru." Deng is also known as Lt. Col. Deng Changru of the People's Liberation Army, head of the PLA communications corps. Still another Chinese army officer on the Galaxy New Technology staff was Co-General Manager "Mr. Xie Zhichao," better known in military circles as Lt. Col. Xie Zhichao, director of the Chinese Army Electronics Design Bureau.

In fact, the evidence shows that Lewis worked not only for Stanford and the Chinese army during this time period. Documents obtained from the Department of Defense using the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) show that he also worked for the U.S. Defense Department.

In August 1994, Lewis and Secretary of Defense Perry traveled to Beijing to meet with Gen. Ding Henggao. According to the official list of attendees, Lewis accompanied Perry as his "personal" consultant. Lewis, then a paid consultant of the U.S. Defense Department, met in Beijing with Ding, who was also then Lewis's partner inside a joint U.S. Chinese "commercial venture" for military communications systems.

It is unimaginable that Professor Lewis, this professor emeritus of Chinese politics and advisor to the Clinton Administration's Defense Department on China, did not now how the People's Liberation Army was using this operation to steal secrets for military use.

Therefore, he must have been collaborating as a willing co-conspirator.

Professor Lewis made significant money in this business deal.

In 1997, Stanford professor Lewis was charged with using university funding and equipment to set up the deal with Galaxy New Technology. Stanford Provost Condoleeza Rice announced that Lewis faced an investigation because he had used iniversity stationery and his office to run the joint U.S-Chinese business. In the 1997 investigation, Rice issued a statement to the university press.

"We'll follow what is a normal process under these circumstances," said Rice in the 1997 interview. "Similar issues arise quite frequently. It's not all that unusual that issues arise concerning conflict of interest."

The other thing I find exceptionally interesting about this scandal is the role of Condoleezza Rice.

According to Forbes, Rice has an interesting nickname:

With her steely nerve and delicate manners (she has been called the "Warrior Princess"), Rice lately has reinvigorated her position with diplomatic activism, whether it's promoting Israel's withdrawal from the Gaza Strip to ease the Palestinian conflict...

Let's see how the Warrior Princess's investigation went:

Yet, no formal charges were filed, and Rice quietly dropped the investigation against Lewis and Hua Di. To this day, Ms. Rice will not answer why she stopped the investigation.

It was quietly dropped.

The steely-nerved Provost of Stanford University must have decided that this was an occasion for delicate manners.

The General Accounting Office also documented the New Galaxy Technology scandal (GAO report GAO/NSIAD-97-5). According to the GAO, the scandal involved the "transfer of broadband telecommunications equipment to Hua Mei, a joint venture between SCM Brooks Telecommunications, a U.S. limited partnership, and Galaxy New Technology, a Chinese company primarily owned by an agency of the Chinese military."

In 1997, Rep. Henry Hyde pressed Attorney General Janet Reno to investigate the Galaxy New Technology scandal in a letter outlining his concerns. According to Hyde, "in 1994, sophisticated telecommunications technology was transferred to a U.S.-Chinese joint venture called HUA MEI, in which the Chinese partner is an entity controlled by the Chinese military. This particular transfer included fiber-optic communications equipment, which is used for high-speed, secure communications over long distances. Also included in the package was advanced encryption software."

By the end of 1997 the scandal was drawing too much heat for Hua Di to remain in the United States. In an article curiously released in October 1998, the New York Times announced that Hua Di had returned to China in December 1997.

According to the New York Times, Hua met with Chinese security officials in late 1997 and was assured that he would not be prosecuted. On Dec. 31, 1997, he returned to China. On Jan. 6, 1998, he was arrested and charged with passing state secrets to U.S. officials. In 1999, according to the official Chinese news service, Chinese defector and missile scientist Hua Di was sentenced in a people's court to 15 years for passing state secrets to the United States.

The end of this story is not very pretty. Stanford officials, including Rice and Lewis, have openly appealed to the Chinese government for Hua's release. Rice also continues to defend Hua.

Rice stated in a New York Times interview that Lewis "provided evidence to the fact that the source materials for publications written by him and Mr. Hua were provided by approved Chinese authorities or already were available through the Stanford University library."

Yet, Rice will not talk about Hua Di and the Galaxy New Technology deal. There was more than profit for Hua and the Chinese Army company packed with electronics experts. The secure fiber optic communication system delivered by Hua to his People's Liberation Army general buddies was modified in 1998 and now serves as a secure air-defense system exported to Iraq.

The current Iraqi air defense network, NATO code-named "Tiger Song," is made of U.S. and French fiber optic parts modified and re-exported by the People's Liberation Army. Tiger Song is based on the original secure AT&T system obtained by Hua Di in 1994. Iraqi missiles guided by Tiger Song have repeatedly attacked U.S. fighter jets.

Chinese proliferation in general goes far beyond some radar.

As I document in Enter the Dragon and The Islamic Bomb, Part 4: "The PRC has stolen classified information on every currently deployed thermonuclear warhead in the U.S. ICBM arsenal."

China has passed a tremendous amount of information on to Pakistan, helping Pakistan develop its own nuclear arsenal. Pakistan's A. Q. Khan network has, in turn, helped provide nuclear expertise and components to anyone with money and an interest -- including to Al Qaeda.

As we first found out in Information Dominance, Part 4, and again saw in Part 9, when an Army computer was datamining open-source information about Al Qaeda, it came up with the name of Condoleezza Rice -- connected to Chinese proliferation!

It was a surprise then -- but is it a surprise now?

We conclude with the article:

According to an August 2000 Washington Times interview, Rice asserted, "China is not a threat."

Tiger Song is considered a lethal threat to American and allied armed forces. Such sweet irony that we now face our own weapons and they are not a threat.

Still, all seems to be well between Beijing and Bush. Condoleeza Rice is national security adviser to the president, and the Chinese Army again has a "matchmaker" inside the White House. Just don't ask her about Chinese army spy Hua Di.

The Army program that connected Rice to Chinese proliferations was called Able Danger, and it was run from the Army's Information Dominance Center. It was shut down at the end of the Clinton Administration, even though it was digging up mountains of useful data (2.5 terabytes!) about Al Qaeda. It even made connections that would have allowed us to prevent 9/11.

As asked during Congressional hearings (see Information Dominance, Part 4):

Senator Biden. Is there anything to the sort of, when you get into this, the sort of buzz that it was shut down because Able Danger exceeded its authority and was dealing with targeting Americans that the Defense Department and others were concerned would cause a real brouhaha? There were even some press accounts that the now-Secretary of State came up on a list as being a suspect somehow, or something ridiculous. What part did that play in it?

It wasn't so ridiculous, was it? In fact, the apolitical computer, without prejudices or hang-ups, was right on the money!

John Lewis, Stanford University's William Haas Professor of Chinese Politics, emeritus, and the Honorable Condoleezza Rice, United States Secretary of State, need to be investigated for their roles in this scandal, and for their connections to Communist China's People's Liberation Army.

A conscientious investigation will result in indictments of John Lewis and Condoleezza Rice; the charges will include, but will not be limited to, espionage and treason.

Then, of course, the role of our 42nd President in Chinese proliferation has never been adequately, legally addressed, has it?

The Turkish Lobby, Obstruction of Justice and Henry Waxman

The Sibel Edmonds case is about US government officials who take bribes from Turkish organized crime to steer US policy in order to further the interests of Turkish organized crime.

The Turkish organized crime cartels work through "semi-legit" lobby groups in the United States.

Bribes, organized crime, Turkish lobby....

People who are following the Sibel Edmonds case took certain Democrats at their word when they promised in 2006 that, if the Democrats gained a majority in Congress, there would be hearings into the Sibel Edmonds case.

Of course, they are counting on Henry Waxman, Democrat from California's 30th District, to get this ball rolling in committee.

Here's why I don't think that will happen.

First, I came across a report implicating Waxman in taking bribes from organized crime back during the Clinton era: DEMOCRAT ON HEARING PANEL TAKES MOB MONEY.

July 15, 1996

The House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight last week started hearings into alleged ties between the Clinton administration and Mob-controlled labor unions.

Union boss Arthur E. Coia of the Laborers' International Union has close ties to several Mob leaders, and has been under investigation by the FBI for Mob-influenced racketeering. The Clinton Justice Department, however, settled the RICO suit against Coia on terms that were very favorable to Coia. The law firm defending Coia, Williams and Conolly, is the same law firm defending Clinton against Whitewater charges. Republicans allege that the Clinton administration let Coia off the hook because of his generous campaign contributions. Coia was recently seen as a co-chairman of a Democratic fundraiser, and Hillary Clinton had her picture taken with him.

"There is a pattern," said House Majority Leader Dick Armey last week, "when the Justice Department reaches a settlement with the Laborers International Union and leaves its president, Arthur Coia, in charge rather than proceed with racketeering charges against an organization that supports President Clinton."

Democrats on the committee attacked Republicans for partisanship. "It's hard for me to see how this hearing isn't part of a political agenda," said Rep. Henry Waxman, D-Calif. He may have other motives than protecting the President, however. An investigation by the Washington Weekly reveals that Henry Waxman has taken money from Laborers' International Union. In accordance with the charge by Democrats last week that Bob Dole is in the pocket of the Tobacco Industry, one might say that Henry Waxman is in the pocket of the Mob.

Perhaps links into Congressional representatives who take bribes from organized crime is not a can of worms that Waxman wishes to open?

Well, it seems links to Turkish lobby groups might not be Waxman's, uh, ball of wax, either.

There's a new Turkish lobby that has appeared in town since the Sibel Edmonds story came out but did not break: The Turkish Coalition of America. (Note: There are several sites with similar addresses that seem to be near mirrors of each other.)

About TCA
The Turkish Coalition of America (TCA) is an educational, charitable organization incorporated in February 2007. Based in the nation’s capital, TCA’s objective is to

Educate the general public about Turkey and Turkish Americans and voice their opinion on critical issues to interested parties.

Engage and cultivate a new generation of young Turkish American leaders.

Promote and advance the interests of the Turkish American community and Turks.

Foster friendship, understanding and cooperation between the United States and Turkey.

Protect the character and ensure a realistic portrayal of Turkey and Turkish Americans in the media and the arts.

Serve as a think tank of expertise and a clearinghouse of information on Turkey and Americans of Turkish descent.

Identify and recognize the achievements of Turkish Americans in academia, arts, business, education, government, public service and science.

Notice how this organization appeared in February 2007, shortly after this herd of Democrats took their oaths of office when the new Congress convened.



From the TCA's page entitled About Us:

Message from the Co-Chairs of the Congressional Caucus on Turkey

On behalf of the membership of the Congressional Caucus on Turkey in the U.S. House of Representatives, we wish to extend our congratulations and best wishes to the Turkish Coalition of America (TCA). We are pleased that a new organization has been established to foster greater understanding of issues impacting the Turkish American community through public education both in Washington and across the nation. We look forward to working with TCA, and believe that with their support and participation members of Congress will be more effective in addressing the concerns of the Turkish American community in addition to promoting stronger US-Turkish relations.

Of course, here is the Congressional Caucus membership list: Members of Caucus on US Turkish Relations and Turkish Americans



And whose smiling face do we see on the list?



There's another link (pay attention, as you mouse over it, to how it is different from the previous links -- they were "www.turkishcoalitionofamerica.com", this is "www.turkishcoalition.org") entitled Organizing in Politics.



It gives the following list of Congressional representatives:

MEMBERS OF THE TURKISH CAUCUS
Rep. Robert Wexler – Co-Chair D-Florida/19th Rep.
Ed Whitfield – Co-Chair R-Kentucky/1st
Rep. Kay Granger – Co-Chair R-Texas/12th
Rep. Robert Aderholt R-Alabama/4th
Rep. Gresham Barrett R-South Carolina/3rd
Rep. Joe Barton R-Texas/6th
Rep. Howard Berman D-California/28th
Rep. Charles Boustany R-Louisana/7th
Rep. Dan Burton R-Indiana/5th
Rep. G. K. Butterfield D-North Carolina/1st
Rep. Steve Chabot R-Ohio/1st
Rep. Ben Chandler D-Kentucky/6th
Rep. Howard Coble R-North Carolina/6th
Rep. Bud Cramer D-Alabama/5th
Rep. Henry Cueller D-Texas/28th
Rep. Lincoln Davis D-Tennessee/4th
Rep Norm Dicks D-Washington/6th
Rep. Lloyd Doggett D-Texas/25th
Rep. Phil English R-Pennsylvania/3rd
Rep. Eni Falmeoveaga D-American Samoa
Rep. Virginia Foxx R-North Carolina/5th
Rep. Paul Gillmor R-Ohio/5th
Rep. Alcee Hastings D-Florida/23rd
Rep. Rush Holt D-New Jersey/12th
Rep. Jesse Jackson, Jr. D-Illinois/2nd
Rep. William Jefferson D-Louisiana/2nd
Rep. Eddie Bernice Johnson D-Texas/30th
Rep. Tim Johnson R-Illinois/15th
Rep. Tom Lantos D-California/12th
Rep. John Lewis D-Georgia/5th
Rep. Betty McCollum D-Minnesota/4th
Rep. Mike McIntyre D-North Carolina/7th
Rep. Gregory W. Meeks D-New York/6th
Rep. Brad Miller D-North Carolina/13th
Rep. Dennis Moore D-Kanasa/3rd
Rep. Jim Moran D-Virginia/8th
Rep. John Murtha D-Pennsylvania/12th
Rep. Ortiz Solomon D-Texas/27th
Rep. Bill Pascrell D-New Jersey/8th
Rep. Mike Pence R-Indiana/6th
Rep. Joe Pitts R-Pennsylvania/16th
Rep. Todd Platts R-Pennsylvania/19th
Rep. Earl Pomeroy D-North Dakota/At Large
Rep. David Price D-North Carolina/4th
Rep. Adam Putnam R-Florida/12th
Rep. Nick Rahall D-West Virginia/3rd
Rep. Jim Ramstad R-Minnesota/3rd
Rep. Silvestre Reyes D-Texas/16th
Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen R-Florida/18th
Rep. Dutch Ruppersberger D-Maryland/2nd
Rep. David Scott D-Georgia/13th
Rep. Pete Sessions R-Texas/32nd
Rep. Chris Shays R-Connecticut/4th
Rep. Mike Simpson R-Idaho/2nd
Rep. Ike Skelton D-Missouri/4th
Rep. Adam Smith D-Washington/9th
Rep. Cliff Stearns R-Florida/6th
Rep. Tom Tancredo R-Colorado/6th
Rep. John Tanner D-Tennessee/8th
Rep. Gene Taylor R-Mississippi/4th
Rep. Bennie Thomson D-Mississippi/2nd
Rep. Henry Waxman D-California/30th
Rep. Heather Wilson R-New Mexico/1st
Rep. Joe Wilson R-South Carolina/2nd

Now, this is quality: farther down, it gives information about the TCA's president, G. Lincoln McCurdy.

He served as the senior advisor to the Turkish American Chamber of Commerce and Industry in New York in 2005 and 2006. McCurdy was the president and chief executive officer, 1998 - 2004, and executive director, 1989 – 1998, of the American-Turkish Council (ATC) in Washington, the leading business association in the United States devoted to the promotion of U.S.-Turkish commercial, defense and cultural relations. He received ATC’s Distinguished Career Award in 2005. Before joining ATC, Mr. McCurdy served in the American Consulate General in Istanbul as the Consul for Commercial Affairs, 1980 – 1984.

If anything of what Sibel Edmonds says is true -- and we know it is, see the summaries and links at Digging It Up, Part 1 of 2 and Digging It Up, Part 2 of 2-- this guy G. Lincoln McCurdy is a stinker; and, logically, so is his organization.

Connections with Turkish lobby groups might also be something that Waxman and a great many of his colleagues in Congress do not want to delve into in public hearings, which is exactly what an inquiry into the Sibel Edmonds case would demand.

____________________

There needs to be a conscientious investigation of Congressman Henry Waxman's ties with the Turkish lobby, and his failure to hold hearings regarding the Sibel Edmonds case as he had promised to do.

A conscientious investigation will result in indictments that will name G. Lincoln McCurdy, the president of the Turkish Coalition of America, and the Honorable Henry Waxman, Democratic Congressional Representative from California.

The charges are: influence-peddling, racketeering, obstruction of justice, bribery, espionage and treason.

____________________

While we're at it, notice who took a great deal of money from the Turkish lobby for her Presidential bid.

Information Dominance, Part 12

We review an article from August 30, 2000: Condoleezza Rice and the Stanford spy ring is reproduced in its entirety, with my enlightening observations interspersed.

On the surface, Condoleezza Rice is the perfect pick for George W. Bush. Rice worked for George Bush Sr. in the White House, handling Russian issues. She is a distinguished fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University. Bush insiders have mentioned Rice as being on the short list for Secretary of State.

Rice reportedly is also close with former Clinton Secretary of Defense Dr. William Perry. Rice worked with Perry and the Clinton administration during her term at Stanford. Clinton insiders have also mentioned her as being on the short list for Secretary of State.

On Aug. 1, Condoleezza Rice stated during her speech at the Republican National Convention that George W. Bush is up to speed on communist China.

"I know that he understands the complexities of our relationship with China," stated the former Stanford provost of the Texas governor.

"He believes that conflict between our nations is not inevitable. Yet he recognizes the challenge that the Chinese government poses to our interests and values and the irresistible demand for liberty that can be unleashed by freer trade with its people."

"'I know that he understands the complexities of our relationship with China,' stated the former Stanford provost of the Texas governor."

That's quite an endorsement.

Rice has some experience concerning past free trade issues with China. In 1996, Rice was involved in the largest Chinese army penetration of the Clinton administration. To this day, Condoleezza Rice will not answer questions about her service at Stanford with Chinese Army spy Hua Di.

Hua Di came from a family of prominent Communist officials. Hua Di studied missiles in Russia, and worked in the Chinese ballistic missile program for 24 years. In 1984, Hua Di went to work for the China International Trust and Investment Company (CITIC) a firm part owned by the Chinese army.

In 1989, Hua Di fled China for America during the Tiananmen Square crackdown and joined Stanford University. While at Stanford, Hua Di worked with Condoleezza Rice, Dr. William Perry and Dr. John Lewis. Hua Di spent most of his time documenting Chinese missile systems for the University and the Clinton administration.

This Dr. John Lewis has an impressive background. It is worth recalling from Information Dominance, Part 11 his credentials as a professor emeritus of Chinese politics:

John Lewis is the William Haas Professor of Chinese Politics, emeritus, and an FSI senior fellow by courtesy. He is an expert on Chinese politics, U.S.-China relations, China's nuclear weapons program, and U.S. policy toward Korea. He founded and directed the Center for East Asian Studies, in 1969-1970; the Center for International Security and Arms Control (now the Center for International Security and Cooperation, or CISAC) from 1983 to 1991; and the Northeast Asia-United States Forum on International Policy (now APARC), from 1983 to 1990. He currently directs CISAC's Project on Peace and Cooperation in the Asian-Pacific Region.

With that kind of background, keep in mind this question: How likely is it that Dr. Lewis did not know what was really going on in his dealings with China?

Continuing now with Condoleezza Rice and the Stanford spy ring:

Hua Di also started a little home-based company at Stanford. By 1994, Dr. Lewis of Stanford and Hua Di were in business with the Chinese army. In 1994, Hua Di and Dr. Lewis joined with Chinese Gen. Nie Li -- wife of Chinese warlord Gen. Ding Henggao -- and entered into a joint venture called Galaxy New Technology.

As a result of that joint venture, a secure fiber-optic communication system was exported directly to the Chinese army.

The project, named "Hua Mei," also drew a General Accounting Office report that was sharply critical of the direct transfer to the Chinese army.

The key to the whole transaction was Chinese defector Hua Di. In an interview published by the Far Eastern Economic Review, Hua Di described himself as a "matchmaker." Hua Di also noted that he was a good friend of Gen. Huai Guomo, the Chinese army officer then working for Gen. Ding.

Hua Di was a spy for Communist China. Reading the GAO report, it is amazing how astutely these guys circumvented export safeguards.

Hua's business partner, Dr. Lewis, was also a busy man with two extra jobs. In 1994, Dr. Lewis was officially listed on the U.S. Defense Department payroll as Defense Secretary William Perry's personal "consultant" at the same time he worked on the Hua Mei project. According to documents obtained using the Freedom of Information Act, Lewis was pulling three paychecks: one from Stanford, one from the U.S. Defense Department, and one from the Chinese army.

So this professor emeritus of Chinese politics, on the U.S. government payroll as a consultant to the Secretary of Defense, was also involved in establishing a front company for China, through which the People's Liberation Army acquired sensitive technology.

How likely was it that Dr. Lewis did not know that this project was an espionage effort for the Chinese Army?

In 1994, Dr. Lewis traveled to Beijing with Secretary Perry. Lewis went to China in order to meet with Gen. Ding and his subordinate, Gen. Huai, as a paid consultant to the secretary of defense. At the same time, the Hua Mei deal was completed with the same Chinese generals. The sudden upgrade of Chinese military technology enriched Ding and Lewis.

Gen. Ding's incredible espionage success inside the Clinton administration brought a literal flood of advanced military equipment for the People's Liberation Army. The long list of advanced military equipment obtained by Gen. Ding does not stop with the Hua Mei secure fiber-optic communications system. Ding, reported to be a close and old friend of Dr. Perry, also obtained super computers for nuclear weapons research, missile nose cone design software, special missile manufacturing equipment and multiple nuclear warhead designs.

"Ding ... also obtained super computers for nuclear weapons research, missile nose cone design software, special missile manufacturing equipment and multiple nuclear warhead designs."

It may be worth reviewing my post Enter the Dragon for a look at some of the nuclear weapons technology that China has acquired from the U.S., and where some of that technology may go.

Keep in mind Dr. Lewis' impressive credentials as you consider his role in all this, especially this part: "He is an expert on ... China's nuclear weapons program".

In 1996, then Stanford Provost Condoleezza Rice investigated Dr. John Lewis, Dr. Perry and Hua Di. According to the allegations, some of the documentation used to support the Hua Mei project with the Chinese army was prepared using Stanford resources.

At the time, Rice, as an official of Stanford, was concerned whether Stanford resources had been improperly used to further this Hua Mei deal.

"We'll follow what is a normal process under these circumstances. It's not all that unusual that issues arise concerning conflict of interest," said Rice in 1994.

Nothing ever became of the Stanford investigation. Rice made no comment.

And nothing ever came of her investigation.

Why?

What did she discover?

It is possible that she was threatened by Communist thugs or something like that, and intimidated off the case... but, since then, she became National Security Advisor and now Secretary of State in the Bush-43 Administration. Her boss is the most powerful man in the world -- isn't he? Surely she has no reason to be afraid now -- assuming she ever was afraid.

Like her boss, she is dedicated to doing what it takes to enforce the laws and protect America's national security interests -- right?

So, what ever became of the Stanford investigation?

In December 1997, I tried to contact Chinese missile expert Hua Di at Stanford University in California. Curiously, Hua Di would not grant an interview on missiles or the Hua Mei project.

In fact, immediately after my call, Hua Di suddenly decided to return to China.

On Dec. 31, 1997, Hua returned to China. Later in 1998, the official Chinese press announced that Hua had been arrested and charged with passing state secrets to U.S. officials. In response, the Clinton administration and Condoleezza Rice at Stanford University worked together to lobby the Chinese government. Stanford officials wrote to the Chinese government appealing for Hua's release.

Then Stanford Provost Condoleezza Rice said, "Professor John Lewis had provided evidence to the fact that the source materials for publications written by him and Mr. Hua were provided by approved Chinese authorities or already were available through the Stanford University library."

Suddenly, they were concerned about Hua Di, and Lewis and Rice were working together to keep him out of trouble with China.

That last paragraph was an important one: "Then Stanford Provost Condoleezza Rice said, Professor John Lewis had provided evidence to the fact that the source materials for publications [about the Chinese missile program -- YD] written by him and Mr. Hua were provided by approved Chinese authorities or already were available through the Stanford University library."

So, was Hua Di really in trouble with Beijing?

Dr. Lewis, Dr. Perry and Rice have all refused repeated requests for an interview. Hua Di is in China and unavailable for comment. However, an Aug. 28 article by top reporter Bill Gertz, titled "Chinese Military Gets Lesson In U.S. Thinking," contains an interesting point about Condoleezza Rice, the George W. Bush campaign adviser.

"Mr. Bush's key campaign national security adviser, Condoleezza Rice, has said she does not regard China as a threat," noted Gertz in his excellent article.

As provost it was Rice's job to investigate and document the work of Hua Di and Dr. Lewis. Rice did not make public that two top Stanford missile researchers were involved in a business deal to provide the Chinese army a secure communications system. Rice never noted that the Clinton administration's military evaluation of the Chinese missile force is based on the now-in-question Stanford works of Hua Di and Dr. Lewis.

Or, was Beijing actually happy that Hua Di had not only acquired sensitive U.S. technology, but had gone so far as to throw the U.S. off the trail about how advanced China's missile programs were?

It is worth recalling that the source materials for the publications about China's missile program "were provided by approved Chinese authorities", and that work then became the basis of the Clinton Administration's evaluation of the People's Liberation Army's missile force.

Recall also what Condoleezza Rice said about George W. Bush:

"'I know that he understands the complexities of our relationship with China,' stated the former Stanford provost of the Texas governor."

Considering how complex "our relationship with China" really is, that is quite an endorsement.

Condoleezza Rice is reported to have traveled to China in recent years. Her views on China, her close work with the Clinton administration and her involvement in the Hua Mei project raise disturbing and unanswered questions. Today, Rice continues to maintain the Clinton administration fiction that Hua Di was not a spy and nothing happened.

Remember, the article quoted here is from August of 2000.

_________________
**My apologies!**

I just realized that I have been misspelling Condoleezza Rice's name.

Apparently, her first name has two Z's.

How embarrassing; it was not intentional.

Wikipedia had it wrong at one point, too; the page is titled "Condoleezza Rice", but the URL is "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Condoleeza_Rice" -- and there's a note at the page: "(Redirected from Condoleeza Rice)", so apparently I'm not the only one.

Once again, please accept my apologies, and don't worry: I'll have it right on the indictment.

Enter the Dragon

We begin with some excerpts from PAKISTAN - The Saudi Factor, dated August 9, 2004:

A report in The Financial Times on Aug. 5 recalled that, a week before Pakistan's maiden nuclear tests in May 1998, then Premier Nawaz Sharif received a late night telephone call from a Saudi prince. India, Pakistan's arch-rival, had conducted nuclear tests that month and Sharif was weighing the consequences of following suit. As Sharif told a hurriedly organised meeting of senior officials, the Saudi prince had offered to provide up to 50,000 b/d of oil to Pakistan for an indefinite period and on deferred payment terms. This would allow Pakistan to overcome the impact of punitive Western sanctions expected to follow the tests.

The FT reported a former aide to Sharif as saying the message from Saudi Arabia, delivered on behalf of Crown Prince Abdullah, the de-facto ruler, had once again bailed out Pakistan at one of the most difficult moments in its history. The FT quoted the same former aide as adding: "It is possible that Pakistan may still have conducted its nuclear tests without the Saudi oil. But the tests would have been done with the knowledge that the economic fallout was going to be far more severe".

The telephone call illustrated the intimacy between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, a relationship that receives little international attention but has so far proved, for both sides, probably more profound and secure than any other. A year after the tests, Prince Sultan, the Saudi defence minister, visited the uranium enrichment and missile assembly plant at Kahuta, then run by the now disgraced Pakistani scientist Abdul-Qadeer Khan. He thus became the first foreign official known to have visited a Pakistani nuclear research facility.

Saudi financial support has fuelled suspicions of nuclear co-operation between the two countries. The FT quoted a "senior US official" as saying Saudi finance helped fund Pakistan's nuclear programme, allowing it among other things to buy nuclear technology from China. But the FT added: "Officials discount the possibility of Pakistani help to build an indigenous Saudi nuclear weapon: Saudi Arabia does not appear to have the necessary technical infrastructure. But they say there could be a sort of 'lend-lease arrangement' that would allow weapons from Pakistan to be made available to Saudi Arabia". The paper quoted the US official as saying: "The argument that they (Saudis) have options on Pakistan's arsenal are more likely".

Saudi Arabia may have available to it Pakistani bombs!

Here we have an excerpt from Chapter 2 of the Cox Report, which is the unclassified version of a report by the House Select Committee that investigated during the Clinton years Communist Chinese espionage in the United States:

The PRC's nuclear weapons intelligence collection efforts began after the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1976, when the PRC assessed its weaknesses in physics and the deteriorating status of its nuclear weapons programs.

The PRC's warhead designs of the late 1970s were large, multi-megaton thermonuclear weapons that could only be carried on large ballistic missiles and aircraft. The PRC's warheads were roughly equivalent to U.S. warheads designed in the 1950s. The PRC may have decided as early as that time to pursue more advanced thermonuclear warheads for its new generation of ballistic missiles.

The PRC's twenty-year intelligence collection effort against the U.S. has been aimed at this goal. The PRC employs a "mosaic" approach that capitalizes on the collection of small bits of information by a large number of individuals, which is then pieced together in the PRC. This information is obtained through espionage, rigorous review of U.S. unclassified technical and academic publications, and extensive interaction with U.S. scientists and Department of Energy laboratories.

The nice thing about the "mosaic" approach is that the information could be immediately marketable in the right hands; what you learn, though perhaps not useful to you, might be exactly what somebody else wants to know, and providing it might be very profitable.

The trouble is to find a middleman.

In that context, it is chilling to recall the information from Libyan Arms Designs Traced Back to China, which was presented in The Islamic Bomb, Part 4:

U.S. intelligence officials concluded years ago that China provided early assistance to Pakistan in building its first nuclear weapon -- assistance that appeared to have ended in the 1980s. Still, weapons experts familiar with the blueprints expressed surprise at what they described as a wholesale transfer of sensitive nuclear technology to another country. Notes included in the package of documents suggest that China continued to mentor Pakistani scientists on the finer points of bomb-building over a period of several years, the officials said.

China continues to tutor Pakistani scientists on bomb-building.

Skipping ahead now with another excerpt from Chapter 2 of the Cox Report (emphasis in original):

The PRC stole classified information on every currently deployed U.S. intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). The warheads for which the PRC stole classified information include: the W-56 Minuteman II ICBM; the W-62 Minuteman III ICBM; the W-70 Lance short-range ballistic missile (SRBM); the W-76 Trident C-4 SLBM; the W-78 Minuteman III Mark 12A ICBM; the W-87 Peacekeeper ICBM; and the W-88 Trident D-5 SLBM. The W-88 warhead is the most sophisticated strategic nuclear warhead in the U.S. arsenal. It is deployed on the Trident D-5 submarine-launched missile.

Skipping back now with another excerpt from Chapter 2 of the Cox Report:

The Select Committee judges that the PRC's intelligence collection efforts to develop modern thermonuclear warheads are focused primarily on the Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, Sandia, and Oak Ridge National Laboratories.

As a result of these efforts, the PRC has stolen classified U.S. thermonuclear design information that helped it fabricate and successfully test a new generation of strategic warheads.

Returning now to another excerpt from PAKISTAN - The Saudi Factor (I adjusted the punctuation, inserting the dashes, to make it more readable):

So far, there is no suggestion that Saudi Arabia purchased nuclear equipment or expertise from the Khan network. But the network's ability to outsource important elements of a nuclear weapons programme would make it easier for any country -- even one without much technical infrastructure -- to start weapons development.

"To be sure", the FT said, "Saudi Arabia has plenty of reasons and the financial muscle to seek nuclear weapons. Saudis live in a dangerous environment, surrounded by rivals. They include Israel, whose undeclared nuclear arsenal Saudi Arabia criticises as the main block to a nuclear-free Middle East, and Iran, Saudi Arabia's strategic competitor suspected by western governments of developing nuclear weapons". The FT recalled that, in the 1980s when Saddam Hussein was considered a close friend of Saudi Arabia, "Iraq's military strength was seen as protection for the Sunni Muslim monarchies of the Gulf against the ambitions of a revolutionary Shia regime in Iran". After Saddam invaded Kuwait in 1990, however, Iraq became the main threat in the Gulf and the Saudis called on the US for protection.

It is not assessed that Saudi Arabia is trying to develop a nuclear weapons program, but the Saudis do have reason to want nukes, and may have options on Pakistani nuclear weapons, which the Saudis helped pay for.

Recall now the quote from the hearing held by the 109th Congress on Thursday, May 25, 2006, entitled THE A.Q. KHAN NETWORK: CASE CLOSED?, quoted in The Islamic Bomb, Part 1 (the BBC China was the ship that was transporting the smuggled material):

Four months after the BBC China was interdicted, Khan appeared on Pakistani television, and on that show he apologized. The following day, President Musharraf apparently felt compelled to call Khan a national hero. Or does he believe that? I wonder.

[snip]

Khan claims to have acted without Pakistani Government support, yet former Pakistani President Zia spoke about acquiring and sharing nuclear technology, in his words, with the entire Islamic world. Khan advanced Zia's mission well. Some of Khan's exports were transported by Pakistani military aircraft. Many ask how can the network aggressively market its nuclear products, including the glossy brochures, without Pakistan's Government taking notice?

Recall also the quote from Pakistan Nuclear Security Questioned by Joby Warrick, which was reproduced in The Islamic Bomb, Part 3:

When the United States learned in 2001 that Pakistani scientists had shared nuclear secrets with members of al-Qaeda, an alarmed Bush administration responded with tens of millions of dollars worth of equipment such as intrusion detectors and ID systems to safeguard Pakistan's nuclear weapons.

For emphasis, I again present the image shown in the previous post. The caption at the bottom reads: The PRC has stolen classified information on every currently deployed thermonuclear warhead in the U.S. ICBM arsenal.



How much of that stolen information about U.S. thermonuclear warhead design has made it to Pakistan?

How much has made it beyond Pakistan, perhaps to someone in Saudi Arabia, or perhaps even to Al Qaeda?

Information Dominance, Part 11

We begin with Spying for fun and profit, December 21, 1999, which I reproduce in its entirety with quotes from other sources and my comments interspersed:

Wang Xi, an 11th century scholar in the Sung Dynasty Hanlin, or Imperial Academy, wrote commentary on the "Use of Spies." According to Wang Xi, "Dead spies are those who are fooled by their own leaders into passing on false information to the enemy; when the facts are determined, they are inevitably killed."

In 1999, according to the official Chinese news service, Chinese defector and missile scientist, Hua Di was sentenced in a People's court to 15 years for passing state secrets to the United States.

State Department spokesman James Foley said, "Based on what we know of his activities as an academic researcher in the U.S., we are aware of no reason to justify his detention and sentencing. We remain deeply concerned about Mr. Hua's reported health problems and need for medical treatment. We're concerned that his detention may have a chilling effect on academic exchanges between the U.S. and China."

So far, so good. A Chinese defector gets sentenced to prison by Beijing, and the U.S. government protests. The only hint that a surprise might be coming up is the first introductory paragraph about dead spies.

Why all the concern over a foolish missile scientist? In 1989, Hua Di defected from China, leaving after the Tiananmen Square crackdown on student democracy demonstrators. Hua Di went to work as a researcher at Stanford's Center for International Security and Arms Control, whose co-directors are former Secretary of Defense William Perry and Stanford Political Science Professor John Lewis.

Tiananmen Square crackdown, terrible thing, appalled scholar defects & winds up working at Stanford....

In late October 1998, it was announced that Hua Di had returned to China. He met with Chinese security officials in late 1997 and was assured that he would not be prosecuted. On Dec. 31, 1997, Hua Di returned to China; on Jan. 6, 1998, he was arrested and charged with passing state secrets to U.S. officials.

Guy wants to go back, Beijing says it isn't holding a grudge, guy goes back, gets arrested and thrown in prison....

The U.S. government is concerned.

Nothing suprising so far....

Stanford University officials and Dr. John Lewis have written to the Chinese government appealing for Hua Di's release. In 1998, then Stanford Provost Condoleezza Rice said Professor John Lewis "had provided evidence to the fact that the source materials for publications written by him and Mr. Hua were provided by approved Chinese authorities or already were available through the Stanford University library."

The issue on the part of Beijing was supposedly that Hua Di had worked on sensitive programs for the People's Liberation Army, and may have passed sensitive information to the U.S. about Chinese missiles. But, those concerns were unfounded, Beijing was assured by the Stanford Provost, Condoleeza Rice -- after all, the information was already publicly available, much of it approved by Chinese authorities.

Notice above the name Dr. John Lewis....

However, Stanford officials have refused all requests for a comment or interview on Hua Di. Former Stanford Provost Condoleezza Rice, now serving as a foreign policy advisor to presidential candidate George W. Bush, has refused to comment. In addition, Perry has likewise refused all requests for an interview on Hua Di.

Why the silence from the very people who have made open statements to defend Hua Di? Perhaps it is because the other Hua Di, agent of the Chinese army, fooled Stanford University and the Clinton administration.

Hmm....

Hua Di was born into a family of prominent Communist officials. He studied missiles in Russia and worked in China's missile program for 24 years. In 1984, Hua Di went to work for the China International Trust and Investment Company (CITIC), a firm part owned by the Chinese army.

In 1989, after defecting to America, Hua Di arranged for the Chinese army to obtain a secure fiber-optic communication system. Hua Di participated in the "Hua Mei" scandal documented by the General Accounting Office (GAO report GAO/NSIAD-97-5).

Some key elements of the GAO report GAO/NSIAD-97-5 are as follows:

HuaMei, while a commercial enterprise, has as its principal Chinese partner, a company controlled by the Chinese military. As shown in figure 1, SCM Brooks Telecommunications and Galaxy New Technology each own 50 percent of HuaMei. However, the Chinese military is the primary shareholder of Galaxy New Technology, with two other Chinese government agencies each holding a minority interest in the company. Several members of the HuaMei board of directors are military officers or have direct ties to the Chinese military. Such a high degree of involvement in HuaMei could indicate a strong military interest in this company.

[snip]

According to Commerce Department officials, an exporter is responsible for knowing its end user when exporting under GLX (or CIV).

[snip]

If there are no suspicious circumstances, the exporter is not required to verify the buyer's representations of civil end use. AT&T officials stated that they did not ask the Commerce Department to determine if HuaMei was a civil end user, nor were they required to under GLX.

Commerce officials stated that the civil end-user requirement in GLX was specifically included to allow Commerce to review exports going to the military. However, in the export of telecommunications equipment to HuaMei, the Commerce Department did not have an opportunity to review the end user because prior government review is not required under GLX. Consequently, the equipment was exported to HuaMei without Commerce review, even though the company was partially controlled by several high-level members of the Chinese military.

So, this Hua Di helped obtain high-tech communications equipment to upgrade the People's Liberation Army's command and control systems.

Returning now to Spying for fun and profit:

According to Hua Di's statements to the Far Eastern Economic Review, Dr. Lewis and he worked together on the Hua Mei project through an American contracting firm called SCM/Brooks. SCM/Brooks formed a joint venture with Galaxy New Technology, a newly formed Chinese company, to arrange the purchase of the fiber-optic system for "civilian" use.

However, Galaxy New Technology was actually owned by the Chinese army. In 1994, Hua Di contacted an old friend in the Chinese army, Lt. Gen. Huai Guomo. Huai arranged for a Madam Nie Li to run the project as the Chinese co-chair. Dr. Lewis, himself a board member of the project, located Adlai Stevenson III, the former Democratic Senator from Ohio, to lead the American side.

The details on all this are a little hard to follow, so I reference here one diagram of the arrangement. Some of the names are spelled a little differently, but you get the idea.

Dr. John Lewis of Stanford helped set this whole thing up.

Is this the Dr. John Lewis of Stanford? The Dr. John Lewis of Stanford University whose bio sheet says this?

John Lewis is the William Haas Professor of Chinese Politics, emeritus, and an FSI senior fellow by courtesy. He is an expert on Chinese politics, U.S.-China relations, China's nuclear weapons program, and U.S. policy toward Korea. He founded and directed the Center for East Asian Studies, in 1969-1970; the Center for International Security and Arms Control (now the Center for International Security and Cooperation, or CISAC) from 1983 to 1991; and the Northeast Asia-United States Forum on International Policy (now APARC), from 1983 to 1990. He currently directs CISAC's Project on Peace and Cooperation in the Asian-Pacific Region.

Keep in mind Dr. Lewis' extensive background and expertise regarding Chinese politics, U.S.-China relations and China's nuclear weapons program, as you continue reading from Spying for fun and profit about the organization he helped set up:

Yet, Galaxy New Technology head Madam Nie Lie was also the wife of Chinese army Gen. Ding Henggao. In fact, according to a 1997 report from the Congressional Reporting Service, Madam Nie Lie was actually Lt. Gen. Nie Lie of the Chinese army. In 1994, Gen. Ding was also the boss of Lt. Gen. Huai, the Chinese military contact for Hua Di. Ding also commanded the Chinese army unit COSTIND, the Commission on Science Technology and Industry for National Defense.

COSTIND, according to the General Accounting Office "oversees development of China's weapon systems and is responsible for identifying and acquiring telecommunications technology applicable for military use."

The U.S. firm, SCM/Brooks contracted AT&T to ship advanced, secure communication systems directly to the Chinese army using Galaxy New Technology as a front. AT&T officials who sold most of the equipment and software to SCM/Brooks were adamant that there was no need to check the Chinese firm since it was led by the "civilian" Madam Nie Lie.

Yet, the so-called "civilian" firm was actually packed with Chinese army officers and experts. One member of Galaxy New Technology management, according to a Defense Department document, was Director and President "Mr. Deng Changru." Mr. Deng Changru was also Lt. Col. Deng Changru of the People's Liberation Army, head of the PLA communications corps. Another Chinese army officer in the Galaxy New Technology staff is co-General Manager "Mr. Xie Zhichao" who is really Lt. Col. Xie Zhichao, director of the Chinese army Electronics Design Bureau.

There's no way around it: on the Chinese side, two partners were government agencies, and the controlling partner was a front company for the Red Army.

This was an operation on the part of the People's Liberation Army to gain important military technology.

Did Dr. Lewis, Stanford University's William Haas Professor Emeritus of Chinese Politics, not realize or even suspect as much?

Documents obtained from the Department of Defense using the Freedom of Information Act show that Dr. Lewis was being paid by the Chinese army while working for Secretary of Defense William Perry as a civilian "consultant."

You can go back to the link with the diagram and scroll down a little to get an idea what they're talking about.

In August 1994, Lewis and Perry traveled to Beijing to meet with Chinese army generals. Included in the meeting were Lewis' Chinese army business partners, Gens. Huai and Ding. According to the official list of attendees, Lewis accompanied Perry as his personal consultant.

In 1997, Lewis was charged with using Stanford University funding to set up the profitable Hua Mei deal. Lewis faced an investigation from Stanford Provost Ms. Rice because he had used University stationery for his Hua Mei business. No formal charges were filed. Ms. Rice dropped the investigation and left Stanford for the Bush presidential campaign.

So Condoleeza Rice left her post at Stanford to advise then-Governor Bush on his Presidential bid. When Bush won, she was appointed as National Security Advisor and from there, moved up to Secretary of State when Colin Powell left at the end of Bush's first term.

Given that, I could understand leaving as unfinished business an investigation into whether some kid cheated on a test or something, but leaving as unfinished business an investigation into the affairs of a man who used his position at Stanford to help the People's Liberation Army skirt laws and upgrade its command and control capability? That seems like something an aspiring National Security Advisor would want to have completed out of professional interest and patriotic duty.

Assuming, of course, getting to the bottom of this was the desired result....

The Galaxy New Technology deal went public in 1996, drawing a General Accounting Office report and the Department of Defense documents cited here. It also drew far too much public attention to Hua Di. Thus, Hua Di returned home to China.

While he served at Stanford, Hua Di passed incorrect and misleading information about Red army missile developments. In 1992, Hua Di and Lewis published "China's Ballistic Missile Program," in which Hua Di claimed a newly developed missile, called the DF-25, was not a success. Hua Di's work is cited by Stanford and Clinton administration officials as "gospel" in an effort to minimize the PLA's recent advances.

So, as alluded to in the first paragraph of the article, this guy's job was to get what could be gotten, and to throw us off the track of the real capabilities of the People's Liberation Army.

According to the co-author of the new book, "Red Dragon Rising," William Triplett, in August 1999, the Clinton administration was shocked by Chinese communist press announcements declaring the DF-25 to be fully operational and tipped with multiple nuclear warheads.

Despite the disinformation, Stanford continues to publish information based on the twisted and false tales spun by Hua Di. Stanford's latest report, "The Cox Committee Report: An Assessment," asserts that China's latest long range nuclear missile, the DF-31, is "less likely to be used first."

The Cox Committee Report: An Assessment is a rebuttal to The Cox Committee Report, which are a couple of TiNRATs. More on that to follow. For now, we continue with the article:

According to the Stanford report, "A mobile ICBM, the DF-31, was initially tested this year. If deployed, it could increase the survivability of Chinese land-based missile forces. ... How U.S. interests are affect by survivability of Chinese nuclear forces is a complex question, however. Survivable weapons are less likely to be used first."

The Stanford conclusion that the mobile Chinese DF-31 can survive a U.S. first strike is correct and misleading. Of all the weapons at the disposal of the Chinese 2nd Artillery Corps, the DF-31 is the most likely to be used in a first strike against the United States.

The mobile DF-31 is also very accurate, thanks to the Chinese espionage documented in the Cox Report. The DF-31 can put three nuclear warheads anywhere inside America. In fact, the "mobile" DF-31 is so accurate that, unlike other Chinese nuclear weapons, it can destroy our "fixed" silo-based U.S. missile force in a first-strike attack. A Chinese first strike with a limited number of DF-31 missiles could destroy our land-based missile force, and in the process, kill millions of Americans.

Again, information in The Cox Committee Report is very interesting, and pertinent, but will be addressed in a subsequent post.

What is key to keep in mind here is the cooperation between Beijing and Islamabad on so many issues. After all, they have a common potential enemy on their borders, India, with which both China and Pakistan have fought wars in the past few decades.

With that in mind, and in the context of the suprising capabilities of the People's Liberation Army's missile forces, we must recall the evidence we saw in The Islamic Bomb, Part 4, of Beijing's assistance to Islamabad: actual blueprints of nuclear weapons, in Chinese, turned up as far afield as Libya, via A. Q. Khan's nuclear blackmarket.

Certainly, those plans were for vintage implosion devices, and were not for state-of-the-art nuclear weapons.

But what else might be lurking in the Shadow Realm, waiting to pop up?

I am certain that Stanford officials will continue to comment on the military and political relationships between the United States and China. However, also expect Stanford officials to remain silent on questions about their former employee Hua Di. Do not be surprised if they continue to refuse all comments on the so-called "defector" in order to dodge questions of his espionage while at the university.

Hua Di served the Chinese Communist party and the People's Liberation Army by doing their dirty work in America. He passed disinformation, he was cozy with top Clinton defense officials and he was personally responsible for upgrading the Chinese army communications network, making them more "survivable" in case of nuclear war.

However, in accordance with the military theories of Wang Xi, the eleventh century Chinese espionage scholar, Hua Di may have one more service to perform. I anticipate that Hua Di will be reported as "dead" in the red Chinese controlled press.

With this post, I begin a new label, one I should have begun long ago: Espionage.

I leave you now with the image of a page from Chapter 2 of the Cox Report: