Enter the Dragon

We begin with some excerpts from PAKISTAN - The Saudi Factor, dated August 9, 2004:

A report in The Financial Times on Aug. 5 recalled that, a week before Pakistan's maiden nuclear tests in May 1998, then Premier Nawaz Sharif received a late night telephone call from a Saudi prince. India, Pakistan's arch-rival, had conducted nuclear tests that month and Sharif was weighing the consequences of following suit. As Sharif told a hurriedly organised meeting of senior officials, the Saudi prince had offered to provide up to 50,000 b/d of oil to Pakistan for an indefinite period and on deferred payment terms. This would allow Pakistan to overcome the impact of punitive Western sanctions expected to follow the tests.

The FT reported a former aide to Sharif as saying the message from Saudi Arabia, delivered on behalf of Crown Prince Abdullah, the de-facto ruler, had once again bailed out Pakistan at one of the most difficult moments in its history. The FT quoted the same former aide as adding: "It is possible that Pakistan may still have conducted its nuclear tests without the Saudi oil. But the tests would have been done with the knowledge that the economic fallout was going to be far more severe".

The telephone call illustrated the intimacy between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, a relationship that receives little international attention but has so far proved, for both sides, probably more profound and secure than any other. A year after the tests, Prince Sultan, the Saudi defence minister, visited the uranium enrichment and missile assembly plant at Kahuta, then run by the now disgraced Pakistani scientist Abdul-Qadeer Khan. He thus became the first foreign official known to have visited a Pakistani nuclear research facility.

Saudi financial support has fuelled suspicions of nuclear co-operation between the two countries. The FT quoted a "senior US official" as saying Saudi finance helped fund Pakistan's nuclear programme, allowing it among other things to buy nuclear technology from China. But the FT added: "Officials discount the possibility of Pakistani help to build an indigenous Saudi nuclear weapon: Saudi Arabia does not appear to have the necessary technical infrastructure. But they say there could be a sort of 'lend-lease arrangement' that would allow weapons from Pakistan to be made available to Saudi Arabia". The paper quoted the US official as saying: "The argument that they (Saudis) have options on Pakistan's arsenal are more likely".

Saudi Arabia may have available to it Pakistani bombs!

Here we have an excerpt from Chapter 2 of the Cox Report, which is the unclassified version of a report by the House Select Committee that investigated during the Clinton years Communist Chinese espionage in the United States:

The PRC's nuclear weapons intelligence collection efforts began after the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1976, when the PRC assessed its weaknesses in physics and the deteriorating status of its nuclear weapons programs.

The PRC's warhead designs of the late 1970s were large, multi-megaton thermonuclear weapons that could only be carried on large ballistic missiles and aircraft. The PRC's warheads were roughly equivalent to U.S. warheads designed in the 1950s. The PRC may have decided as early as that time to pursue more advanced thermonuclear warheads for its new generation of ballistic missiles.

The PRC's twenty-year intelligence collection effort against the U.S. has been aimed at this goal. The PRC employs a "mosaic" approach that capitalizes on the collection of small bits of information by a large number of individuals, which is then pieced together in the PRC. This information is obtained through espionage, rigorous review of U.S. unclassified technical and academic publications, and extensive interaction with U.S. scientists and Department of Energy laboratories.

The nice thing about the "mosaic" approach is that the information could be immediately marketable in the right hands; what you learn, though perhaps not useful to you, might be exactly what somebody else wants to know, and providing it might be very profitable.

The trouble is to find a middleman.

In that context, it is chilling to recall the information from Libyan Arms Designs Traced Back to China, which was presented in The Islamic Bomb, Part 4:

U.S. intelligence officials concluded years ago that China provided early assistance to Pakistan in building its first nuclear weapon -- assistance that appeared to have ended in the 1980s. Still, weapons experts familiar with the blueprints expressed surprise at what they described as a wholesale transfer of sensitive nuclear technology to another country. Notes included in the package of documents suggest that China continued to mentor Pakistani scientists on the finer points of bomb-building over a period of several years, the officials said.

China continues to tutor Pakistani scientists on bomb-building.

Skipping ahead now with another excerpt from Chapter 2 of the Cox Report (emphasis in original):

The PRC stole classified information on every currently deployed U.S. intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). The warheads for which the PRC stole classified information include: the W-56 Minuteman II ICBM; the W-62 Minuteman III ICBM; the W-70 Lance short-range ballistic missile (SRBM); the W-76 Trident C-4 SLBM; the W-78 Minuteman III Mark 12A ICBM; the W-87 Peacekeeper ICBM; and the W-88 Trident D-5 SLBM. The W-88 warhead is the most sophisticated strategic nuclear warhead in the U.S. arsenal. It is deployed on the Trident D-5 submarine-launched missile.

Skipping back now with another excerpt from Chapter 2 of the Cox Report:

The Select Committee judges that the PRC's intelligence collection efforts to develop modern thermonuclear warheads are focused primarily on the Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, Sandia, and Oak Ridge National Laboratories.

As a result of these efforts, the PRC has stolen classified U.S. thermonuclear design information that helped it fabricate and successfully test a new generation of strategic warheads.

Returning now to another excerpt from PAKISTAN - The Saudi Factor (I adjusted the punctuation, inserting the dashes, to make it more readable):

So far, there is no suggestion that Saudi Arabia purchased nuclear equipment or expertise from the Khan network. But the network's ability to outsource important elements of a nuclear weapons programme would make it easier for any country -- even one without much technical infrastructure -- to start weapons development.

"To be sure", the FT said, "Saudi Arabia has plenty of reasons and the financial muscle to seek nuclear weapons. Saudis live in a dangerous environment, surrounded by rivals. They include Israel, whose undeclared nuclear arsenal Saudi Arabia criticises as the main block to a nuclear-free Middle East, and Iran, Saudi Arabia's strategic competitor suspected by western governments of developing nuclear weapons". The FT recalled that, in the 1980s when Saddam Hussein was considered a close friend of Saudi Arabia, "Iraq's military strength was seen as protection for the Sunni Muslim monarchies of the Gulf against the ambitions of a revolutionary Shia regime in Iran". After Saddam invaded Kuwait in 1990, however, Iraq became the main threat in the Gulf and the Saudis called on the US for protection.

It is not assessed that Saudi Arabia is trying to develop a nuclear weapons program, but the Saudis do have reason to want nukes, and may have options on Pakistani nuclear weapons, which the Saudis helped pay for.

Recall now the quote from the hearing held by the 109th Congress on Thursday, May 25, 2006, entitled THE A.Q. KHAN NETWORK: CASE CLOSED?, quoted in The Islamic Bomb, Part 1 (the BBC China was the ship that was transporting the smuggled material):

Four months after the BBC China was interdicted, Khan appeared on Pakistani television, and on that show he apologized. The following day, President Musharraf apparently felt compelled to call Khan a national hero. Or does he believe that? I wonder.

[snip]

Khan claims to have acted without Pakistani Government support, yet former Pakistani President Zia spoke about acquiring and sharing nuclear technology, in his words, with the entire Islamic world. Khan advanced Zia's mission well. Some of Khan's exports were transported by Pakistani military aircraft. Many ask how can the network aggressively market its nuclear products, including the glossy brochures, without Pakistan's Government taking notice?

Recall also the quote from Pakistan Nuclear Security Questioned by Joby Warrick, which was reproduced in The Islamic Bomb, Part 3:

When the United States learned in 2001 that Pakistani scientists had shared nuclear secrets with members of al-Qaeda, an alarmed Bush administration responded with tens of millions of dollars worth of equipment such as intrusion detectors and ID systems to safeguard Pakistan's nuclear weapons.

For emphasis, I again present the image shown in the previous post. The caption at the bottom reads: The PRC has stolen classified information on every currently deployed thermonuclear warhead in the U.S. ICBM arsenal.



How much of that stolen information about U.S. thermonuclear warhead design has made it to Pakistan?

How much has made it beyond Pakistan, perhaps to someone in Saudi Arabia, or perhaps even to Al Qaeda?

The Islamic Bomb, Part 4

It is worth reviewing some old news to learn some new things.

Normally, I pick one article and reproduce it in its entirety. However, in this post, I present excerpts from different sources. Consequently, please pay attention to which source is being worked with; also, please note the date of each item quoted as we skip around. (This will be good practice for upcoming posts!)

From an article from the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies entitled Proliferation Unbound: Nuclear Tales from Pakistan by Gaurav Kampani, February 23, 2004:

After years of blanket denials, Pakistan's government has finally admitted that during 1989-2003 Pakistani nuclear scientists and entities proliferated nuclear weapons-related technologies, equipment, and know how to Iran, North Korea, and Libya. The Pakistani government's denials collapsed after Libya formally decided to terminate its clandestine weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs in October 2003 and make a full disclosure of its efforts to build nuclear weapons; and after Iran, in fall 2003, agreed to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and provide details of its clandestine uranium enrichment programs that originated in the mid-1980s.

Notice: "The Pakistani government's denials collapsed...."

So, Libya and Iran decided to come clean, and have helped us piece together what is happening.

This happened in late 2003, after Iraq had been invaded earlier that year, a major reason for the invasion given as Iraq's efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction. Was that an influencing factor? Iran was listed among the Axis of Evil, but Libya was not.

The Iranian and Libyan revelations have exposed a vast black market in clandestine nuclear trade comprising of middle men and shell companies; clandestine procurement techniques; false end-user certifications; transfer of blueprints from one country, manufacture in another, transshipment to a third, before delivery to its final destination. But even more remarkably, the investigations of Iranian and Libyan centrifuge-based uranium enrichment efforts have exposed the central role of the former head of Pakistan's Khan Research Laboratories (KRL), Dr. A.Q. Khan, in the clandestine trade. Detailed information has surfaced about transfers of technical drawings, design specifications, components, complete assemblies of Pakistan's P-1 and P-2 centrifuge models, including the blueprint of an actual nuclear warhead from KRL. But the transfer of hardware apart, there is equally damning evidence that Khan and his top associates imparted sensitive knowledge and know how in secret technical briefings for Iranian, North Korean, and Libyan scientists in Pakistan and other locations abroad.

The blueprints for actual nuclear weapons! Cool!!

Notice how it was done -- everything in the shadows, hard to trace.

Recall: "The Pakistani government's denials collapsed...."

Supposedly, this A. Q. Khan network was doing this despite Pakistani government policy. Why would Islamabad be denying it until witnesses came forward, instead of investigating at the first hint of trouble?

We now go to a Washington Post story entitled Libyan Arms Designs Traced Back to China from a few days earlier:

Pakistanis Resold Chinese-Provided Plans

By Joby Warrick and Peter Slevin
Washington Post Staff Writers
Sunday, February 15, 2004; Page A01

Investigators have discovered that the nuclear weapons designs obtained by Libya through a Pakistani smuggling network originated in China, exposing yet another link in a chain of proliferation that stretched across the Middle East and Asia, according to government officials and arms experts.

The bomb designs and other papers turned over by Libya have yielded dramatic evidence of China's long-suspected role in transferring nuclear know-how to Pakistan in the early 1980s, they said. The Chinese designs were later resold to Libya by a Pakistani-led trading network that is now the focus of an expanding international probe, added the officials and experts, who are based in the United States and Europe.

The packet of documents, some of which included text in Chinese, contained detailed, step-by-step instructions for assembling an implosion-type nuclear bomb that could fit atop a large ballistic missile. They also included technical instructions for manufacturing components for the device, the officials and experts said.

"It was just what you'd have on the factory floor. It tells you what torque to use on the bolts and what glue to use on the parts," one weapons expert who had reviewed the blueprints said in an interview. He described the designs as "very, very old" but "very well engineered."

A how-to-build-a-nuke manual, with information on how to torque the bolts and what kind of glue to use! The only hard part was: the instructions were in Chinese!

U.S. intelligence officials concluded years ago that China provided early assistance to Pakistan in building its first nuclear weapon -- assistance that appeared to have ended in the 1980s. Still, weapons experts familiar with the blueprints expressed surprise at what they described as a wholesale transfer of sensitive nuclear technology to another country. Notes included in the package of documents suggest that China continued to mentor Pakistani scientists on the finer points of bomb-building over a period of several years, the officials said.

China's actions "were irresponsible and short-sighted, and raise questions about what else China provided to Pakistan's nuclear program," said David Albright, a nuclear physicist and former U.N. weapons inspector in Iraq. "These documents also raise questions about whether Iran, North Korea and perhaps others received these documents from Pakistanis or their agents."

So A. Q. Khan's network funneled technology -- including detailed blueprints and how-to manuals on nuclear bomb-building -- from China to countries like Iran and Libya.

"China's actions 'were irresponsible and short-sighted, and raise questions about what else China provided to Pakistan's nuclear program,'...."

The package of documents was turned over to U.S. officials in November following Libyan leader Moammar Gaddafi's decision to renounce weapons of mass destruction and open his country's weapons laboratories to international inspection. The blueprints, which were flown to Washington last month, have been analyzed by experts from the United States, Britain and the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency, the U.N. nuclear watchdog.

And Libya's Gaddafi is our hero for ratting these guys out?

How times have changed!

Back to Proliferation Unbound: Nuclear Tales from Pakistan:

Three decades ago, Khan, with the support of Pakistan's government, set out to create a new model of proliferation. He used centrifuge design blueprints and supplier lists of companies that he had pilfered from URENCO's facility in the Netherlands to launch Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. In the process, he perfected a clandestine model of trade in forbidden technologies outside formal government controls. By the end of the 1980s, after KRL acquired the wherewithal to produce highly-enriched uranium for a nuclear weapons program, it reversed course and began vending its services to other clients in the international system. KRL and Khan's first client was Iran (or possibly China even earlier); but the list gradually expanded to include North Korea and Libya. Starting in the late 1980s, Khan and some of his top associates began offering a one-stop shop for countries that wished to acquire nuclear technologies for a weapons program. Khan's key innovation was to integrate what was earlier a disaggregated market place for such technologies, design, engineering, and consultancy services; and in the process offer clients the option of telescoping the time required to develop a nuclear weapons capability.

"Three decades ago, Khan, with the support of Pakistan's government, set out to create a new model of proliferation."

By telescoping development time, they mean shortening the time needed -- dramatically!

For example, one technology needed is how to purify fissile materials. Another is how to compress a fissile mass so it achieves supercritical density, which yields a runaway chain reaction. This is often done explosively, so explosives technology is needed, too. Other technologies are needed, as well.

It is true that many of these technologies would be developing simultaneously, but a change regarding one may drive another to move in a whole new direction. Consequently, any delay in any one technology could hold up the production of the entire weapon.

Now, however, thanks to A. Q. Khan, critical technology, know-how and even components could be bought from KRL Nuke Supplies, so there is no longer a need for delays. With enough money, you can buy not just the appropriate components, but even blueprints to put them together -- although you may need consultants to translate the instructions from Chinese for your technicians!

From a March, 2005, paper entitled New Players on the Scene: A.Q. Khan and the Nuclear Black Market by Colonel Charles D. Lutes, USAF:

Current nonproliferation regimes "may be inadequate to deal with the emerging threat of non-state proliferation" that Pakistani nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan represents, according to U.S. Air Force Colonel Charles D. Lutes.

[snip]

A Nuclear Marketplace

The godfather of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, A.Q. Khan is a legendary and celebrated figure in his country for his years of secretive work in developing the first "Islamic bomb" to counter the threat from long-time rival India.

As a scientist working for the Dutch Urenco firm in the 1970s, Khan had access to blueprints for uranium enrichment technology, which he stole and brought back to Pakistan when he returned home.

Khan was appointed by then-Pakistani Prime Minister Ali Bhutto to run Pakistan's nuclear-research program, with the goal of countering India's nuclear aspirations with a weapon of its own. Running counter to the nonproliferation norms of the international community, Khan was forced to pursue this goal with the utmost secrecy. However, Pakistan's indigenous scientific and engineering infrastructure was underdeveloped for the task. So Khan did what any good entrepreneur would do: he outsourced.

He cultivated a network of suppliers and manufacturers, many of whom did not realize the ultimate objective of the science project undertaken at the Khan Research Laboratories. By 1998, however, there was no doubt. To the surprise of the international community, Pakistan completed five underground nuclear tests and joined an elite club of nuclear weapon states.

For A.Q. Khan, the patriotic fervor surrounding this achievement was only the beginning. A shrewd businessman, he saw potential for financial gain between his network of suppliers and a burgeoning market for nuclear arms. North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Libya were foremost on a list of those at least window-shopping for such capability.

An ongoing investigation reveals that the Khan network played a significant role, beginning in the early 1990s, in the development of Iranian and North Korean enrichment technology. In exchange, North Korea appears to have shared its ballistic missile technology with Pakistan.

One key point here is that the movement of technology, components and know-how was not along a one-way street; it was more like an exchange, with some things moving one way, and other things moving the other way.

A case in point is North Korea's ballistic missile technology. Pyongyang got nuclear know-how, but Pakistan got missile technology.

If Pakistan got missile technology from North Korea, and we know Khan's network got nuclear weapons technology (including blueprints for bombs) from China, might it stand to reason that Khan's network got other kinds of technology from China? Might China have gotten access to F-16 technology from Pakistan?

Picking up later on in Colonel Lutes' paper:

Supply Always Meets Demand

Now that A.Q. Khan is under house arrest in Pakistan, but unavailable to Western authorities for interrogation, vexing questions remain. It is clear that Khan met with, and possibly sold components to, officials in a number of nuclear-aspiring states. Ongoing investigation has linked Khan to nuclear programs in Iraq, Iran, North Korea, and Libya. Additionally, published reports have identified Khan meetings with potential customers in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Malaysia, Indonesia, Algeria, Kuwait, Myanmar, and Abu Dhabi. The wider the spread of this dangerous knowledge and expertise, the greater the opportunity exists for terrorists or criminals to become armed with a nuclear bomb.

Clearly, al-Qaida and its affiliates are in the market for nuclear weapons. On the one hand, Khan's far-flung conglomeration of shady manufacturers, unsavory middlemen, and illicit traffickers seems the ideal supplier to meet the terrorist demand for nuclear arms. Its loosely coupled network mirrors the cellular structure favored by al-Qaida-affiliated terrorists. This structure facilitates surreptitious and relatively untraceable transactions among those who wish to wreak catastrophic violence.

On the other hand, in considering the terrorist link it is important to look at the wares that Khan and his cronies offered for sale. Primarily, Khan purveyed the necessary materiel for a state nuclear program: centrifuge components and designs, weapons blueprints, and technical expertise. There are no published reports of Khan dealing in nuclear fissile material itself, the final product of the enrichment process that fuels a nuclear weapon.

Presumably terrorists would prefer to purchase a finished weapon or, at a minimum, the fissile material, as they likely have little ability or patience to develop a program infrastructure. To a terrorist, then, dealing with Khan would be tantamount to asking for AK-47s and bullets, and instead receiving steel, metal casts and molds, and a fabrication instruction manual.

As much damage as the black market may have done in bringing North Korea and Iran closer to membership in the nuclear club, the present danger lies in how the supplier network adapts now that Khan is no longer at the helm.

Although President Bush has stated that Khan's network has been shut down, it remains possible that parts of it may have just burrowed more deeply underground. While it is unlikely that Khan Research Laboratories will engage in any further black market activity, it remains to be seen what will become of its associates.

Just as terrorist networks re-form and adapt, so too can the supplier network. The predominant commodity will be the knowledge base and expertise resident in the remaining supplier nodes. Cut off from Khan's access to the rogue state market, a new network of nuclear scientists and engineers may coalesce around the terrorist market.

To the extent that these profiteers may have any access to fissile material or even a finished weapon, the risk of proliferation to terrorists increases exponentially. Unfortunately in the case of terrorist actors, unlike state actors, possessing a nuclear weapon probably has only one purpose: for detonation into a visible mushroom cloud.

Just like Al Qaeda morphed and is now somewhat harder to track in the aftermath of the invasion of Afghanistan, so has Khan's network presumably morphed in the aftermath of its "closing down".

The concern is that it has a great deal of profitable momentum, supplying goods and services that are in great demand to people who have a great deal of money.

Logically, then, it is not shut down, but rather is just harder to track, and now more tailored as a supplier to meet the demands of its most likely customers -- Islamic terrorists.

Returning now to Libyan Arms Designs Traced Back to China for some excerpts near the end:

As for who delivered the material to the Libyans, a European official who has studied the question said the connection to the Khan network was indirect. "The middleman is quite invisible. The middleman has covered his tracks very well."

[snip]

"Did the Chinese make a huge mistake in sharing technology with Pakistan? Sure. Did we make a mistake by looking the other way in the 1980s when Pakistan was developing the bomb? Yes," Wolfsthal said. "But none of that should get in the way of dealing with the real threats we face today. Our priority must be to drain the swamp created by the action of these nuclear suppliers and businessmen over the past 10 years."

Keep in mind, these reports are three to four years old.

Also keep in mind that the Able Danger program, when datamining open-source material for intelligence on Al Qaeda, connected Condoleeza Rice to Chinese proliferation. In Information Dominance, Part 4, we see the part of the Congressional record where that came up, and in Part 9, we look at that again.

This is everything Sibel Edmonds has been gagged about -- the international arms black market, where even nuclear secrets are for sale.

Our world is threatened by entities from the Shadow Realm, a world where big terror, big narcotics, big business and big politics hold nothing sacred -- a world into which a "lowly" translator, Sibel Edmonds, caught a peek, tried to go through channels to warn our government about what she saw, and has been gagged for her efforts. Now held in limbo by the Shadow Realm for a sixth year, Edmonds is an embattled American hero on a par with the very best the United States has to offer -- and on a par with the very best her native nation of Turkey has to offer, as well!

Stay tuned to Stop Islamic Conquest, as future posts examine 1) the connection between US Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice and the intelligence apparatus of Communist China's People's Liberation Army, 2) the illegal proliferation of critical US military technology to Communist China, and 3) the role of parties based in Riyadh, Dubai and other places in the proliferation not just of nuclear weapons technology, but of the means to actually deliver Islamic bombs to their infidel targets.

The Islamic Bomb, Part 3

Here is a Washington Post article from last November, Pakistan Nuclear Security Questioned by Joby Warrick, which has been reproduced at International Institute for Strategic Studies. I present it in its entirety with my commentary.

When the United States learned in 2001 that Pakistani scientists had shared nuclear secrets with members of al-Qaeda, an alarmed Bush administration responded with tens of millions of dollars worth of equipment such as intrusion detectors and ID systems to safeguard Pakistan's nuclear weapons.

This is quality: "When the United States learned in 2001 that Pakistani scientists had shared nuclear secrets with members of al-Qaeda,..."

But Pakistan remained suspicious of U.S. aims and declined to give U.S. experts direct access to the half-dozen or so bunkers where the components of its arsenal of about 50 nuclear weapons are stored. For the officials in Washington now monitoring Pakistan's deepening political crisis, the experience offered both reassurance and grounds for concern.

It seems Pakistan has accurately judged that the value of nuclear weapons for a nation-state lies in their impact on foreign relations to deter a major conflict.

Consequently, it is assessed the Pakistan does not keep weaponized nukes ready-to-fire, as the US does, and as the Russian Federation supposedly does, but that, rather, weapons components are stored individually, and away from delivery systems.

Protection for Pakistan's nuclear weapons is considered equal to that of most Western nuclear powers. But U.S. officials worry that their limited knowledge about the locations and conditions in which the weapons are stored gives them few good options for a direct intervention to prevent the weapons from falling into unauthorized hands.

"We can't say with absolute certainty that we know where they all are," said a former U.S. official who closely tracked the security upgrades. If an attempt were made by the United States to seize the weapons to prevent their loss, "it could be very messy," the official said.

I think that is deliberate.

As previously reported here in The Islamic Bomb, Part 1:

Given the ongoing crisis in Pakistan, which, since the publishing of the article being quoted has heightened with the Bhutto assassination, Pakistan's position should be one of cooperating with the international community to ensure the security of the Pakistani nuclear arsenal.

Instead, the concern is about Pakistan's sovereignty, and protecting that sovereignty from possible US infringement.

Returning to our article:

Of the world's nine declared and undeclared nuclear arsenals, none provokes as much worry in Washington as Pakistan's, numerous U.S. officials said. The government in Islamabad is arguably the least stable. Some Pakistani territory is partly controlled by insurgents bent on committing hostile acts of terrorism in the West. And officials close to the seat of power -- such as nuclear engineer A.Q. Khan and his past collaborators in the Pakistani military -- have a worrisome track record of transferring sensitive nuclear designs or technology to others.

I hope that last paragraph sank in.

That record, and the counterterror prism of U.S. policymaking since the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, have led the Bush administration to worry less that Pakistan's nuclear arsenal might be used in a horrific war with India than that it could become a security threat to the U.S. homeland in the event of any theft or diversion to terrorist groups.

Because the risks are so grave, U.S. intelligence officials have long had contingency plans for intervening to obstruct such a theft in Pakistan, two knowledgeable officials confirmed. The officials would not discuss details of the plans, which are classified, but several former officials said the plans envision efforts to remove a nuclear weapon at imminent risk of falling into terrorists' hands.

The existence of contingency plans means very little. There are hordes of guys (& gals) whose job it is to plan, just in case.

The plans imagine, in the best case, that Pakistani military officials will help the Americans eliminate that threat. But in other scenarios there may be no such help, said Matt Bunn, a nuclear weapons expert and former White House science official in the Clinton administration. "We're a long way from any scenario of that kind. But the current turmoil highlights the need for doing whatever we can right now to improve cooperation and think hard about what might happen down the road."

It always seems to be the scenarios that "we're a long way from" that seem to develop suddenly and get everyone excited.

Former and current administration officials say they believe that Pakistan's stockpile is safe. But they worry that its security could be weakened if the current turmoil persists or worsens. They are particularly concerned by early signs of fragmented loyalties among Pakistan's military and intelligence leaders, who share responsibility for protecting the arsenal.

The current turmoil has, since that was written, persisted and worsened.

"The military will be stretched thin if the level of protest rises," said John E. McLaughlin, the No. 2 official at the CIA from 2000 to 2004. "If the situation becomes more volatile, the conventional wisdom [about nuclear security] could come into question." He noted that Pakistan's army has become increasingly diverse, reflecting the country's ethnic and religious differences, "and that is different from the way it was years ago."

The level of protest has risen.

Former and current intelligence officials said the focus of U.S. concerns is the stability of Pakistan's army, which was already showing strain from Western pressures to upgrade its counterinsurgency work when President Pervez Musharraf declared a state of emergency last week, unleashing riots and a police crackdown on political opposition groups. The officials said the military might not remain a loyal, cohesive force if violence becomes sustained or widespread.

Violence has become more sustained and more widespread.

Anytime a nation with nuclear weapons experiences "a situation such as Pakistan is at present, that is a primary concern," said Lt. Gen. Carter Ham, director of operations for the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, during a Pentagon news conference last week. "We'll watch that quite closely, and I think that's probably all I can say about that at this point."

Concerns about possible thefts if the government's authority erodes or disintegrates extend to nuclear components, design plans and special materials such as enriched uranium. Twice in the past six years, Pakistan has acknowledged that its nuclear scientists passed sensitive nuclear information or equipment to outsiders -- including, in one case, members of al-Qaeda.

The loss of components, plans and know-how is a very real threat, one that has repeatedly materialized in Pakistan.

Of course, the US has a fairly bad track record of preventing espionage of US nuclear secrets. We also have a bad track record of investigating these incidents and throwing the criminals and spies in prison. The investigations, you see, would lead to some embarrassing places....

Two retired Pakistani nuclear scientists traveled to Afghanistan in August 2001 at the request of al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden. He pressed the scientists for details on how to make nuclear weapons, and the scientists replied with advice and crude diagrams, according to U.S. officials at the time.

Officials at the Pakistani Embassy declined to comment for this story.

While we're yukking it up here, here's one for you:

"Mr. Ambassador, is it true that Pakistan has provided nuclear weapons, complete with delivery systems, to Al Qaeda?"
"No, that is absolutely false, that is ridiculous."
"Mr. Ambassador, is it true that Pakistan has provided complete nuclear warheads to Al Qaeda?"
"No, that is untrue, that is a fabrication, it is completely inaccurate."
"Mr. Ambassador, is it true that Pakistan has provided nuclear weapons expertise to Al Qaeda?"
"No comment."

Not funny, huh?

Pakistan, which tested its first warhead in 1998, began developing nuclear weapons in the 1970s with help from Khan, the Pakistani engineer who years later became the leader of an international nuclear smuggling ring. Khan covertly acquired sensitive nuclear information and equipment from several European countries, helped build the stockpile and later profited personally by providing materials to Libya, North Korea and Iran.

The Father of the Islamic Bomb was the head of an international nuclear smuggling ring.

Pakistan has repeatedly asserted that its government and army were unaware of Khan's proliferation activities until 2003. However, numerous published accounts have described extensive logistical support that military officials provided to Khan, including the use of military aircraft.

And Pakistani officials new nothing about the stuff that was being flown by Khan's network on Pakistani military aircraft.

In the weeks after the 2001 terrorist attacks, the Bush administration dispatched Deputy Secretary of State Richard L. Armitage and other senior officials to Islamabad to raise the issue of safeguarding the country's nuclear arsenal. Musharraf agreed to policy changes and security upgrades, starting with the dismissal of some Pakistani intelligence officials suspected of ties to the Taliban, bin Laden's ally.

Musharraf also agreed to move some nuclear weapons to more secure locations and accepted a U.S. offer to help design a system of controls, barriers, locks and sensors to guard against theft.

Unlike U.S. nuclear arms, which are protected by integrated electronic packages known as "permissive action links," or PALs, that require a special access code, Pakistan chose to rely on physical separation of bomb components, such as isolating the fissile "core" or trigger from the weapon and storing it elsewhere. All the components are stored at military bases.

That means would-be thieves would have to "knock over two buildings to get a complete bomb," said Bunn, now a researcher at Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. "Theft would be more difficult to pull off, though presumably in a crisis that might change."

In a crisis?

Supposedly Pakistan hasn't been able to prevent it, didn't know it has been happening, and has no comment on it occurring in the absence of a crisis.

The Khan network's proliferation has been business-as-usual. Quoting Congressional testimony presented in Part 1:

Khan claims to have acted without Pakistani Government support, yet former Pakistani President Zia spoke about acquiring and sharing nuclear technology, in his words, with the entire Islamic world. Khan advanced Zia's mission well. Some of Khan's exports were transported by Pakistani military aircraft. Many ask how can the network aggressively market its nuclear products, including the glossy brochures, without Pakistan's Government taking notice?

Back to the article:

Instead of allowing U.S. officials access to its weapons facilities, the Musharraf government insisted that Pakistani technicians travel to the United States for training on how to use the new systems, said Mark Fitzpatrick, a weapons expert who recently completed a study of the Pakistani program for the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies.

Washington is confident that Pakistan's nuclear safeguards are designed to be robust enough to withstand a "fair amount of political commotion," said John Brennan, a retired CIA official and former director of the National Counterterrorism Center. The problem, he said, is that no one can reliably predict what will happen if the country slides toward civil war or anarchy.

You know, ethnically, Pakistan has divisions in some ways not unlike Afghanistan's.

"There are some scenarios in which the country slides into a situation of anarchy in which some of the more radical elements may be ascendant," said Brennan, now president of Analysis Corp., a private consulting firm based in Fairfax. "If there is a collapse in the command-and-control structure -- or if the armed forces fragment -- that's a nightmare scenario. If there are different power centers within the army, they will each see the strategic arsenal as a real prize."

Imagine something along the lines of Afghanistan's civil war, though not as anarchic, but where some of the factions -- warlords -- have nukes.

And I hope my Pakistani readers don't take offense at this. There is no slam of Pakistan intended here. I am merely pointing to human nature. We know the factionalism and strife that can happen on the streets of major American cities -- gang wars, etc. -- and we know what has happened in the Balkans. It is perhaps less likely, but still very possible, for even disciplined Pakistani military officers to become "warlords" under the wrong circumstances.

Other nuclear "prizes" could leak more easily if the military holds together and the bombs remain in their bunkers, according to David Albright, a former U.N. weapons inspector and president of the nonprofit Institute for Science and International Security. He said individuals working inside nuclear facilities could make a quick fortune by selling bomb components or "fissile" material -- the plutonium or enriched uranium needed for building bombs.

There's lots of ways to make money if you have access to nuclear weapons components, technology, materials and know-how.

And everything is for sale, baby.

"If stability doesn't return, you do have to worry about the thinking of the people with access to these things," said Albright, whose Washington-based institute tracks global nuclear stockpiles. "As loyalties break down, they may look for an opportunity to make a quick buck. You may not be able to get the whole weapon, but maybe you can get the core."

And, naturally, the component someone is going to want to buy is the component someone doesn't already have.

The Islamic Bomb, Part 2

Continuing our look at The Islamic Bomb, we now review in its entirety an article from Asia Times Online from November 7th, 2003, entitled Saudi Arabia's nuclear gambit by Stephen Blank.

The war against Saddam Hussein, along with the current crises involving North Korea and Iran's nuclear activities, underscore the centrality of the issue of nuclear proliferation in today's politics. Many governments, not just the United States, have concentrated on the danger of terrorists or of states who sponsor them getting hold of nuclear weapons.

However, apparently defying those international concerns, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia are now reported to have arranged a deal by which Pakistan will provide Saudi Arabia with nuclear technology in return for cheap oil. The US-based Defense and Foreign Affairs Daily even goes so far as to say that Pakistan will station nuclear weapons on Saudi territory. These weapons will be fitted to a new generation of Chinese-supplied long-range missiles with a reach of 4,000 to 5,000 kilometers.

This "cheap oil" is still a concern. Several days ago, the following article appeared, Government paying Rs 13 bln per month subsidy to check POL prices, of which an excerpt is reproduced here (variations of this article can be found at many Pakistani news sources):

ISLAMABAD, Dec 22 (APP): Interim Finance Minister Dr Salman Shah Saturday said that the government is paying Rs 13 billion per month as subsidy to keep the oil prices in check.

Talking to Dawn News he said, global oil prices have increased to unprecedented level from $20 to $100 per barrel within a few years. Government will have no option but to ultimately pass on the increase to consumers as huge subsidy is increasing budget deficit.

In next six months of current financial year the oil increase will have to be passed on to the consumers in small chunks, he added.

Oil prices are a powerful domestic political issue, not just for developed nations like the United States, but for developing nations like Pakistan, as well. In Pakistan, the government has been subsidizing oil prices, and this has kept food prices low. But, that can't continue forever.

So, the issue is so serious in Pakistan that Islamabad is willing to trade its nuclear weapons for a good price on Saudi oil.

Regarding new generation Chinese missiles, in the late 1980's, the Saudis procured from China the Dongfeng 3 (CSS-2) surface-to-surface missile with conventional warheads. The Dongfeng 3 is an intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM), and it gave the Saudis the capability to strike Iran, Israel and other regional powers; the Dongfeng 3 is now quite obsolete, hence the need for newer Chinese missiles.

It is worth keeping in mind that in the 1980's, Iran and Iraq were at war, and one weapon often used in that war was surface-to-surface ballistic missiles. There was a reasonable assumption that the US could keep any situation from flaring up between Israel and Saudi Arabia, but Iran was a loose cannon in the Persian Gulf, and there was no love lost between Saudi Arabia and Iran. First, there was old-fashioned power politics (Arabs and Persians; oil); second, Iran's fanatical Shi'ism and Saudi Arabia's hateful Wahhabism don't mix, either.

Consequently, although Israel could be considered a nuclear threat to Saudi Arabia, it is far more likely that the Saudis had Iran in mind when developing their surface-to-surface ballistic missile program, hoping to deter the SSM's that Iran already had and was using against Iraq.

Continuing with the 2003 article Saudi Arabia's nuclear gambit:

There are numerous motives for this deal, as reported by different sources. In the Saudi case there is evidently growing disengagement with Washington due to the "war on terrorism" and the war on Iraq. These events have created an atmosphere where Saudi elites evidently feel less inclined to rely on American protection in the face of regional threats, specifically the likelihood of an Iranian nuclear weapon. They also see no pressure from Washington being directed against Israel's nuclear arsenal, even though there is no sign or even consideration of an attack on Saudi Arabia. They also clearly resent the evidence of a Saudi connection to al-Qaeda and accusations against them of less than wholehearted cooperation with Washington and other Western capitals in efforts to break up al-Qaeda and its source of financing.

Some Saudis probably are serious about battling terrorists, but, sorry -- where there's Wahhabi hatred....

At the same time, Saudi Arabia has refused to stop supporting the financing of Palestinian terrorism, even as its officials and elites' ties through various intermediary organizations to al-Qaeda remain a source of anxiety to Western and Israeli officials. Nor is it only Pakistan that Saudi Arabia might use as a source for nuclear weapons. Speculation by Jane's that Saudi Prince Abdullah's recent visit to Moscow might indicate an interest in arms trading with Russia, and it also raised the possibility of Saudi Arabia buying an entire weapon rather than technology.

Pakistan's fears of an Israeli-Indian alliance are well known and out in the open. As India is reported to have some 200-400 nuclear weapons, Pakistan is seeking equalizers to deter India, and weapons located outside India's targeting reach offer that possibility. At the same time, because its other oil sources are located in areas that might be unreliable, like the Gulf or Central Asia, a deal with Saudi Arabia eases fears of an energy boycott or blockade in time of crisis.

The links between Israel and India seem to slip under the American public's radar.

Even farther under the radar were the ties between New Dehli and Saddam's Baghdad.

Another consideration is that a possible Saudi nuclear deterrent might also check Iran, with whom Pakistan has issues, especially over Afghanistan. Thus, a possible Riyadh-Islamabad axis would offer those two capitals, both of which continue to sponsor terrorism in Palestine and Kashmir respectively, a way to check India and its allies or partners, Iran and Israel.

It is important to keep in mind the role of China. India is a strategic opponent of China; China is the source of the Saudi IRBM's; China is a supplier of military equipment to Pakistan, China is helping Pakistan in various economic and industrial endeavors -- in short, China and Pakistan are close allies.

Currently, China is investing heavily in developing the port of Gwadar in Balochistan, which is a very large province in the west of Pakistan, bordering Afghanistan and Iran, on the Arabian Sea at the entrance to the Persian Gulf.

Thus, while important for a variety of reasons, perhaps some of the key reasons that Gwadar is important are that it offers Pakistan a deepwater port for trade and power projection toward the Persian Gulf, enhancing its ties with regional allies, and making its shipping (including imports of oil) and any naval units based there less vulnerable to Indian attack in the event of war -- goals which are in China's strategic interests as well.

Returning to the 2003 article Saudi Arabia's nuclear gambit:

Although both governments have firmly denied these allegations of nuclear cooperation, the explosion of reports from different sources in the US and Europe, many allegedly based on sources with access to these governments, appears to have some basis in reality.

Reportedly, President George W Bush and Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage have confronted Pakistani President General Pervez Musharraf and other officials about these reports. Certainly, if they possess any element of truth, the news would represent a further escalation of the proliferation threat, but this time it would be clear that one is dealing with states which sponsor terrorism as proliferators.

Obviously, that kind of transformation of the proliferation situation raises the possibility of several more crises in different regions of the world, all of which could occur in relatively simultaneous fashion and which would all involve the linked threats of either terrorists with access to nuclear weapons or states possessing those weapons which extend their protection and deterrence to those terrorists.

Furthermore, there are still more considerations. If one looks at the history of Pakistan's nuclear program there immediately arises the issue of Pakistan's widely-reported assistance to North Korea, which at the same time is apparently proliferating missiles all over the Middle East. Adding Saudi Arabia to this chain of proliferators only extends the process of secondary or tertiary proliferation by which new nuclear powers assist other nuclear "wannabes" to reach that state. Thus, the threat expressed by the US of being at the crossroads of radicalism and technology becomes that much more real.

That's it in a nutshell.

Then, as I alluded to above:

Finally, there is the role of China. Beijing has been the main foreign supplier to Pakistan, and has a long record of supplying missiles to Saudi Arabia. Although some analysts claim that China is becoming a good citizen of the proliferation regime, and certainly now shows considerable anxiety about Pyongyang, its military ties to Pakistan remain as robust as ever, if not stronger.

The history of Chinese policies to orchestrate a network of such secondary and tertiary proliferation to include North Korea, Pakistan and Iran, and the reports that the missiles involved in this Saudi-Pakistani deal come from China, all lead one to ponder to what degree China knows about this relationship and supports it as another way of weakening the US by undermining its alliances and by disseminating nuclear know-how around the world to multiply potential threats to American forces and capabilities abroad.

While one cannot know what role China may have here; it is clear that this issue of a Saudi-Pakistani connection has the potential to become a major threat to many states and to trigger another international crisis in both the Middle East and South Asia. If there is anything the world does not need now it is a further escalation of the threat posed by proliferation to and from states with a record of extensive support for terrorism against their neighbors.

"If there is anything the world does not need now it is a further escalation of the threat posed by proliferation to and from states with a record of extensive support for terrorism against their neighbors."

And now, Benazir Bhutto is assassinated in Pakistan, causing just that.

The China connection is particularly interesting in light of what the Army's Information Dominance Center came up with through Able Danger in the 1999-2000 time frame. As addressed in previous posts (see Information Dominance, Part 7 and Information Dominance, Part 4), while this automated Able Danger system was going through open source information looking for leads and connections dealing with Al Qaeda, it came up with Condoleeza Rice's name in connection with proliferation to China.

How bizarre!

Bizarre, unless one considers 1) the connections described here among China, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia and 2) the A. Q. Khan network addressed in The Islamic Bomb, Part 1.

It should be recalled from Part 1 that the Bush Administration did not cooperate with the Congressional hearing on Khan's network, nor did Bush pressure Islamabad for access to Khan so international investigators could question him.

Perhaps Able Danger's result -- connecting Condoleeza Rice to Chinese proliferation while investigating Al Qaeda -- is not so bizarre after all.

Perhaps Bush, Rice et al., deliberately decided not to pursue the Khan issue for the same reason they shut down inquiries regarding Able Danger: because they already knew where it would lead -- to their buddies in Riyadh, and ultimately to themselves in Washington.

Perhaps this is the same reason the Bush Administration has gagged Sibel Edmonds -- to cover up international criminal activity, involving terrorism, narcotics trafficking, money laundering and the nuclear black market.

The Islamic Bomb, Part 1

By now, you likely have heard that Benazir Bhutto was assassinated today in Pakistan.

Now for some history.

The House of Representatives, Committee on International Relations (now the House Committee on Foreign Affairs as of the 110th Congress), of the 109th Congress held a hearing on Thursday, May 25, 2006, entitled THE A.Q. KHAN NETWORK: CASE CLOSED? The Chairman of the Committee, the Hon. Edward R. Royce, was presiding. (I fixed a couple of typos.)

Mr. ROYCE. This hearing will come to order. The title of the hearing today is, "The A.Q. Khan Network: Is the case closed?" and that is what we want to explore, and that is why we have these witnesses here with us.

The A.Q. Khan network has been described as the "Wal-Mart of private sector proliferation for the world." Its handiwork has helped deliver to us two of the most threatening security challenges faced in the West, one is North Korea and the other is Iran.

"Its handiwork has helped deliver to us two of the most threatening security challenges faced in the West, one is North Korea and the other is Iran."

That's the two remaining members of the Axis of Evil -- the third was, of course, Hussein's Iraq.

A.Q. Khan, the so-called father of Pakistan's bomb, for over a decade ran a sophisticated and multinational clandestine network built around Pakistan's own nuclear weapons program, which provided advanced nuclear enrichment technology and expertise to a number of hostile countries, as well as to Libya, and perhaps others.

Khaddafy-duck may be "dethpicable", but he knows how to sniff the wind and change sides at an opportune moment.

In October 2003, Italian authorities seized sophisticated centrifuge components bound for Libya aboard the ship BBC China, forcing the Pakistan Government and President Musharraf to confront A.Q. Khan and to confront A.Q. Khan's cohorts publicly. This should have been done years earlier.

Khan's network has done incalculable and potentially catastrophic damage to international security. It has opened an era in which many states, including among the most unstable and most hostile to the U.S., can now expect to develop nuclear weapons. This is the grim legacy of A.Q. Khan.

Here we are going after these nations for developing weapons of mass destruction.

Iraq was invaded for that reason, although the evidence was disputed at the time, and has not since been found.

Iran is being threatened over this very issue.

North Korea is safe for the moment, in part because the Bush Administration is already tied up in Iraq and seems to have its sights on neighboring Iran anyway.

Perhaps more to the point, though, is that Pyongyang claims to already have nuclear weapons.

It is far less scary to invade a country that is claimed to be developing nuclear weapons than it is to invade a country that may already have them.

Bush can sniff the wind pretty well, too.

United States policy rightly attempts to work with and pressure the Pakistan Government on counterterrorism, proliferation and other concerns, but not to a destabilizing degree. The possibility of radical Islamists seizing control of Pakistan's Government and nuclear arsenal is a serious concern.

Four months after the BBC China was interdicted, Khan appeared on Pakistani television, and on that show he apologized. The following day, President Musharraf apparently felt compelled to call Khan a national hero. Or does he believe that? I wonder.

This month, Pakistan released Mohammad Farooq, who allegedly was responsible for coordinating the Khan network's foreign supply activities. He was the last of 12 or so detainees being held for their network involvement. There have been no Pakistani prosecutions of Khan's network members. Khan himself was pardoned by President Musharraf, and that sent a very unfortunate signal to would-be proliferators.

At the time of Farooq's release, the Pakistani Foreign Ministry announced in so many words that the Khan case was closed. It also said that Khan would remain off limits to foreign investigations, despite requests by the IAEA, the U.S. and others to interview him.

Pakistan receives some 700 million annually in United States aid. President Bush has designated Pakistan a major non-NATO ally. Given this support, the grave consequences of Khan's acts and his role in the Iranian military crisis of today, the United States and the international community should expect more from Pakistan's Government.

Khan claims to have acted without Pakistani Government support, yet former Pakistani President Zia spoke about acquiring and sharing nuclear technology, in his words, with the entire Islamic world. Khan advanced Zia's mission well. Some of Khan's exports were transported by Pakistani military aircraft. Many ask how can the network aggressively market its nuclear products, including the glossy brochures, without Pakistan's Government taking notice?

Either the Pakistani Government was complicit to some degree, or Khan was able to proliferate enrichment technology for years without attracting its attention. Both scenarios are deeply troubling. In light of what is now known about the Khan network, we should be gravely concerned about the security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. The idea that Pakistan should be offered the same civilian nuclear energy cooperation agreement being proposed for India is a non-starter.

"In light of what is now known about the Khan network, we should be gravely concerned about the security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal."

Some question whether the A.Q. Khan network is truly out of business, asking if it is not merely hibernating. We would be foolish to rule out that chilling possibility. Vigilance and greater international pressure on Pakistan to air out the Khan network is in order, and that is what we intend to begin today.

I would like to turn to the Ranking Member of this Committee, Mr. Brad Sherman, for any opening statement he might have.

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Chairman, the purpose of Congress is to ask the questions the Administration doesn't want to answer, and the proof that we are fulfilling that duty is the fact that we are talking about A.Q. Khan and the Bush Administration hasn't sent anyone to these hearings. There is no greater proof that they would prefer that we simply say that the case has been closed.

Here is the guy who armed two of the three members of Bush's Axis of Evil.

Bush went to war because he claimed Iraq was developing nuclear weapons. Possibly the only reason why he hasn't invaded Iran is because Iraq hasn't gone as well as had been hoped.

Yet, Bush seems uninterested in the guy who helped provide the nuclear technology to his Axis of Evil -- the very nuclear technology he has gone to war over. He didn't even send a representative to Congress for hearings on this guy!

Why?

Pakistan warns against nuclear weapons grab by Staff Writers, Islamabad (AFP) Nov 12, 2007

Pakistan warned Monday it had sufficient "retaliatory capacity" to defend its nuclear weapons, after a report the United States had made contingency plans to stop them falling into the wrong hands. Denouncing "irresponsible conjecture," the foreign ministry said Pakistan was ready and able to defend its nuclear arsenal and there was no risk of the arms being taken.

Its reaction followed a Washington Post report that with Pakistan in the throes of a political crisis, the United States had drawn up contingency plans in case the Pakistani military risked losing control of the weapons.

"If there is any threat to our nuclear assets and sovereignty, we have the capacity to defend ourselves," foreign ministry spokesman Mohammad Sadiq told AFP.

A ministry statement went further, saying in response to the daily's report that "suffice it to say that Pakistan possesses adequate retaliatory capacity to defend its strategic assets and sovereignty."

Given the ongoing crisis in Pakistan, which, since the publishing of the article being quoted has heightened with the Bhutto assassination, Pakistan's position should be one of cooperating with the international community to ensure the security of the Pakistani nuclear arsenal.

Instead, the concern is about Pakistan's sovereignty, and protecting that sovereignty from possible US infringement.

The ministry strongly denied its weapons were at any risk. "Our strategic assets are as safe as that of any other nuclear weapons state," it said.

A number of US officials and lawmakers have voiced concern that President Pervez Musharraf's government could lose control over its nuclear arsenal amid the crisis triggered by his imposition of a state of emergency.

I wonder if the assassination today of opposition leader Benazir Bhutto makes everyone

more?
or
less?

comfortable about those nukes.

The Post cited several former US officials saying that the plans envision efforts to remove a nuclear weapon at imminent risk of falling into the hands of terrorists.

Of course, some terrorists already have nuclear weapons.

However it reported that US officials were worried their limited knowledge about the location of the arsenal could pose a problem.

That was laughed off by the Pakistani foreign ministry.

"If they cannot locate Pakistan's nuclear weapons despite their satellites, how can people sitting on a mountain know where they are," it said.

Ah, but there are non-Pakistani players who know exactly where Pakistan's nuclear weapons are.

Pakistan, a crucial Washington ally in the fight against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, has amassed some 50 nuclear weapons since detonating its first atomic devices in May 1998.

There is no doubt that Pakistan is a crucial ally in the fight against Al Qaeda and the Taliban.

Now, if we only knew whose ally they are....

But, what terrorists have nuclear weapons?

And, who else besides the Pakistanis knows about Pakistan's nuclear weapons?

Ah, but this is a long post already -- stay tuned for Part 2, under a new label entitled Islamic Bomb!