Smackdown, Part 1

I begin with an article on a subject that an email tipster alerted me to, NATO agrees on Afghan drug role for military, from October 10, 2008:

BUDAPEST, Hungary - NATO defense ministers Friday authorized their troops in Afghanistan to attack drug barons blamed for pumping up to US$100 million (euro74 million) a year into the coffers of resurgent Taliban fighters.

Sound promising?

Ah, but longtime readers of my blog are aware of the importance of heroin in Afghanistan -- and thus, they know that this is not the beginning of the story, and neither will it be the end.

Before we continue with this, perhaps we should review some history. Though I have written extensively about this in the past, I will nevertheless paint the picture again in this series of posts.

I present material from an article that appeared on October 9, 2008, entitled U.S. Study Warns of Crisis in Afghanistan:

WASHINGTON -- A draft report by U.S. intelligence agencies concludes that Afghanistan is in a downward spiral and casts serious doubt on the ability of the Afghan government to stem the rise in the Taliban's influence there, the New York Times reported on Wednesday.

The classified report finds that the breakdown in central authority in Afghanistan has been accelerated by corruption within President Hamid Karzai's government and by an increase in attacks by militants operating from Pakistan, the Times said, citing U.S. officials familiar with the document.

There are two problems. One is that Pakistan is a sanctuary for the militants; the other is that of corruption in the Kabul government.

In reviewing my Genesis series, it is not surprising that Pakistan is a sanctuary for the militants; indeed, as I often pointed out during the Genesis posts, it sure looked like Pakistan was behind the rise of the Taliban. No wonder the Taliban would flee to the border area between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and no wonder Islamabad has been unable to root them out, and unwilling to give the US permission to enter Pakistani territory to do so.

Is it not interesting that one thing Benazir Bhutto was proposing was to get the militants out of the border area, without US help if possible, but with US help if necessary? And, of course, look what happened to her!

Then, there's the corruption in the Kabul government.

The report, a nearly completed version of a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), is set to be finished after the November elections and will be the most comprehensive U.S. assessment in years on the situation in Afghanistan, the paper said.

Beyond the cross-border attacks launched by militants from neighboring Pakistan, the intelligence report asserts that many of Afghanistan's most vexing problems are of the country's own making, the officials said.

The report cites gains in the building of Afghanistan's national army. But officials said it also laid out in stark terms what it described as the destabilizing impact of the booming heroin trade, which by some estimates accounts for 50 percent of Afghanistan's economy.

Back now to NATO agrees on Afghan drug role for military from October 10, 2008:

"With regard to counter-narcotics ... ISAF can act in concert with the Afghans against facilities and facilitators supporting the insurgency," said NATO spokesman James Appathurai, referring to the NATO force.

The United States has pushed for NATO's 50,000 troops to take on a counter-narcotics role to hit back at the Taliban, whose increasing attacks have cast doubt on the prospects of a Western military victory in Afghanistan.

However, Germany, Spain and others were wary and their doubts led to NATO imposing conditions on the anti-drug mandate for the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force.

Troops will only be able to act against drug facilities if authorized by their own governments; only drug producers deemed to be supporting the insurgency will be targeted; and the operation must be designed to be temporary — lasting only until the Afghan security forces are deemed able to take on the task.

So, what is going on here?

We now begin with a translation by Ferghana.Ru of an article that originally appeared in Russian, entitled US AF serving Afghani drug dealers, from November, 2007; keep in mind that, as a translation by a non-native speaker of English, it reads just a little rough in places:

Afghani drugs are as much a pressing problem of the international community as the global warming is. Existence of the problem is recognized by everybody but a solution to it is not known. An international conference on the subject took place in Kabul in late October. According to the UN report presented there, Afghani opium reaching the international market accounts 93% of the global production. Fifty percent of Afghani drugs is produced in Gilmand on the border with Pakistan, a province where British troops are quartered.

Persuading the House of Commons to send British troops to Helmand last year [as this is a 2007 article, that would be 2006 -- YD], Premier Tony Blair capitalized on the danger to Great Britain posed by Afghani heroin. Paradoxically as it is, British servicemen and their American colleagues have found themselves now dragged into the international mafia that buys drugs made in Afghanistan and smuggles them abroad.

The information this publication is based on came from various Afghani sources that cannot be identified for quite understandable reasons. All the same, indirect evidence indicates that the Western military is involved in traffic. An operation against poppy plantations was to take place in several southern and southeastern provinces of Afghanistan this May (they were to be sprayed with defoliants). Sources in administration of Kandahar and Jalalabad say, however, that commanders of the US and British contingents in these provinces made a pact with the Afghanis and cancelled the operation.

Did you catch that? "[I]ndirect evidence indicates that the Western military is involved in traffic."

Of course, since then, there has been more of an outcry on the part of the Russian Federation regarding the involvement of the US military in the heroin trade.

Sources point out that interests of the Western military involved in trafficking out of Afghanistan (usually by US military aviation) coincide with interests of Afghani chieftains who control poppy fields. Afghani officials say that 85% of all drugs produced in southern and southeastern provinces are shipped abroad by US aviation.

Again, that was a report from a year ago: "Afghani officials say that 85% of all drugs produced in southern and southeastern provinces are shipped abroad by US aviation."

There are several ways of shipping drugs abroad. Some sources maintain that the chain begins with civilian salesmen - usually Americans acting under the cover of all sorts of non-governmental organizations and security firms. They buy "goods" from Afghani wholesale dealers and take them to military bases (usually the airfield in Kandahar). A well-informed source in Afghani security structures claims in the meantime that the American military never deals with Western civilian structures and works with local Afghani officials directly. It is these officials who deal with field commanders, from Taliban more often than not, who are in charge of drug production. The Talibs control bank accounts money is transacted to in all sorts of devious ways via the Afghanis living in the United States and West Europe.

As a matter of fact, money is not the only commodity drugs are paid with. Weapons will do too. Afghani sources claim that drugs-for-weapons barter deals with the Talibs are widely used. (One cannot help recalling the "deals" between our servicemen and the mujahedin during Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s.) It may be added that the mujahedin nowadays get weapons from the northern provinces to which the merchandise is smuggled in the first place from Asian states. Insiders say that a great deal of merchandise passes via Shurtepa, a settlement on the Afghani-Turkmen border. Insiders say that weapons and munitions are ferried to the Taliban-controlled provinces of Afghanistan by American or British armored vehicles.

Does this ring any bells?



From 'The Stakes Are Too High for Us to Stop Fighting Now' An interview with FBI whistleblower Sibel Edmonds by Christopher Deliso August 15, 2005:

CD: Can you elaborate here on what countries you mean?

SE: It's interesting, in one of my interviews, they say "Turkish countries," but I believe they meant Turkic countries – that is, Turkey, Azerbaijan, and all the 'Stans, including Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, and [non-Turkic countries like] Afghanistan and Pakistan. All of these countries play a big part in the sort of things I have been talking about.

CD: What, you mean drug-smuggling?

SE: Among other things. Yes, that is a major part of it. It's amazing that in this whole "war on terror" thing, no one ever talks about these issues. No one asks questions about these countries – questions like, "OK, how much of their GDP depends on drugs?"

CD: But of course, you're not implying...

SE: And then to compare that little survey with what countries we've been putting military bases in --

And, it's not just today's fight in Afghanistan against the Taliban; the same connections to corrupt US officials permitted 9/11 to occur (so it could be used as cover for a bigger crime).

From State Dept. Quashed 9/11 Links To Global Drug Trade -- FBI Whistleblower by Fintan Dunne, June 7, 2004:

Because of a provisional gag order issued by Judge Reggie B. Walton which prohibits revealing specific details, Edmonds can only paint a picture in the broadest of brush strokes.

But her measured words hint at politically explosive connections between criminal drug/intelligence networks, and the 9/11 attacks.

"You have [a] network of people who obtain certain information and they take it out and sell it to... whomever would be the highest bidder. Then you have people who would be bringing into the country narcotics from the East, and their connections. [It] is only then that you really see the big picture."

"And you see certain semi-legitimate organizations that may very well have a legit front, but with very criminal illegitimate activities -- who start coming at you from these investigations."

"And the picture becomes, actually, very clear. Crystal clear."

From 'I Saw Papers That Show US Knew al-Qa'ida Would Attack Cities With Airplanes' by Andrew Buncombe; published on Friday, April 2, 2004 by the Independent/UK:

Sibel Edmonds said she spent more than three hours in a closed session with the commission's investigators providing information that was circulating within the FBI in the spring and summer of 2001 suggesting that an attack using aircraft was just months away and the terrorists were in place. The Bush administration, meanwhile, has sought to silence her and has obtained a gagging order from a court by citing the rarely used "state secrets privilege".

She told The Independent yesterday: "I gave [the commission] details of specific investigation files, the specific dates, specific target information, specific managers in charge of the investigation. I gave them everything so that they could go back and follow up. This is not hearsay. These are things that are documented. These things can be established very easily."

She added: "There was general information about the time-frame, about methods to be used -- but not specifically about how they would be used ­ and about people being in place and who was ordering these sorts of terror attacks. There were other cities that were mentioned. Major cities -- with skyscrapers."

[snip]

She said said it was clear there was sufficient information during the spring and summer of 2001 to indicate terrorists were planning an attack. "Most of what I told the commission -- 90 per cent of it -- related to the investigations that I was involved in or just from working in the department. Two hundred translators side by side, you get to see and hear a lot of other things as well."

"President Bush said they had no specific information about 11 September and that is accurate but only because he said 11 September," she said. There was, however, general information about the use of airplanes and that an attack was just months away.

For a wild ride, stay tuned to Stop Islamic Conquest as this series continues!

Genesis, Part 34

We continue reviewing declassified State Department cables addressing the rise of the Taliban. This is a September 28, 1996, cable from the US Secretary of State's office to the American Embassy in Islamabad; its subject is DEALING WITH THE TALIBAN IN KABUL. The abbreviation USG in the cable stands for United States Government.



Notice in Paragraph 2, we again encounter the "TALL BAN" where we expect to see "Taliban".

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY ROBIN L. RAPHEL, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE. REASON: 1.5(B) AND (D).

2. (C) SUMMARY. IN OUR INITIAL CONTACTS WITH THE NEW AUTHORITIES IN KABUL, WE WILL SEEK INFORMATION ABOUT THE NEW GOVERNMENT AND ITS INTENTIONS, AND REITERATE OUR KEY CONCERNS -- THE IMPORTANCE OF A BROAD-BASED GOVERNMENT AND THE NEED TO ADDRESS QUICKLY THE TWIN PROBLEMS OF NARCOTICS AND TERRORISM. WE WILL CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE UN AS A MECHANISM TO PROMOTE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION. WE WILL INFORM THE TALL BAN AUTHORITIES THAT WE ARE MOVING TO ADDRESS THEIR PUBLICLY-STATED CONCERNS ABOUT THE SECURITY OF THEIR MISSIONS IN THE UNITED STATES. IF THE TALIBAN RAISE THE QUESTION OF REOPENING OUR MISSION IN KABUL, WE WILL SAY THAT ACTION IS UNDER REVIEW, SUBJECT TO SECURITY CONCERNS. END SUMMARY.

3. (C) WE WISH TO ENGAGE THE NEW TALIBAN "INTERIM GOVERNMENT" AT AN EARLY STAGE TO:

--DEMONSTRATE USG WILLINGNESS TO DEAL WITH THEM AS THE NEW AUTHORITIES IN KABUL;
--SEEK INFORMATION ABOUT THEIR PLANS, PROGRAMS, AND POLICIES; AND
--EXPRESS USG VIEWS ON AREAS OF KEY CONCERN TO US -- STABILITY, HUMAN RIGHTS, NARCOTICS AND TERRORISM.

Some of this sounds like it could be so contemporary!

4. (C) EMBASSY ISLAMABAD IS AUTHORIZED TO SEND REPRESENTATIVES TO KABUL, WHENEVER FEASIBLE AND SAFE, TO MAKE INITIAL CONTACT WITH THE TALIBAN INTERIM GOVERNMENT. THEY SHOULD MAKE THE POINTS BELOW:

5. (SBU)

-- THE UNITED STATES HAS HAD A LONG HISTORY OF FRIENDSHIP WITH THE AFGHAN PEOPLE, AND WE LOOK FORWARD TO A FUTURE OF THE SAME. WE RECOGNIZE THAT THE TALIBAN NOW CONTROL KABUL AND MUCH OF THE COUNTRY.

-- WE HAVE NOTED THE INITIAL ANNOUNCEMENT ABOUT THE NEW INTERIM GOVERNMENT. WE HOPE YOU WILL PROPOSE SOON AN ENVOY TO REPRESENT YOUR GOVERNMENT IN WASHINGTON. WE ARE NOT RENEWING VISAS OF AFGHAN DIPLOMATS CURRENTLY IN THE U.S. WE ARE TAKING STEPS TO ENSURE THE SECURITY OF THE AFGHAN MISSIONS IN WASHINGTON AND NEW YORK.

-- WE WISH TO HAVE A DIALOGUE WITH YOUR GOVERNMENT, AND WE WANT TO LEARN MORE ABOUT YOUR PLANS AND POLICIES.

-- WE CONSISTENTLY TOLD THE FORMER GOVERNMENT THAT WE WANT TO SEE A PEACEFUL AND STABLE AFGHANISTAN, WITH A GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVE OF AFGHANS OF ALL ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS GROUPS.

-- WE WERE ENCOURAGED BY YOUR STATEMENT THAT AFGHANISTAN IS THE COMMON HOME OF ALL AFGHANS, AND THAT NO SINGLE GROUP CAN GOVERN THE COUNTRY. WE SHARE THIS SENTIMENT, AND WOULD BE INTERESTED IN LEARNING MORE ABOUT YOUR PLANS TO BRING IN REPRESENTATIVES OF ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS MINORITIES.

HUMANITARIAN ISSUES

-- AS YOU KNOW, WE HAVE ASSISTED THE PEOPLE OF AFGHANISTAN WITH FUNDS FOR FOOD, DISASTER RELIEF, AND DE-MINING. WE WANT TO CONTINUE WITH THIS ASSISTANCE.

-- WE HAVE ALSO PROVIDED HEALTH AND EDUCATION ASSISTANCE TO THE REFUGEES IN PAKISTAN. WE HOPE THAT THE NEW SITUATION IN THE COUNTRY WILL ALLOW THE REFUGEES CURRENTLY THERE AND IN IRAN TO RETURN.

-- WE BELIEVE THE UN HAS AN IMPORTANT CONTINUING ROLE IN AFGHANISTAN. IT HAS MADE A MAJOR CONTRIBUTION IN HUMANITARIAN RELIEF, DE-MINING, AND OTHER AREAS. WE URGE YOU TO CONTINUE TO WORK CLOSELY WITH THEM.

-- WE WERE DISMAYED BY THE VIOLATION OF UN PREMISES WHEN YOUR FORCES ENTERED KABUL AND BY THE SUMMARY EXECUTION OF FORMER PRESIDENT NAJIBULLAH.

-- THE UN SPECIAL MISSION CAN ALSO PLAY A ROLE IN ASSISTING YOUR TASK OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION. HOW DO YOU SEE THEIR ROLE AT THIS TIME?

Now we get to an interesting part.

NARCOTICS

-- WE HAVE DISCUSSED WITH YOUR REPRESENTATIVES OUR CONCERN ABOUT INCREASING NARCOTICS CULTIVATION AND TRAFFICKING IN AFGHANISTAN. WE HAVE WELCOMED YOUR REASSURANCES THAT THE TALIBAN CONDEMN NARCOTICS AS UN-ISLAMIC.

-- HOWEVER, WE NOTE THAT CULTIVATION IN HELMAND HAS INCREASED BY OVER 30 2.666863E-78ACH [typo in message -- YD] YEAR SINCE 1993. THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT HEROIN PROCESSING IN KANDAHAR HAS ALSO INCREASED DRAMATICALLY.

Some things never change.

-- WE HOPE THAT THE TALIBAN WILL MAKE ONE OF ITS FIRST TASKS THE PUBLIC CONDEMNATION IN CLEAR TERMS OF NARCOTICS GROWING AND TRAFFICKING. WE HOPE YOU WILL TAKE FIRM STEPS TO ENSURE THAT THOSE NOW CULTIVATING OPIUM WILL TURN TO OTHER CROPS.

-- WE HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO COUNTER-NARCOTICS PROGRAMS IN HELMAND AND OTHER AREAS IN CROP SUBSTITUTION. WE HAVE PLEDGED USDOLS 1.6 MILLION THRU UNDCP OVER THE LAST 2 YEARS FOR THEIR WORK IN AFGHANISTAN. WE WISH TO CONTINUE TO CONTRIBUTE TO NGOS WORKING IN AFGHANISTAN AND TO UNDCP TO HELP PROVIDE AFGHANS PRACTICAL ALTERNATIVES TO GROWING OPIUM.

TERRORISM

-- WE WELCOMED YOUR ASSURANCES THAT YOU WERE CLOSING THE TERRORIST AND MILITANT TRAINING CAMPS FORMERLY RUN BY HEKMATYAR, SAYYAR OR ARAB GROUPS. CAN YOU TELL US THE CURRENT STATUS OF THOSE CAMPS?

-- DO YOU KNOW THE LOCATION OF EX-SAUDI FINANCIER AND RADICAL ISLAMIST OSAMA BIN LADEN? WE HAD HEARD PREVIOUSLY THAT HE WAS IN THE EASTERN PROVINCES. HIS CONTINUED PRESENCE HERE WOULD NOT, WE BELIEVE, SERVE AFGHANISTAN'S INTERESTS.

To say the least!

OUR MISSION IN AFGHANISTAN (ONLY IF ASKED)

-- WE HAVE EMBASSY PROPERTY IN KABUL, FOR WHICH WE SEEK YOUR PROTECTION. WE WOULD LIKE TO RE-OPEN OUR EMBASSY HERE, WHEN SECURITY PERMITS. WE ARE CONSIDERING WHEN WE COULD TAKE THIS STEP. IN THE MEANTIME, WE WOULD LIKE TO MAKE FREQUENT TRIPS TO KABUL TO STAY IN CONTACT WITH YOUR GOVERNMENT.
CHRISTOPHER

Complete with an interest in Osama bin Laden!

If the West grows tired of the war in Afghanistan and withdraws US and NATO troops, they could wait a couple of months, and then retransmit this very same cable, and it would be right on the money!

This concludes the Genesis series; next up in our review of Afghanistan through State Department cable traffic is the series Exodus.

The Sword of Allah, Part 5

We continue from Part 4 reviewing Is Afghanistan a Narco-State?:

Then it all began to unravel.

In May 2007, Anthony Harriman, the senior director for Afghanistan at the National Security Council, in order to ensure the strategy paper would be executed, decided to take it to the Deputies Committee — a group of cabinet deputy secretaries led by Lt. Gen. Douglas Lute, whom President Bush had appointed his "war czar" — which had the power to make the document official U.S. policy. Harriman asked me to start developing an unclassified version for public release.

Almost immediately, the Pentagon bureaucracy — particularly the South Asia office — made an about-face. First, they resisted bringing the paper to the deputies. When that effort failed (largely because of unexpected support for the plan from new field commanders like Gen. Dan McNeill, who saw the narcotics-insurgency nexus and were willing to buck their Pentagon minders), the Pentagon bureaucrats tried to prevent the release of an unclassified version to the public. Indeed, two senior Pentagon officials threatened me with professional retaliation if we made the unclassified document public. When we went ahead anyway, the Pentagon leaked the contents of the classified version to Peter Gilchrist, a British general posted in Washington. Defense Department officials were thus enlisting a foreign government to help kill U.S. policy — a policy that implicitly recognized that the Pentagon's "sequencing" approach had failed and that the Defense Department would have to get more involved in fighting the narcotics trade.

The plan that might win the war in Afghanistan, and that would certainly cut back the amount of heroin flooding into Russia, Europe and even America's Midwest, was killed by Pentagon bureaucrats.

In this context, let's consider a quote from Sibel Edmonds, which I had reproduced already in Part 1, from Cracking the Case: An Interview With Sibel Edmonds by Scott Horton, August 22, 2005:

SH: I want to get to your appearance on Democracy Now! earlier in the week, referring to officials at the State Department, you used the word "treason." And I wonder whether this is specifically referring to the Sept. 11 attacks and whether you have information that indicates complicity on the part of American elites who are part of these semi-legit organizations that funded Sept. 11, or are we talking seven degrees of Kevin Bacon here?

SE: Again, it's hard to talk about this around the gag order, but this is what I have been saying for the past three years, that's why I refer to the transcript of CBS 60 Minutes. These people who call themselves Americans and these people are using their position, their official position within these agencies -- some of them in the Department of Defense, some of them in the Department of State -- and yet, what they are doing with their position, with their influence is against the United States' national security, it's against the best interests of its people, and that is treason. Be it giving information to those that are either quasi-allies -- and I would underline quasi, who one day will be another al-Qaeda -- and who are already are engaged in activities that are damaging to our country, its security and its interests -- and that is treason. So that's what I was referring to. And what would you call someone who, let's say if they were to go after Douglas Feith, and if they were to establish that Douglas Feith with his access to information, willingly, intentionally used the information he had and gave it to those that would one day use it or maybe right now are using that information against the United States. Would you call that treason?

SH: Well, if it's an overt act to benefit an American enemy then yes, that's treason.

SE: Correct, and I as I said, those lines are so blurry because there are certain countries that we call allies but I wouldn't call them allies, these people are, these countries are, quasi-allies.

SH: Okay, I'm going to go ahead and name some people whom I suspect inside the State Department and the Pentagon, and I suppose you won't be able to answer affirmative or negative on any of these, but I'm very curious when I read about this kind of corruption going on in the State Department, I immediately think of John Bolton and David Wurmser. Do those names mean anything to you?

SE: Well, first of all, I'm not going to answer that question at all, but also you should pay attention to the fact that some of these people have been there for a while, and some of these people had their roots in there even in the mid-1990s.

SH: So more career officials rather than political appointees.

SE: Or maybe a mixture of both.

Returning to Is Afghanistan a Narco-State?:

Gilchrist told me that the plan was unacceptable to Britain. Britain, apparently joined by Sweden (which has fewer than 500 troops in a part of the country where there is no poppy cultivation), sent letters to Karzai urging him to reject key elements of the U.S. plan. By the time Wood and Secretary Rice pressed Karzai for more aggressive action, Karzai told Rice that because some people in the U.S. government did not support the plan, and some allies did not support it, he was not going to support it, either. An operations-center assistant, who summarized the call for me over my car phone just after it occurred, made an uncharacteristic editorial comment: "It was not a good call, ambassador."

Even more startling, it appeared that top Pentagon officials knew nothing about the changing nature of the drug problem or about the new plan. When, through a back channel, I briefed the under secretary of defense for intelligence, James Clapper, on the relationship between drugs and the insurgency, he said he had "never heard any of this." Worse still, Defense Secretary Robert Gates testified to Congress in December 2007 that we did not have a strategy for fighting drugs in Afghanistan. I received a quick apology from the Pentagon counterdrugs unit, which sent a memo to Gates informing him that we actually did have a strategy.

This dissension was, I believe, music to Karzai's ears. When he convened all 34 Afghan provincial governors in Kabul in September 2007 (I was a "guest of honor"), he made antidrug statements at the beginning of his speech, but then lashed out at the international community for wanting to spray his people's crops and giving him conflicting advice. He got a wild ovation. Not surprising — since so many in the room were closely tied to the narcotics trade. Sure, Karzai had Taliban enemies who profited from drugs, but he had even more supporters who did.

That pretty much nails it. While both sides benefit from the heroin trade, "our" side benefits more, it seems.

Karzai was playing us like a fiddle: the U.S. would spend billions of dollars on infrastructure improvement; the U.S. and its allies would fight the Taliban; Karzai's friends could get rich off the drug trade; he could blame the West for his problems; and in 2009 he would be elected to a new term.

Why does the U.S. have to fight the Taliban to support this guy?



There are some real differences we have with the Taliban -- things like the status of women in society, and so on.

Once we get past that though, I'm wondering if the U.S. shouldn't side with the Taliban against Karzai and Al Qaeda (with whom the Taliban don't have the best of relations, and who seem to traffic heroin with far more gusto than the Taliban).

This is not just speculation, even when you stick with unclassified materials. In September 2007, The Kabul Weekly, an independent newspaper, ran a blunt editorial laying out the issue: "It is obvious that the Afghan government is more than kind to poppy growers.... [It] opposes the American proposal for political reasons. The administration believes that it will lose popularity in the southern provinces where the majority of opium is cultivated. They're afraid of losing votes. More than 95 percent of the residents of ... the poppy growing provinces — voted for President Karzai." The editorial recommended aerial eradication. That same week, the first vice president of Afghanistan, Ahmad Zia Massoud, wrote a scathing op-ed article in The Sunday Telegraph in London: "Millions of pounds have been committed in provinces including Helmand Province for irrigation projects and road building to help farmers get their produce to market. But for now this has simply made it easier for them to grow and transport opium.... Deep-rooted corruption ... exists in our state institutions." The Afghan vice president concluded, "We must switch from ground-based eradication to aerial spraying."

The trouble is, the corruption isn't just in Kabul -- nor is the rest of it found in Washington. It goes to London, Islamabad, Dubai and many other places in the world, as well.

(Of course, in some of these places, it isn't really "corruption" -- it's just how they do business.)

Stay tuned to Stop Islamic Conquest as The Sword of Allah continues!

The Sword of Allah, Part 4

We continue from Part 3 reviewing Is Afghanistan a Narco-State?:

In July 2007, I briefed President Karzai on the drive for a new strategy. He was interested in the new incentives that we were developing, but became sullen and unresponsive when I discussed the need to balance those incentives with new disincentives — including arrests of high-level traffickers and eradication of poppy fields in the wealthier areas of the Pashtun south, where Karzai had his roots and power base.

Karzai himself may or may not be a narcotrafficker.

But, if there is pressure to end narcotics production and trafficking, that will impact immediately and severely on Karzai's powerbase -- and might that spark a new Afghan civil war, a free-for-all as various factions square off to preserve their slices of the heroin pie?

The opiate trade isn't the only pie up for grabs, either.

We also tried to let the public know about the changing dynamics of the trade. Unfortunately, most media outlets clung to the myth that the problem was out of control all over the country, that only desperate farmers grew poppies and that any serious law-enforcement effort would drive them into the hands of the Taliban. The "starving farmer" was a convenient myth. It allowed some European governments to avoid involvement with the antidrug effort. Many of these countries had only one- or two-year legislative mandates to be in Afghanistan, so they wanted to avoid any uptick in violence that would most likely result from an aggressive strategy, even if the strategy would result in long-term success. The myth gave military officers a reason to stay out of the drug war, while prominent Democrats used the myth to attack Bush administration policies. And the Taliban loved it because their propaganda campaign consisted of trotting out farmers whose fields had been eradicated and having them say that they were going to starve.

An odd cabal of timorous Europeans, myopic media outlets, corrupt Afghans, blinkered Pentagon officers, politically motivated Democrats and the Taliban were preventing the implementation of an effective counterdrug program. And the rest of us could not turn them around.

Not committed to victory, committed to doing their time and getting out -- doesn't that remind me of another counterinsurgency we fought?

Nonetheless, we stayed hopeful as we worked on what became the U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy for Afghanistan. The Defense Department was initially cooperative (as I testified to Congress). We agreed to expand the local meetings and education campaign that worked well in the north. Afghan religious leaders would issue anti-poppy statements, focusing on the anti-Islamic nature of drugs and the increasing addiction rate in Afghanistan. In the area of agricultural incentives, since most farmers already had an alternative crop, we agreed to improve access to markets not only in Afghanistan but also in Pakistan and the wider region. USAid would establish more cold-storage facilities, build roads and establish buying cooperatives that could guarantee prices for legal crops. With the British, we developed an initiative to reward provinces that became poppy-free or reduced their poppy crop by a specified amount. Governors who performed well would get development projects: schools, bridges and hospitals.

But there had to be disincentives too. We agreed to provide security for manual poppy eradication, so that we could show the Afghan people that the more-powerful farmers were vulnerable. We focused on achieving better ground-based eradication, but reintroduced the possibility of aerial eradication. We agreed to increase D.E.A. training of counternarcotics police and establish special investigative units to gather physical and documentary evidence against corrupt Afghan officials. And we developed policies that would increase the Afghan capacity to prosecute traffickers.

We might try some of that in D.C.

Adding to the wave of optimism was the arrival of William Wood as the new U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan. He had been ambassador in Colombia, so he understood drugs and insurgency well. His view was that poppy cultivation was illegal in Afghanistan, so he didn't really care whether the farmers were poor or rich. "We have a lot of poor people in the drug trade in the U.S.A. — people mixing meth in their trailers in rural areas and people selling crack in the inner cities — and we put them in jail," he said.

What an unenlightened viewpoint! (Gasp!)

At first Wood advocated — in an unclassified e-mail message, surprisingly — a massive aerial-eradication program that would wipe out 80,000 hectares of poppies in Helmand Province, delivering a fatal blow to the root of the narcotics problem. "If there is no poppy, there is nothing to traffic," Wood said. The plan looked good on paper, but we knew it would be impossible to sell to Karzai and the Pentagon. Wood eventually agreed to language advocating, at a minimum, force-protected ground-based eradication with the possibility of limited aerial eradication.

Another ally for a more aggressive approach to the problem was David Kilcullen, a blunt counterterrorism expert. He became increasingly concerned about the drug money flowing to the Taliban. He noted that, while Afghans often shift alliances, what remains constant is their respect for strength and consistency. He recommended mobile courts that had the authority to execute drug kingpins in their own provinces. (You could have heard a pin drop when he first made that suggestion at a large meeting of diplomats.) In support of aerial eradication, Kilcullen pointed out that, with manual eradication you have to "fight your way in and fight your way out" of the poppy fields, making it deadly, inefficient and subject to corrupt bargaining. Aerial eradication, by contrast, is quick, fair and efficient. "If we are already bombing Taliban positions, why won't we spray their fields with a harmless herbicide and cut off their money?" Kilcullen asked.

The problem is, it isn't just the Taliban's money that would be cut off. From Cracking the Case: An Interview With Sibel Edmonds by Scott Horton, August 22, 2005:

SH: And as you pointed [out], some of this information has been confirmed in the public. I know when you speak about the Iranian informant...

SE: Correct.

SH: ...who warned in April of 2001 -- that was even confirmed by Mueller, the director of the FBI.

SE: Absolutely there was actually an article in the Chicago Tribune in July 2004 saying that even Mueller expressed surprise that during the hearings, the commissioners didn't ask about this. And guess what, nobody reported all these omissions. What would happen if you hit them with 20 cases? And I'm talking about 20 affidavits from experts and veteran agents.

SH: This is all about the question of prior knowledge and who knew what, when before the attack.

SE: And also what happened afterward. I started working three days after Sept. 11 with a lot of documents and wiretaps that I was translating. Some of them dated back to 1997, 1998. Even after Sept. 11, covering up these investigations and not pursuing some of these investigations because the Department of State says, "You know what, you can't pursue this because that may deal with this particular country. If this country that the investigation deals with are not one of the Axis of Evil, we don't want to pursue them." The American people have the right to know this. They are giving this grand illusion that there are some investigations, but there are none. You know, they are coming down on these charities as the finance of al-Qaeda. Well, if you were to talk about the financing of al-Qaeda, a very small percentage comes from these charity foundations. The vast majority of their financing comes from narcotics. Look, we had 4 to 6 percent of the narcotics coming from the East, coming from Pakistan, coming from Afghanistan via the Balkans to the United States. Today, three or four years after Sept. 11, that has reached over 15 percent. How is it getting here? Who are getting the proceedings from those big narcotics?

Who, indeed? It isn't all going back to these farmers, or even to the Taliban, or even to people in some part of Asia.

Once again quoting a key passage from Former FBI Translator Sibel Edmonds Calls Current 9/11 Investigation Inadequate by Jim Hogue, May 07, 2004:

JH: Here's a question that you might be able to answer: What is al-Qaeda?

SE: This is a very interesting and complex question. When you think of al-Qaeda, you are not thinking of al-Qaeda in terms of one particular country, or one particular organization. You are looking at this massive movement that stretches to tens and tens of countries. And it involves a lot of sub-organizations and sub-sub-organizations and branches and it's extremely complicated. So to just narrow it down and say al-Qaeda and the Saudis, or to say it's what they had at the camp in Afghanistan, is extremely misleading. And we don't hear the extent of the penetration that this organization and the sub-organizations have throughout the world, throughout their networks and throughout their various activities. It's extremely sophisticated. And then you involve a significant amount of money into this equation. Then things start getting a lot of overlap -- money laundering, and drugs and terrorist activities and their support networks converging in several points. That's what I'm trying to convey without being too specific. And this money travels. And you start trying to go to the root of it and it's getting into somebody's political campaign, and somebody's lobbying. And people don't want to be traced back to this money.

Eradicate poppies in Afghanistan, and bigwigs in America lose money, elections and power.

Returning to Is Afghanistan a Narco-State?:

So it appeared that things were moving nicely. We were going to increase incentives to farmers and politicians while also increasing the disincentives with aggressive eradication and arrest of criminal officials and leading traffickers. The Pentagon seemed on board.

Of course, you know that wasn't going to last.

Stay tuned to Stop Islamic Conquest as The Sword of Allah continues!

The Sword of Allah, Part 2

We pick up where we left off at the end of Part 1 reviewing Is Afghanistan a Narco-State?:

The United States Agency for International Development (USAid) was also under fire — particularly from Congress — for not providing better alternative crops for farmers. USAid had distributed seed and fertilizer to most of Afghanistan, but more comprehensive agricultural programs were slow to start in parts of the country. The USAid officers in Kabul were competent and committed, but they had already lost several workers to insurgent attacks, and were understandably reluctant to go into Taliban territory to implement their programs.

The Department of Justice had just completed an effort to open the Afghan anti-narcotics court, so capacity to prosecute was initially low. Justice in Afghanistan was administered unevenly by tribes, religious leaders and poorly paid, highly corruptible judges. In the rare cases in which drug traffickers were convicted, they often walked in the front door of a prison, paid a bribe and walked out the back door. We received dozens of reports to this effect.

And then there was the problem of the Afghan National Police. The Pentagon frequently proclaimed that the Afghan National Army (which the Pentagon trained) was performing wonderfully, but that the police (trained mainly by the Germans and the State Department) were not. A respected American general in Afghanistan, however, confided to me that the army was not doing well, either; that the original plan for training the army was flimsy and underfinanced; and that, consequently, they were using police to fill holes in the army mission. Thrust into a military role, unprepared police lost their lives trying to hold territory in dangerous areas.

There was no coherent strategy to resolve these issues among the U.S. agencies and the Afghan government. When I asked career officers at the State Department for the interagency strategy for Afghan counternarcotics, they produced the same charts I used to brief the cabinet in Washington months before. "There is no written strategy," they confessed.

That passage says a lot.

In that kind of a chaotic situation, the only Afghans who are going to thrive are the narcotraffickers -- at least they are both motivated and organized.

As big as these challenges were, there were even bigger ones. A lot of intelligence — much of it unclassified and possible to discuss here — indicated that senior Afghan officials were deeply involved in the narcotics trade. Narco-traffickers were buying off hundreds of police chiefs, judges and other officials. Narco-corruption went to the top of the Afghan government. The attorney general, Abdul Jabbar Sabit, a fiery Pashtun who had begun a self-described "jihad against corruption," told me and other American officials that he had a list of more than 20 senior Afghan officials who were deeply corrupt — some tied to the narcotics trade. He added that President Karzai — also a Pashtun — had directed him, for political reasons, not to prosecute any of these people. (On July 16 of this year, Karzai dismissed Sabit after Sabit announced his candidacy for president. Karzai's office said Sabit's candidacy violated laws against political activity by officials. Sabit told a press conference that Karzai "has never been able to tolerate rivals.")

An Afghan government official begins "jihad against corruption" and gets trumped by Karzai.

Is this not reminiscent of what Sibel Edmonds said in 'The Stakes Are Too High for Us to Stop Fighting Now' An interview with FBI whistleblower Sibel Edmonds by Christopher Deliso, August 15, 2005?

SE: In some cases where the FBI stumbles upon evidence of high-level officials being involved in drug-smuggling, they're even prevented from sharing it with the DEA [Drug Enforcement Agency]. The Department of State just comes in and says, "Leave it."

You know, it's funny, after 9/11, the common criticism was that there was "no information-sharing" between the FBI, CIA, and the like, and this is why the terrorists pulled it off -- as if we didn't want to cooperate. No information-sharing? That's the biggest BS I ever heard!

Returning to Is Afghanistan a Narco-State?:

A nearly equal challenge in 2006 was the lack of resolve in the international community. Although Britain's foreign office strongly backed antinarcotics efforts (with the exception of aerial eradication), the British military were even more hostile to the antidrug mission than the U.S. military. British forces — centered in Helmand — actually issued leaflets and bought radio advertisements telling the local criminals that the British military was not part of the anti-poppy effort. I had to fly to Brussels and show one of these leaflets to the supreme allied commander in Europe, who oversees Afghan operations for NATO, to have this counterproductive information campaign stopped. It was a small victory; the truth was that many of our allies in the International Security Assistance Force were lukewarm on antidrug operations, and most were openly hostile to aerial eradication.

Nonetheless, throughout 2006 and into 2007 there were positive developments (although the Pentagon did not supply the helicopters to the D.E.A. until early 2008). The D.E.A. was training special Afghan narcotics units, while the Pentagon began to train Afghan pilots for drug operations. We put together educational teams that convened effective antidrug meetings in the more stable northern provinces. We used manual eradication to eliminate about 10 percent of the crop. In some provinces with little insurgent activity, the eradication numbers reached the 20 percent threshold — a level that drug experts see as a tipping point in eradication — and poppy cultivation all but disappeared in those areas by 2007. And the Department of Justice got the counternarcotics tribunal to process hundreds of midlevel cases.

By late 2006, however, we had startling new information: despite some successes, poppy cultivation over all would grow by about 17 percent in 2007 and would be increasingly concentrated in the south of the country, where the insurgency was the strongest and the farmers were the wealthiest. The poorest farmers of Afghanistan — those who lived in the north, east and center of the country — were taking advantage of antidrug programs and turning away from poppy cultivation in large numbers. The south was going in the opposite direction, and the Taliban were now financing the insurgency there with drug money — just as Patterson predicted.

In late January 2007, there was an urgent U.S. cabinet meeting to discuss the situation. The attendees agreed that the deputy secretary of state John Negroponte and John Walters, the drug czar, would oversee the development of the first interagency counternarcotics strategy for Afghanistan. They asked me to coordinate the effort, and, after Patterson’s intervention, I was promoted to ambassadorial rank. We began the effort with a briefing for Negroponte, Walters, Attorney General Alberto Gonzales and several senior Pentagon officials. We displayed a map showing how poppy cultivation was becoming limited to the south, more associated with the insurgency and disassociated from poverty. The Pentagon chafed at the briefing because it reflected a new reality: narcotics were becoming less a problem of humanitarian assistance and more a problem of insurgency and war.

Negroponte -- doesn't he have a background working in a counterinsurgent/counternarcotics environment?

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime was arriving at the same conclusion. Later that year, they issued a report linking the drug trade to the insurgency and made a controversial statement: "Opium cultivation in Afghanistan is no longer associated with poverty — quite the opposite." The office convincingly demonstrated that poor farmers were abandoning the crop and that poppy growth was largely confined to some of the wealthiest parts of Afghanistan. The report recommended that eradication efforts be pursued "more honestly and more vigorously," along with stronger anticorruption measures. Earlier this year, the U.N. published an even more detailed paper titled "Is Poverty Driving the Afghan Opium Boom?" It rejected the idea that farmers would starve without the poppy, concluding that "poverty does not appear to have been the main driving factor in the expansion of opium poppy cultivation in recent years."

The U.N. reports shattered the myth that poppies are grown by destitute farmers who have no other source of income. They demonstrated that approximately 80 percent of the land under poppy cultivation in the south had been planted with it only in the last two years. It was not a matter of "tradition," and these farmers did not need an alternative livelihood. They had abandoned their previous livelihoods — mainly vegetables, cotton and wheat (which was in severely short supply) — to take advantage of the security vacuum to grow a more profitable crop: opium.

The relatively rich farmers began to grow poppies to make more money -- and the business was supporting our enemy.

Heroin -- the sword of Allah!

Stay tuned to Stop Islamic Conquest as the series continues!

Genesis, Part 32

We pick up where we left off at the end of Part 31, reviewing a May 13, 1996, cable from the US Embassy in Moscow to the US Secretary of State's office addressing a discussion between Assistant Secretary of State Raphel and Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Chernyshev:

---------------------------------
CHERNYSHEV FAILS TO TAKE THE BAIT
---------------------------------

8. (C) CHERNYSHEV BLANDLY OBSERVED THAT RUSSIA CONTINUES TO SUPPORT THE UN MISSION AND STANDS READY TO COORDINATE WITH US TO ENHANCE THE MISSION'S EFFECTIVENESS. [redacted] NOTION THAT MEST [redacted] REGARDING AN ARMS EMBARGO, CHERNYSHEV ASSERTED THAT RUSSIA FAVORS A SYSTEM TO CONTROL THE FLOW OF ARMS TO AFGHANISTAN, BUT ADDED THAT HE DOES NOT YET SEE ANY EFFECTIVE MECHANISM FOR DOING SO. LATER IN THE MEETING, HOWEVER, TRUBNIKOV SPOKE APPROVINGLY OF THE POLITICAL VALUE OF AN ARMS EMBARGO, CALLING IT THE BEST POSSIBLE EVIDENCE THAT THE INTERESTED OUTSIDE POWERS NO LONGER BELIEVE IN A MILITARY SOLUTION.

9. (C) IN HIS OTHER COMMENTS ABOUT THE AFGHAN SITUATION, CHERNYSHEV SIAD THAT

-- THE GOR IS NOT SUPPLYING ARMS TO ANY FACTION

[redacted]

-- RUSSIA TRIES TO MAINTAIN CONTACTS WITH ALL THE MAJOR AFGHAN GROUPS, THOUGH OBVIOUSLY THEIR CONTACTS ARE WEAKEST WITH THE TALIBAN.

-- MOST AFGHAN FACTIONS TELL MOSCOW THAT RUSSIA HAS A USEFUL ROLE TO PLAY IN THEIR COUNTRY. CHERNYSHEV ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT SOME OF THE SAME FACTIONS THEN TURN AROUND AND COMPLAIN ABOUT RUSSIAN IMPERIALISM TO THE IRANIANS AND PAKISTANIS. THERE IS NOTHING UNUSUAL ABOUT SUCH MANIPULATION, HE SAID, AND RUSSIA TAKES IT IN STRIDE.

[redacted]

---------------------
THE KANDAHAR HOSTAGES
---------------------

10. (C) RAPHEL, WHO HAD MET RECENTLY WITH THE RUSSIAN AIR CREW BEING HELD BY THE TALIBAN IN KANDAHAR, DESCRIBED THE HOSTAGES AS REASONABLY FIT AND HEALTHY. SHE PASSED CHERNYSHEV A VIDEO AND SOME PHOTOGRAPHS TAKEN DURING THE MEETING. ALTHOUGH THE TALIBAN SEEM TO FEEL THAT THE SEVEN HOSTAGES ARE SOMEHOW ACCOUNTABLE FOR ALL THE SINS -- PAST AND PRESENT, REAL AND IMAGINED -- OF RUSSIA AND THE USSR AGAINST AFGHANISTAN, RAPHEL SAID THAT THE TALIBAN NEVERTHELESS SEEM TO REALIZE THAT THEY HAVE LOST THE MORAL ARGUMENT FOR CONTINUING TO HOLD THE CREW. THE DETENTION OF THE RUSSIANS CONTINUES, HOWEVER, BECAUSE A) THE TALIBAN HAVE BOXED THEMSELVES IN BY PLACING IMPOSSIBLE DEMANDS ON THEIR RELEASE; AND B) THE TALIBAN SUPPOSEDLY MAKE DECISIONS BY CONSENSUS, BUT HAVE NO MECHANISM FOR DOING SO; THEY THEREFORE CLAIM VAGUELY THAT THE MUST "CONSULT WITH THE PEOPLE" BEFORE RELEASING THE HOSTAGES. [redacted] CONCLUDED BY NOTING THAT THE PAKISTANI INTE[redacted]

What did the Taliban really think they were going to get in exchange for the Russian aircrew?

11. (C) CHERNYSHEV EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY'S READOUT OF THE HOSTAGE SITUATION AND FOR THE U.S. EFFORTS TO FREE THE RUSSIAN AIR CREW.

-------------
CIS ANXIETIES
-------------


12. (C) RELATING HER CONVERSATIONS WITH CENTRAL ASIAN LEADERS, RAPHEL OBSERVED CANDIDLY THAT THERE IS MUCH SUSPICION IN THE REGION ABOUT RUSSIAN MOTIVES AND INTENTIONS. RUSSIA IS NOT KEEN TO ACQUIESCE IN THE REGION'S INDEPENDENCE, SAY THE CENTRAL ASIANS, WHO ADD THAT THEY KNOW PRIMAKOV AND BELIEVE THAT HIS JOB AS FOREIGN MINISTER IS TO RESTORE THE EMPIRE. THE U.S. BELIEVES THAT RUSSIA'S LEGITIMATE INTERESTS IN STABILITY AND SECURE BORDERS ARE NOT INCONSISTENT WITH CENTRAL ASIAN INDEPENDENCE AND SOVEREIGNTY, SAID RAPHEL. THE U.S. HAS NO OBJECTION TO CIS INTEGRATION, SHE CONCLUDED, AS LONG AS IT IS VOLUNTARY AND DOES NOT COMPROMISE SOVEREIGNTY OR CREATE BARRIERS TO POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH COUNTRIES OUTSIDE THE CIS. RAPHEL'S RUSSIAN INTERLOCUTORS DID NOT COMMENT ON HER REMARKS. (COMMENT: MANY -- THOUGH NOT ALL -- RUSSIANS RECOGNIZE THE IMAGE PROBLEM THEY HAVE IN THE "NEAR ABROAD," BUT IT STILL IRKS THEM TO HEAR ABOUT IT. END COMMENT.)

----------
TAJIKISTAN
----------

13. (C) UNDERSCORING THAT THE TAJIK CEASEFIRE EXPIRES MAY 26, CHERNYSHEV EXPRESSED DISMAY AT THE DEALY IN RESUMING THE INTER-TAJIK PEACE TALKS. NEITHER SIDE SEEMS IN ANY HURRY TO RESUME THE NEGOTIATIONS, HE SAID, [extensively redacted] OF THE TAJOPP INTO THE POLITICAL LIFE OF THE [redacted] A/S RAPHEL COMMENTED THAT THE U.S. SHARES RUSSIA'S DESIRE TO GET THE CEASEFIRE EXTENDED AND THE TALKS RECONVENED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

It is important to consider Moscow's perspective: some of this unrest had spread into Tajikistan, and Russian troops were there assisting the Tajik government with the security situation.

------------------------------------
INDIA: KASHMIRE AND NUCLEAR TESTING
------------------------------------

14. (C) THE MEETING CLOSED WITH A DISCUSSION OF OTHER SOUTH ASIAN TOPICS, PRINCIPALLY RELATED TO INDIA. THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY EXPRESSED HER SENSE THAT THE INDIAN COUNTERINSURGENCY CAMPAIGN IN KASHMIR IS WORKING, GIVING NEW DEHLI A WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE SOME POSITIVE POLITICAL MOVES TOWARD THE KASHMIRIS AFTER THE INDIAN ELECTIONS. [extensively redacted]

-------
COMMENT
-------

[redacted]

18. (U) THIS MESSAGE HAS BEEN CLEARED BY A/S RAPHEL.

PICKERING

ADMIN
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL

Genesis, Part 31

We continue reviewing declassified State Department cables addressing the rise of the Taliban. This is a May 13, 1996, cable from the US Embassy in Moscow to the US Secretary of State's office, and addresses a discussion between Assistant Secretary of State Raphel and Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Chernyshev. Abbreviations used in this cable include GOR for Government of Russia, and USG for United States Government.



This cable was extensively redacted for release.

SUBJECT: A/S RAPHEL CONSULTATIONS WITH DEPUTY FM CHENYSHEV

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY JOHN ORDWAY, A/DCM. REASON: 1.5 (B) AND (D).

2. (C) SUMMARY. DURING A/S RAPHEL'S CONSULTATIONS ON AFGHANISTAN, RUSSIAN OFFICIALS DECLINED TO ENGAGE ON THE ISSUE OF RE-ENERGIZING THE UN MISSION, AND PARTICULARLY ON THE WIDESPREAD VIEW IN THE REGION THAT MISSION HEAD MESTIRI SHOULD BE REPLACED. THEY SHOWED VARYING DEGREES OF ENTHUSIASM FOR THE IDEA OF AN ARMS EMBARGO. THE RUSSIANS EXPRESSED A) GRATITUDE FOR U.S. EFFORTS TO FREE THEIR HOSTAGES IN KANDAHAR; B) HOPE FOR A QUICK RESUMPTION OF THE INTER-TAJIK TALKS; AND C) DETERMINATION TO PRESS INDIA TO SIGN THE CTBT. END SUMMARY.

3. (U) DEPUTY FM ALBERT CHENYSHEV HOSTED VISITING SA A/S ROBIN RAPHEL APRIL 30 FOR TALKS DEVOTED MOSTLY TO AFGHANISTAN. CHERNYSHEV WAS JOINED BY KONSTANTIN SHUVALOV, ACTING DIRECTOR OF THE THIRD ASIA DEPARTMENT, AND VYACHESLAV TRUBNIKOV, DIRECTOR FO THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. EMBASSY MOSCOW POLMINCOUNS, COUNSELOR FOR REGIONAL AFFAIRS, POL/EXT CHIEF AND POLOFF (NOTETAKER) ACCOMPANIED THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY.

-----------------------------------
THE U.S. PERSPECTIVE ON AFGHANISTAN
-----------------------------------

4. (C) A/S RAPHEL BEGAN THE READOUT OF HER TRIP THROUGH PAKISTAN, AFGHANISTAN, AND CENTRAL ASIA BY OBSERVING THAT THERE IS A GROWING INTEREST IN WASHINGTON IN RESOLVING THE AFGHAN CONFLICT. IN ADDITION TO OUR TRADITIONAL CONCERNS -- RESTORING REGIONAL POLITICAL STABILITY, INTERDICTING NARCOTICS, AND RELIEVING HUMAN SUFFERING -- THE USG NOW HOPES THAT PEACE IN THE REGION WILL FACILITATE U.S. BUSINESS INTERESTS LIKE THE PROPOSED UNOCAL GAS PIPELINE FROM TURKMENISTAN THROUGH AFGHANISTAN TO PAKISTAN.

A proposed gas pipeline through Afghanistan -- this would have benefitted not just U.S. business interests, but Pakistan as well. This is in addition to Pakistani interests in opening up a trade route through Afghanistan to Central Asia; and, this trade route would have had U.S. support, as well, if for no other reason to help steer the economic benefit away from rival Iran.

5. (C) THE CURRENT SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN IS FLUID, CONTINUED RAPHEL, WITH A MILITARY STALEMATE ACCOMPANIED BY LIVELY CONTACTS AMONG THE FACTIONS. MOREOVER, SOME OF THE OUTSIDE PARTIES WHO HAVE BEEN MANIPULATING THE FACTIONS (AND HAVE THEMSELVES BEEN MANIPULATED BY THE AFGHANS) ARE TIRING OF THE GAME. [redacted] EMPHASIZING THAT THE U.S DOES NOT BACK ANY FACTION, SHE HOPED THE RUSSIANS UNDERSTAND THAT RUMORS OF U.S. SUPPORT FOR THE TALIBAN WERE AN IRANIAN CANARD.

Were they?

Recall from Part 21 how we saw that Russia had "more than one Afghan policy." We then speculated how and why that might have also been the case for the United States.

Consequently, concerns that the US might have been supporting the Taliban may have been well-founded, even though A/S Raphel might not have had any knowledge of any Americans involved in supporting them.

Was this covert U.S. policy? Was this the activity of rogue elements in the U.S. government, allied with U.S. business interests?

In this context, it is interesting to consider some of what Sibel Edmonds saw, which dates back almost to the time under consideration in this message; from The Highjacking of a Nation, Part 2: The Auctioning of Former Statesmen & Dime a Dozen Generals by Sibel Edmonds, November 29, 2006:

The foreign influence, the lobbyists, the current highly positioned civil servants who are determined future 'wanna be' lobbyists, and the fat cats of the Military Industrial Complex, operate successfully under the radar, with unlimited reach and power, with no scrutiny, while selling your interests, benefiting from your tax money, and serving the highest bidders regardless of what or who they may be. This deep state seems to operate at all levels of our government; from the President's office to Congress, from the military quarters to the civil servants' offices.

Returning now to our May 13, 1996, cable:

6. (C) THERE ARE AT LEAST TWO TRACKS TO PURSUE IN WORKING TO RESOLVE THE AFGHAN CONFLICT, RAPHEL CONCLUDED: INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL. ON THE INTERNAL SIDE, A RE-ENERGIZED UN MISSION NEEDS TO PUSH THE FACTIONS TO CUT A DEAL. [redacted] THIS SENTIMENT IS SO PERVASIVE THAT IT IS BECOMING DIFFICULT TO IGNORE.

7. (C) ON THE EXTERNAL SIDE, SAID RAPHEL, OUTSIDE POWERS MUST RECOGNIZE THAT A BROADLY-BASED AFGHAN GOVERNMENT THAT IS NOT UNFRIENDLY TO THEIR INTERESTS WOULD BE AN ACCEPTABLE ALTERNATIVE TO THE INCREASINGLY UNLIKELY OPTION OF HAVING THEIR FAVORED FACTION EMERGE COMPLETELY TRIUMPHANT. A LOGICAL MANIFESTATION OF THIS RECOGNITION, SHE ASSERTED, WOULD BE THE IMPOSITION OF AN ARMS EMBARGO ON ALL THE AFGHAN FACTIONS, AS UZBEKISTAN AND OTHERS ARE SEEKING. THE U.S., SHE CONCLUDED, WOULD BE ACTIVELY EXPLORING THIS IDEA IN THE COMING MONTHS.

And an Afghan government, with extensive support from Afghanistan's many Pashtuns and with extensive support from across the border in Pakistan, "not unfriendly" to U.S. interests, is what was being cooked up; and that government, the Taliban, was about to seize Kabul.

Continued in Part 32.

Genesis, Part 30

We continue from Part 29 reviewing an April 22, 1996, cable from the US Embassy in Islamabad to the US Secretary of State's office, which addresses a discussion between Assistant Secretary of State Raphel and Pakistani officials about Afghanistan policy. Again, the acronym GOP here means Government of Pakistan, while GOR means Government of Russia.

KABUL GOVERNMENT: SELF-RIGHTEOUSNESS MASKS DEEP INSECURITY
-----------------------------------------------------------

7. (C) THE KABUL GOVERNMENT'S DIALOGUE WITH A/S RAPHEL EMPHASIZED RABBANI AND MASOOD'S PERCEPTION OF THEMSELVES AS THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT OF AFGHANISTAN. THEY BLAMED PAKISTAN AND THE TALIBAN FOR ALMOST ALL OF THEIR PROBLEMS, WITH LAFRAIE AND MASOOD GOING SO FAR AS TO ALLEGE THAT "PAKISTAN IS AS MUCH TO BLAME FOR THE DESTRUCTION IN AFGHANISTAN AS THE SOVIETS;" A PERCEPTION WITH WHICH A/S RAPHEL STRONGLY TOOK ISSUE. A PRE-OCCUPATION WITH FIXING THE BLAME (ON THE TALIBAN AND PAKISTAN), RATHER THAN FIXING THE PROBLEM OF AFGHANISTAN, WAS A RECURRING THEME IN DISCUSSIONS WITH LAFRAIE, MASOOD AND RABBANI. LAFRAIE, IN PARTICULAR, TOOK A HARD-LINE, SUGGESTING THAT IT WAS FOR THOSE OPPOSED TO THE GOVERNMENT TO MAKE PEACE OVERTURES; MASOOD OBSERVED THAT "WE ARE READY TO TALK TO ANYBODY AND HAVE SAID WE ARE PREPARED TO TRANSFER POWER, THAT IS ALL WE NEED TO DO."

That allegation about the extent of Pakistan's involvement in Afghanistan is actually not too far off the mark. From the beginning of the jihad, some elements in Pakistan wanted to spread Islamic revolution throughout Central Asia, just as the Soviets had been determined that Communism, if it could not be spread, would at least not retreat.

8. (C) SELF-RIGHTEOUSNESS WAS THE FIRST REACTION OF ALL OF THE KABUL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS. LAFRAIE SAID AN ARMS EMBARGO WAS A GOOD IDEA, BUT INSISTED THAT "THE GOVERNMENT'S LEGITIMATE RIGHT" TO IMPORT WEAPONS SHOULD NOT BE AT ISSUE; RABBANI INDICATED THAT HE WOULD NOT LET AFGHANISTAN BECOME "ANOTHER BOSNIA." RABBANI SAID A TRANS-AFGHAN PIPELINE WAS A GOOD IDEA, AS LONG AS IT BENEFITTED AND STRENGTHENED THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT RATHER THAN ANY OTHER GROUP. WHEN ASKED HYPOTHETICALLY IF HE WOULD BE WILLING TO ATTEND AN ALL-PARTY PEACE CONFERENCE IN JALALABAD IF THE PRECONDITION FOR UNIVERSAL PARTICIPATION WAS THAT RABBANI NOT GO AS PRESIDENT BUT AS LEADER OF JAMIAT, HE RESPONDED BY NOTING THAT SUCH A CONDITION WOULD BRING INTO QUESTION THE SINCERITY OF THE OTHER PARTICIPANTS AND WOULD NOT BE IN THE INTEREST OF PEACE. SIMILARLY, WHEN ASKED WHAT CONCESSIONS COULD BE MADE TO THE TALIBAN AND DOSTAM FOR THEIR FUTURE ROLE IN AFGHAN SOCIETY, MASOOD SAID BOTH COULD FORM POLITICAL PARTIES TO CONTEST OPEN ELECTIONS AGAINST "THE GOVERNMENT." AS FOR A NEUTRAL SECURITY FORCE OR A NATIONAL ARMY, MASOOD ALLOWED THAT OTHER GROUPS WOULD BE WELCOME TO PARTICIPATE IN SUCH A FORCE, BUT WARNED THAT "THE GOVERNMENT" WOULD NOT TOLERATE "ILLEGITIMATE FACTIONS" RULING THEIR AREAS BY FORCE OF ARMS.

Of course, "'illegitimate factions' ruling their areas by force of arms" was the problem that prompted the rise of the Taliban to begin with.

9. (C) YET IF THE KABUL GOVERNMENT'S INITIAL IMPULSE ON ALMOST ALL QUESTIONS WAS TO STAND ON ITS (HIGHLY QUESTIONABLE) SOVEREIGNTY AND LEGITIMACY, CONCERTED PROBING REVEALED BOTH DEEP INSECURITY AND A WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER A WIDER RANGE OF OPTIONS. INSECURITY WAS CLEAR IN MASOOD AND RABBANI'S STRONG CRITICISM OF DOSTAM'S VISIT TO THE U.S., WHICH THEY SAID "GAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT WRONG-DOERS WOULD BE REWARDED BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY FOR THEIR INCORRECT ACTIONS." BUT ON A MORE POSITIVE NOTE, RABBANI (AFTER A LENGTHY DIATRIBE AGAINST THE EVILS PERPETRATED AGAINST KABUL BY ISLAMABAD) AGREED ULTIMATELY TO SEND A DELEGATION TO PAKISTAN IF THE GOP FIRST ISSUED A FORMAL INVITATION. SIMILARLY, RABBANI AND MASOOD SAID THEY WANTED TO TALK TO THE TALIBAN AND WOULD BE WILLING TO DISCUSS THE ISSUE OF A TRANSFER OF POWER IN THE CONTEXT OF AN INTER-AFGHAN DIALOGUE. AFGHANISTAN NEEDE A STRONGER U.N. MISSION AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO HELP BUILD TOWARDS A TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT WHICH WOULD DRAFT A CONSTITUTIN AND THEN HOLD ELECTIONS, RABBANI STATED. MASOOD OUTLINED A VISION FOR A BOTTOM-UP DEMOCRACY IN WHICH LOCAL, DISTRICT AND PROVINCIAL SHURAS WOULD CREATE THE STRUCTURE FOR A NATIONAL GOVERNMENT.

Of course, "wrong-doers" will "be rewarded by the international community for their incorrect actions" -- and we have demonstrated that in Bosnia and especially in Kosovo.

10. (C) MISSING FROM THE KABUL GOVERNMENT'S APPROACH WAS A SENSE OF HOW TO GET FROM THE CURRENT STALEMATE TO THE ROSY, DEMOCRATIC FUTURE BOTH RABBANI AND MASOOD ENVISIONED. MASOOD SAID HE THOUGHT A JALALABAD CONFERENCE PROBABLY WOULD BE USEFUL ONLY IN GIVING THE "MINOR FACTIONS" OF GAILANI, MOJADDEDI, NABI MOHAMMEDI AND KHALIS THE OPPORTUNITY TO SIGN-ON WITH THE GOVERNMENT. KABUL-SCC DISCUSSIONS WERE SEPARATE FROM THE JALALABAD MOOT, MASOOD NOTED, AND THE DIFFICULTY FACING PROGRESS WITH THE TALIBAN AND DOSTAM WAS THEIR "ARROGANCE AND PURSUIT OF THEIR OWN INTERESTS AT THE EXPENSE OF AFGHANISTAN." IT WAS THE LATTER FACTOR, MASOOD ADDED, WHICH MADE THE KABUL GOVERNMENT RELUCTANT TO ACCEPT THE IDEA OF FEDERALISM, WHICH WOULD ONLY DIVIDE -- OR OBLITERATE -- THE NATION OF AFGHANISTAN.

Actually, some form of federalism is likely the only thing that can keep Afghanistan (and, ultimately, Pakistan) together -- the only thing, that is, short of totalitarianism with a healthy dose of genocide.

11. (C) ON BILATERAL CONCERNS, THE KABUL GOVERNMENT WAS WILLING TO BE COOPERATIVE. ALTHOUGH DESIROUS OF U.S. SUPPORT, BOTH POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC, RABBANI AND MASOOD ACCEPTED THAT THE U.S. WAS A NEUTRAL PLAYER; ALTHOUGH BOTH THOUGHT WASHINGTON SHOULD LEAN MORE ON PAKISTAN TO STOP ITS AID TO THE TALIBAN. RABBANI AGREED TO COOPERATE ON COUNTER-NARCOTICS ISSUES, AND WHILE DENYING KABUL GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT IN TERRORISM, DID ADMIT THAT "AREAS OUTSIDE THE CONTROL" OF THE KABUL AUTHORITIES MAY BE BEING USED BY TERRORIST ELEMENTS. SAYYAF MAY HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN TERRORIST ACTIVITIES IN THE PAST, RABBANI STATED, BUT NO LONGER HAD THE FUNDS TO SUPPORT SUCH ACTIVITIES.

THE TALIBAN: IMAGE CONSCIOUS BUT RELUCTANT TO CHANGE
-----------------------------------------------------

12. (C) TALIBAN LEADERS ASKED A/S RAPHEL TO HELP IMPROVE THEIR IMAGE IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. THEY DENIED BEING HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATORS AND CLAIMED TO HAVE OPENED MANY MORE SCHOOLS IN THE AREA UNDER THEIR CONTROL THAN HAD EXISTED PREVIOUSLY. DIFFERENCES OF CULTURE LAY AT THE HEART OF MUCH OF THE MISUNDERSTANDING, THEY ALLEGED; "IN FRANCE YOU CANNOT WEAR THE VEIL, BY LAW, AND HERE WOMEN HAVE TO, BY LAW" MAULAVI MOTAQI COMMENTED. THE TALIBAN CLAIMED IRAN AND RUSSIA ACCUSED THEM OF BEING TERRORISTS. ON THE CONTRARY, THEY NOTED, THE TALIBAN HAD WITHIN TWO YEARS BROUGHT PEACE AND SECURITY TO HALF OF AFGHANISTAN; SOON THE WHOLE COUNTRY WOULD BE SAFE AND AT PEACE, GOD WILLING.

13. (C) CONTRADICTIONS ABOUNDED IN THE TALIBAN DISCOURSE. RABBANI WAS A LIAR WHO ATTACKED WHEN HE PROMISED TO TALK, THEY SAID -- BUT THE TALIBAN ENCOURAGED THE U.N. MISSION TO CONTINUED ITS EFFORTS TO DEVELOP AN ACCEPTABLE PEACE PLAN TO WHICH "EVERYONE SHOULD AGREE. IF THE U.N. FAILS, THEN WE HAVE FAILED," MOTAQI INTONED. THE TALIBAN CLAIMED TO DESIRE PEACE, BUT DID NOT RULE OUT FIGHTING IF THAT WAS WHAT WAS NECESSARY TO DISARM TO THE KABUL REGIME. WHEN A/S RAPHEL MADE A FULL-COURT PRESS FOR THE RELEASE OF THE DETAINED RUSSIAN AIRCREW, EVEN OFFERING TO FLY THEM OUT VIA DAO C-12 ON THE SPOT AND NOTING PRESIDENT CLINTON'S LETTER REPLYING TO THE MISSIVE SENT BY THE WIVES OF THE CREW, MOTAQI RAILED AGAINST RUSSIAN AND IRANIAN INTERFERENCE AND DEMANDED TO KNOW WHY THE U.S. HAD NOT CONDEMNED AND/OR STOPPED THIS FOREIGN INTERVENTION. HOLDING THE RUSSIAN AIRCREW WAS NECESSARY BECAUSE OF THE INTENSE ENMITY OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE AGAINST RUSSIA AND AS PROOF OF MOSCOW'S INTERFERENCE, THE TALIBAN SAID. YET LATER IN THE CONVERSATION, WHEN A/S RAPHEL EXPLAINED THAT THE U.S. VIEW THAT THE TALIBAN'S ACTIONS TOWARDS THE PRISONERS WERE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE AND REPREHENSIBLE, MOTAQI SAID THE TALIBAN TREATED THE RUSSIAN AIRCREW AS WELL CARED FOR GUESTS, BUT THEY COULD NOT BE RELEASED UNTIL THE MISSING 60,000 AFGHANS IN THE FORMER SOVIET UNION HAD BEEN ACCOUNTED FOR AND/OR THEIR FAMILIES ACROSS AFGHANISTAN HAD BEEN CONSULTED. (A/S RAPHEL MET WITH THE CREW FOR 15 MINUTES IN THE KANDAHAR GOVERNOR'S COMPOUND AND EXPRESSED TO THEM U.S. CONCERN AND EFFORTS TO SECURE THEIR RELEASE; THEY SEEMED GENERALLY HEALTHY AND WERE APPRECIATIVE OF USG EFFORTS ON THEIR BEHALF. PICTURES OF THE AIRCREW (WHOM THE TALIBAN HAD NOT ALLOWED TO BE PHOTOGRAPHED SINCE NOVEMBER, 1995) WILL BE PROVIDED TO THE GOR FOR DELIVERY TO FAMILY MEMBERS.)

14. (C) THE TALIBAN HAD FEW IDEAS TO PUT FORWARD ON WHAT THE FUTURE GOVERNMENT OF AFGHANISTAN SHOULD BE, OR HOW IT COULD BE ACHIEVED. MOTAQI SAID THE SHAPE OF THE GOVERNMENT WOULD BE "DETERMINED BY THE PEOPLE" ONCE THE NATION WAS DISARMED AND PEACE RESTORED. MOTAQI DID EMBRACE THE IDEA OF AN ARMS EMBARGO, HOWEVER, SAYING THAT THE TALIBAN SUPPORTED THIS PROPOSAL AND INVITED THE U.S TO JUDGE FOR ITSELF THE EVIDENCE ON WHO RECEIVED MORE OUTSIDE HELP: THE TALIBAN OR KABUL. WHEN PRESSED TO ENGAGE IN MEANINGFUL NEGOTIATIONS, MOTAQI REPLIED SIMPLY THAT "WE ARE STUDENTS; WE WILL TAKE YOUR ADVICE TO OUR SHURA AND TRY TO IMPLEMENT IT." HOWEVER, WHILE THE BASIC TALIBAN MESSAGE WAS NAIVE, SIMPLISTIC AND RIGID, THEIR CONCERN ABOUT THEIR IMAGE AND REQUEST THAT A/S RAPHEL "TELL PRESIDENT CLINTON AND THE WEST THAT WE ARE NOT BAD PEOPLE" DEMONSTRATED A GROWING AWARENESS, PREVIOUSLY ABSENT, OF THEIR OWN LIMITATIONS -- WHICH MAY BE THE MODALITY THROUGH WHICH THEY CAN BE COAXED, OVER TIME, TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE.

I just don't see these guys holding fair elections; besides which, power that is achieved via elections and not via the force of arms by Allah's hand is illegitimate to many of the extremists: "determined by the people" indeed!

COMMENT: FLEXIBILITY OF FIGHTING?
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15. (C) A/S RAPHEL'S DISCUSSION TOOK PLACE AGAINST THE BACK-DROP OF GENERAL EXPECTATIONS THAT HEAVY FIGHTING BETWEEN THE KABUL REGIME AND THE TALIBAN WILL BE AN INEVITABLITY THIS SUMMER. YET ALL SIDES GENUINELY APPEAR TO DESIRE A WAY OUT -- AT LEAST IN PART BECAUSE NONE CAN BE CONFIDENT THAT THE FIGHTING WILL GO THEIR WAY. THAT INSECURITY HAS CREATED RENEWED OPPORTUNITIES FOR A REINVIGORATED U.N. MISSION TO MOVE FORWARD -- PARTICULARLY NOW THAT PAKISTAN APPEARS WILLING TO ENGAGE MORE POSITIVELY. AN ARMS EMBARGO (PERHAPS TO BE DISCUSSED VIA AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE), PLUS SUPPORT FOR AN ALL-PARTY AFGHAN CONFERENCE, COULD BE USEFUL TOOLS TO BREAK PAST THE KNEE-JERK, RIGID POSITIONS OF THE AFGHAN FACTIONS AND TO START COALESCING SUPPORT FOR A RESOLUTION TO THE CRISIS THERE. THE BOTTOM-LINE IS THAT THERE STILL APPEARS TO BE REASON FOR A LIMITED OPTIMISM THAT, PROPERLY MANAGED, THERE MAY NOW BE OPPORTUNITIES TO MOVE THE PEACE PROCESS FORWARD. END COMMENT.

SIMONS

ADMIN
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL

Genesis, Part 29

We continue reviewing declassified State Department cables addressing the rise of the Taliban. This is an April 22, 1996, cable from the US Embassy in Islamabad to the US Secretary of State's office, and addresses a discussion between Assistant Secretary of State Raphel and Pakistani officials about Afghanistan policy. The acronym GOP here means Government of Pakistan; GOR means Government of Russia.

SUBJECT: A/S RAPHEL DISCUSSES AFGHANISTAN

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY THOMAS W. SIMONS, JR, AMBASSADOR. REASON: 1.5 (D).

2. (C) SUMMARY: DISCUSSIONS WITH GOP, KABUL GOVERNMENT AND TALIBAN OFFICIALS SUGGEST THE DOOR IS NOT YET CLOSED FOR AN AFGHAN PEACE PROCESS -- BUT IT WILL TAKE HARD WORK TO KEEP IT OPEN, LET ALONE GO THROUGH IT. THE GOP HAS RECOGNIZED THAT ITS SUPPORT FOR THE TALIBAN HAS BACK-FIRED AND IS LOOKING FOR ALTERNATIVES, AND NEITHER THE TALIBAN NOR THE KABUL GOVERNMENT CAN BE SUFFICIENTLY SURE THAT THEY WILL WIN THE EXPECTED NEXT ROUND OF FIGHTING TO RULE OUT COMPLETELY NEGOTIATIONS. NONETHELESS, IT WILL TAKE SKILLFUL MANAGEMENT -- AND A BIT OF LUCK -- TO BREAK THROUGH THE RIGID POSITIONS ESPOUSED BY KABUL AND THE TALIBAN. AN ARMS EMBARGO (PERHAPS TO BE DISCUSSED VIA AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE) AND SUPPORT FOR AN ALL-PARTY AFGHAN CONFERENCE COULD BE USEFUL TOOLS TO BREAK THE CURRENT DEAD-LOCK. END SUMMARY.

3. (U) SOUTH ASIA A/S RAPHEL'S APRIL 19-20 VISIT TO AFGHANISTAN, AND HER MEETINGS IN ISLAMABAD WITH TOP GOP AND U.N. OFFICIALS, PROVIDED AN OPPORTUNITY TO ASSESS THE CURRENT STATE OF PLAY ON THE AFGHAN PEACE PROCESS. IN AFGHANISTAN SHE MET WITH KABUL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS INCLUDING PRESIDENT RABBANI, DE FACTO DEFENSE MINISTER AHMED SHAH MASOOD, MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS NAJIBULLAH LAFRAIE AND ACTING DEFENSE MINISTER YUNIS QANUNI AS WELL AS TALIBAN LEADERS MAULAVI AMIR KHAN MOTTAQI (TALIBAN CHIEF FOR INFORMATION) AND FIVE OTHER MEMEBERS OF THE TALIBAN INNER SHURA. IN PAKISTAN SHE CALLED ON, AMONG OTHERS, PM BHUTTO, COAS KARAMAT, INTERIOR MINISTER BABAR, FOREIGN MINISTER ASSEF ALI AND NAJMUDDING SHAIKH.

PAKISTAN: LOOKING FOR A WAY OUT
--------------------------------

4. (C) A CONSENSUS HAS EMERGED AMONG THE TOP LEADERSHIP OF THE GOP THAT PAKISTAN NEEDS TO BROADEN ITS AFGHAN POLICY. PM BHUTTO TOLD A/S RAPHEL THAT THE GOP IS PURSUING AN ENHANCED DIALOGUE WITH THE KABUL GOVERNMENT; FM ASSEF ALI SAID ISLAMABAD WOULD WELCOME A VISIT BY A RABBANI/MASOOD DELEGATION, WHICH WOULD BE RECIPROCATED, AND ALSO OFFERED TO MEET WITH KABUL REGIME MINSTATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS LAFRAIE ON THE MARGINS OF THE UPCOMING ASHGABAT ECO CONFERENCE. THE MOVE TO REPAIR RELATIONS IN KABUL IN LARGE PART DERIVES FROM GOP DISSATISFACTION WITH THE DIRECTION IN WHICH THE TALIBAN ARE MOVING; COAS KARAMAT WENT SO FAR AS TO REFER TO THE TALIBAN AS "A MILLSTONE AROUND OUR NECKS." FONSEC SHAIKH OUTLINED PAKISTAN'S REPEATED EFFORTS TO GET THE TALIBAN TO AGREE TO NEGOTIATIONS AND EXPRESSED DISAPPOINTMENT THAT THE RECENT KANDAHAR ULEMA MAJLIS OPTED FOR HARD-LINE REJECTIONISM; FM ASSEF ALI SAID THE ONLY GOOD RESULT OF THAT GATHERING WAS THE POSSIBILITY THAT MAULAVI MOHAMMED OMAR'S ELEVATION TO "LEADER OF THE FAITHFUL" WOULD GIVE HIM MORE POWER TO MAKE DECISIONS. PM BHUTTO EMPHASIZED THAT PAKISTAN WAS NOT PROVIDING MILITARY SUPPORT TO THE TALIBAN AND INSISTED THAT ONLY MINIMAL, NON-LETHAL AID WAS BEING DELIVERED.

Of course, we by now know that wasn't true.

Was PM Bhutto telling a lie, or did she not know the extent of the involvement of her government in supporting the Taliban?

(It seems fairly obvious to me that any country that can have as many coups and as many years under military rule as Pakistan does, must have a military willing to act upon its own agenda -- including in the arena of foreign affairs -- as opposed to the agenda of the elected rulers.)

This support for Islamic militants, dating back to the founding of Pakistan, has long been a tiger that any civilian (or even military) leadership in Islamabad has by the tail.

5. (C) HOW TO MOVE FORWARD FOR PAKISTAN, HOWEVER, IS STILL A MATTER OF SOME DEBATE WITHIN THE GOP'S TOP CIRCLES, BUT ISLAMABAD IS OPEN TO SUGGESTIONS. FEARING REGIONAL ISOLATION ON AFGHANISTAN POLICY, THE GOP IS REACHING OUT, AND WANTS TO ENGAGE WITH THE U.S. ON NEXT STEPS, FM ASSEF ALI OBSERVED. ENGAGING THE 'RIM STATES' ON AFGHANISTAN ALSO IS IMPORTANT, TOP GOP OFFICIALS AGREE, AND ISLAMABAD IS INCREASINGLY WILLING TO COOPERATE WITH TEHRAN,PERHAPS EVEN TO THE POINT OF HOSTING (AT IRANIAN URGING) AN AFGHAN CONFERENCE IN ISLAMABAD, AND TO ENGAGE THE ECO. IN ADDITION TO BEING LUCRATIVE FOR PAKISTAN, THE TRANS-AFGHAN PIPELINE IDEA IS STRONGLY SUPPORTED BECAUSE IT IS SEEN AS A WAY TO BRING POTENTIALLY HELPFUL ACTORS ONTO THE AFGHAN STAGE. THE PM MADE CLEAR PAKISTAN'S SUPPORT FOR THE U.N. MISSION'S PRIMACY AS THE LEAD ACTOR IN BROKERING A PEACE DEAL, BUT OTHERS OUTLINED ISLAMABAD'S DISSATISFACTION AND DISAPPOINTMENT OVER WHAT IS SEEN AS THE LACK OF ENERGY AND DIRECTION OF THE MESTIRI MISSION.

And herein lies the dilemma: Islamabad had been, and still was, dissatisfied and disappointed with the peace process, and that was why the decision was made to back the Taliban -- they might be able to succeed, by force not just of arms but of Islamic arms, where the warring parties had failed.

What do I mean with the expression "by force of... Islamic arms"?

Well, just as Pakistan in the 1940's painted anything other than unity in the face of the infidel enemy (India) as un-Islamic, so perhaps was it hoped that Mullah Omar, the "Leader of the Faithful", could win not necessarily a military victory, but some kind of religious-political one. Indeed, during the Taliban's rise to power, the forces of the "Leader of the Faithful" bribed enemies into submission more often than they won militarily.

6. (C) AT HEART, PAKISTAN'S NEED TO PURSUE A PRO-PASHTUN POLICY FOR THE SAKE OF ITS OWN DOMESTIC POLITICAL AND SECURITY AGENDA REPRESENTS A HURDLE WHICH THE GOP ACKNOWLEDGES, BUT FEELS THE TAJIK-DOMINATED KABUL GOVERNMENT IS DOING LITTLE TO HELP OUT ON. EFFORTS TO RESUSCITATE RELATIONS WITH KABUL ARE HAMPERED, SHAIKH AND ASSEF ALI REMARKED, BY RABBANI AND MASOOD'S BICKERING OVER MODALITIES AND THEIR UNWILLINGNESS TO ENGAGE IN GOOD FAITH NEGOTIATIONS AIMED AT CREATING A BROAD-BASED GOVERNMENT. PAKISTAN APPEARS TO FOCUS MORE ON WAYS TO GET THE AFGHAN FACTIONS THEMSELVES TO PUT THEIR HOUSE IN ORDER, AND IS LESS FIXATED ON THE ISSUE OF CURBING OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE, THE LATTER BEING SEEN MORE AS A CONTRIBUTING -- RATHER THAN CAUSAL -- FACTOR. WHILE ACCEPTING THE NEED TO WORK BOTH INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL TRACKS, THE GOP WOULD PREFER AN AFGHAN ALL-PARTY CONFERENCE IN JALALABAD TO AN INTERNATIONAL GATHERING, SENIOR OFFICIALS NOTED, SINCE ISLAMABAD BELIEVES THE KEY TO (AND THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR) A SOLUTION MUST LIE WITH THE AFGHAN FACTIONS THEMSELVES. THEY BELIEVE EITHER GATHERING WOULD REQUIRE CAREFUL PREPARATION AND A PRE-AGREED AGENDA.

And that's exactly right -- the Afghan factions themselves need to come to an agreement; military victory was, and is, elusive.

The U.S. might do well even today to keep the door open to negotiations with the Taliban. The Taliban has its differences with Al Qaeda; in fact, the Taliban is internally divided. Once they realize that they cannot win militarily, but stand a chance to gain some real concessions at the conference table, their differences with Al Qaeda will likely prove stronger than we may now realize.

Continued in Part 30.