The Devil and the Deep Blue Sea

An article entitled Five Myths About U.S.-Saudi Relations:

Author: Rachel Bronson, Adjunct Senior Fellow for Middle East Studies

May 21, 2006
The Washington Post

The United States and Saudi Arabia form one of the world’s most misunderstood partnerships. The Saudis are a longtime oil supplier for the U.S. economy—but on 9/11, their kingdom accounted for 15 of the 19 hijackers. The Bush family and the House of Saud are close—yet Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice calls for greater democracy in the region. To understand the relationship, a few misconceptions must be debunked:

1. The U.S.-Saudi relationship is a bargain of oil for security.

There’s more to it than that. Oil is, of course, critical to U.S.-Saudi ties—it can hardly be otherwise for the world’s largest consumer and largest producer. But Washington’s relationship with Riyadh more closely resembles its friendly ties to oil-poor Middle Eastern states such as Jordan, Egypt and Israel than its traditionally hostile relations with oil-rich states such as Libya and Iran. Deep oil reserves have never translated into easy relations with the United States.

A major reason for the close ties between the two nations was their common Cold War fight against communism. Both countries worried about the Soviet Union, and that solidified their oil and defense interests, and minimized differences. In hindsight, by supporting religious zealots in the battle against communism, the two countries contributed to the rise of radical Islamic movements.

2. The 9/11 hijackers undermined otherwise strong U.S.-Saudi ties.

Actually, things were never that smooth. Historians refer to the “special relationship” established when Saudi Arabia’s King Abdel Aziz and President Franklin D. Roosevelt met in 1945. But since then the relationship has endured oil embargoes, U.S. restrictions on arms sales to Saudi Arabia, and tensions around Israel and Palestine. Dissension permeates the entire history of U.S.-Saudi relations.

Since the end of the Cold War, relations have become particularly fraught, with the 9/11 attacks being the most recent issue. Oil, defense and some regional interests keep the countries together, but both sides have made clear that the relationship is less special today. In 2005, Rice stated that “for 60 years…the United States pursued stability at the expense of democracy in this region here in the Middle East—and we achieved neither.”

Meanwhile, members of the Saudi royal family are debating the utility of close ties with the Americans.

3. The Bush family and the House of Saud are too close for comfort.

An overstatement. Filmmaker Michael Moore and others are fond of pointing to the personal and business ties between the Bush family and the reigning Saud family. Unquestionably, the two families are close, in no small part because Saudi Arabia contributed to Operation Desert Storm in 1991, one of the highlights of President George H.W. Bush’s tenure. The late King Fahd provided extensive financial and political assistance to the operation, and allowed U.S. troops on Saudi soil.

But there is little evidence to suggest that such support has led the Bush family to make decisions at odds with U.S. interests. All previous presidents have sought close relations with the kingdom, recognizing its value to the United States. Even presidents such as Dwight D. Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy, who were initially skeptical of the Saudis, found themselves drawn to this relationship for strategic reasons.

4. Washington can call the shots with the Saudis because the United States is all-important to them.

It’s more complex than that. Growing oil demand from China, India and the developing world means that others are pursuing closer ties with the kingdom. Chinese President Hu Jintao flew from Washington to Riyadh in April, despite Bush administration protests that China was “locking up long-term oil deals” with oil-rich countries.

Last year, Prince Saud al-Faisal, the foreign minister, stated that Saudi Arabia and China now have a “strategic relationship,” because Saudi Arabia is the largest supplier of crude to China. Of course, Beijing will not replace Washington as the Saudis’ key global partner. But growing oil demand elsewhere radically alters the options at Saudi Arabia’s disposal.

5. The House of Saud is about to collapse.

Not likely. Since the Saudi monarchy’s earliest days, observers have anticipated its demise. However, it has shown a remarkable ability to overcome such challenges as palace infighting, assassination and incapacitated leaders. There are still many sons of kingdom founder Abdel Aziz waiting in an orderly queue for their chance to reign.

This hardly means the Saudi rulers will have an easy time of it. Osama bin Laden has made toppling the House of Saud one of his key goals, and there have been a series of al-Qaeda attacks since May 2003. Also, Saudi Arabia faces demographic challenges: Sixty percent of the population is younger than 25, and jobs for them are scarce.

Meanwhile, insurgent fighters eventually will return from Iraq, trained and determined, and the Sunni-Shiite battles of Iraq can easily spill into Saudi Arabia, where Shiites make up 10 to 15 percent of the population.

But the cleavages common before a revolution are not visible in Saudi Arabia. The kingdom is now aggressively pursuing terrorists on its soil, and reform-minded Saudis view King Abdullah as an ally.

Washington would be better off planning on the royal family enduring. It’s also the best chance Washington has to realize its oil and counterterrorism goals—and avoid alternatives that could be worse.

Here are my comments regarding this article:

1. It is important to note that the author stated that there is “more to it than that”. American relations with Saudi Arabia became important towards the end of World War II as the US Government considered that American oil reserves in Oklahoma and Texas were becoming depleted, in big part due to the war effort. Much of the reason President Roosevelt sought closer relations with Saudi Arabia was to gain access to Saudi oil. However, as World War II ended and the Cold War began and progressed, both the US and Saudi Arabia were concerned about the Soviet Union, each side for its own reasons. Towards the end of the Cold War, they found common cause in supporting the Mujahideen in Afghanistan; those birds are now coming back to roost.

2. American policy is often shortsighted. There is a distinctive volatility to it, as well, as presidents of different ideological leanings alternate setting the course in foreign affairs (some courses far more foolish and shortsighted than others).

But, the Saudi Kingdom has long played a game of “both ends against the middle” in dealing with foreign powers. And, the connection between the violent spread of Wahhabism and the Saudi Royal Family goes all the way back to the days when Wahhab was a refugee protected in a small piece of desert run by a guy named Saud – roughly three centuries ago.

3. Indeed, it would be going way too far to suggest what would essentially be treason on the part of the Bush family. However, it is not at all too far to question whether President Bush’s friendly relations with the House of Saud have not resulted in unwise foreign policy decisions.

4. It seems apparent to me that the Saudis wish to diversify the group of those who can influence their decision-making, so as to be no one’s puppet. And, that is fair and understandable. However, Washington has more influence than it is willing to use. Part of the problem here may be the close ties addressed in 3), but part is also the nearly schizophrenic nature of American foreign policy due to 2) above in particular and the fact that America is a two-party country in general.

We can get our oil elsewhere, and the Saudis can sell their oil elsewhere.

Beyond that, America could be almost self-sufficient for a time by opening up drilling in certain areas of the Arctic. That would buy us time while we convert to renewable energy sources using off-the-shelf technology to make fuel from America’s agricultural products. And, fusion energy is closer than we think.

Contrast that to Saudi Arabia. The Saudis have spent their petrocash on a variety of things, including the spread of terroristic hatred. Significantly, they have not invested in industrializing the Kingdom. “Sixty percent of the population is younger than 25, and jobs for them are scarce.” No wonder Saudi Arabia’s major exports are 1) jihad, 2) oil, and 3) Mujahideen. Consequently, if they don’t sell their oil, they’re screwed; and, when their oil runs out, they’re screwed.

By the way, did you know their oil is running out?

The Saudis will tell you that they can increase production at the drop of a hat and maintain it indefinitely. That assertion flies in the face of the facts.

There have been no new discoveries of significant oil reserves (read this, you may disagree) in the Kingdom in the past couple of decades. Their production comes from pumping oil fields that have been around for many years. And, that production is only maintained by pumping water down into the ground on the periphery of the oil fields to maintain pressure for oil extraction in the center. Their production will go down, not up, and that descent could start to happen any day.

Saudi Arabia needs the rest of the world – especially the US – far more than the rest of the world – especially the US – needs Saudi Arabia. Yet we put up with a state, many members of whose Royal Family actively sponsor terrorism, and all of whom sponsor the hatred that foments the terror.

Why?

The tail is wagging the dog.

5. This has led us to an interesting dilemma.

If America promotes democracy in Saudi Arabia, there’s a good chance the Saudi people would vote into power a Taliban-style theocracy. Yet, America does need to promote democracy. (The policy really should be one of spreading freedom. Freedom is thoroughly condemned by the preachers of hatred.)

If America does not promote democracy in Saudi Arabia, then we betray those in the Kingdom who are working for positive reform, and, by permitting repression, we, to a certain extent, fuel the radical Wahhabist elements bent on establishing an Islamic caliphate in the land of Mecca and Medina.

A big part of the legitimacy of the Saudi regime, as perceived in the Islamic World, is rooted in its conservative Islamic traditions, necessary for the Kingdom as keeper of the two holiest places in the Islamic World – Mecca and Medina.

A big part of the illegitimacy of the Saudi regime, as perceived in the (radicalized) Islamic World, is rooted in the fact that Saudi Arabia is not conservative enough, not enough like the Taliban.

And this is where it all flies apart....

If the Saudi Government liberalizes and democratizes, that will make the radical Islamists seem to be right in the eyes of more of the Islamic World, an Islamic World that has been radicalized with preaching and mosques paid for by Saudi Arabia; it could help the radicals to overthrow the Saudi regime. But, if the Saudi Government doesn’t liberalize and democratize, the Kingdom faces internal pressure from citizens who increasingly want basic rights that people in other countries take for granted, and it limits the potential for industrialization, which will be needed to replace oil revenue.

If the Saudi Government declares a real war on its terrorists, it faces a significant backlash from a radicalized Islamic World. But, if it doesn’t, the Islamists might succeed in overthrowing the regime and establishing their Caliphate. (Also, the non-Islamic World might get serious about making Riyadh get serious in the War on Terror – though if I were the king, I wouldn’t lose any sleep worrying about that.)

So, meanwhile, the Saudi Government pays off the industrialized (and industrializing) world by keeping the oil flowing. The petrobucks flow back, and that money is used to pay off Saudi citizens to minimize discontent, and to pay off enough of the terrorists so they focus their attacks on targets other than the Kingdom. Everybody is content with the stability provided by riding the gravy train of Saudi oil. But, as mentioned above, the end of the line is near for that gravy train....

Radicalized Islamic terrorists on one side, infidel and takfir targets of their hatred on the other. Those who want to liberalize on one side, those who want to radicalize on the other.

There sits the Saudi Royal Family in Riyadh, geographically kind of towards the center of their Kingdom: Mecca and Medina are on one side, the Persian Gulf on the other.

Ideologically, however, the Royal Family is quite squarely between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea.

What can they do? How can they escape?


Here are some suggestions for the Royal Family:


1) Get down on your knees, beg Jesus for forgiveness, and ask Him to help you out.

(Not likely, huh?)


2) Practice swimming.

(Not amusing, huh?)



There might be a third option....