This information is based on the report of an American citizen (AMCIT) who witnessed the events described.
1. CONFIDENTIAL -- ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY: AM AMCIT WHO WITNESSED THE FALL OF HERAT AND ITS AFTERMATH SAYS ISMAEL KHAN LOST THROUGH A COMBINATION OF POLITICAL AND MILITARY INEPTITUDE. THE TALIBAN, BY CONTRAST, WERE EXTREMELY WELL ORGANIZED, WELL-FINANCED, AND EXHIBITED STRONG DISCIPLINE. DESPITE VERY REAL CULTURAL AND LINGUISTIC DIFFERENCES, THE THREE TO FOUR THOUSAND TALIBAN TROOPS IN HERAT ARE ENGAGED IN AN EFFORT TO WIN THE HEARTS AND MINDS OF ITS CITIZENS, DOUBLING SALARIES OF PUBLIC SERVANTS AND PAYING FOR WHAT THEY TAKE; NOT ACTING AS OCCUPIERS AT ALL. THE CITY IS PEACEFUL AND HERATIS APPEAR CONTENT, FOR NOW, TO GIVE THE TALIBAN THE BENEFIT OF THE DOUBT -- IN PART BECAUSE THEY ARE SEEN AS BETTER THAN THE DISCREDITED ISMAEL KHAN REGIME, AND BECAUSE MANY HERATIS HOPE THE TALIBAN WILL RESTORE PEACE TO AFGHANISTAN, VIA ZAHIR SHAH. HOW SUCCESSFUL THE KABUL GOVERNMENT WILL BE IN EFFORTS TO RE-TAKE THE WESTERN PROVINCES WILL DEPEND IN LARGE MEASURE ON WHETHER THE HERATIS COME TO SEE THE TALIBAN AS TRUE NATIONALIST LIBERATORS OR ANOTHER PAKISTANI-BACKED GROUP COMPETING FOR CONTROL OF AFGHANISTAN. FOR NOW, AT LEAST, THE JURY IS STILL OUT. END SUMMARY.
3. POLOFF MET SEPTEMBER 17 WITH [redacted] (PROTECT), WHO RETURNED FROM HERAT SEPTEMBER 16 (ON THE FIRST U.N. FLIGHT SINCE THE TALIBAN TAKE-OVER) HAVING WITNESSED THE TALIBAN OCCUPATION OF THAT CITY AND ITS AFTERMATH. [redacted] WELL-EDUCATED AND ARTICULATE, [redacted] IT A CREDIBLE INTERLOCUTOR WHO IS VERY WELL INFORMED ABOUT POLITICAL EVENTS IN HERAT.
ISMAEL KHAN LOST THE SUPPORT OF HIS COMMANDERS
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4. [redacted] BEGAN BY NOTING THAT THE FALL OF HERAT HAD MORE TO DO WITH ISMAEL KHAN'S LOSS OF SUPPORT AMONG HIS COMMANDERS THAN ANY PARTICULAR FIGHTING PROWESS BY THE TALIBAN. A KEY FACTOR, HE SAID, WAS THE UNWILLINGNESS OF THE HERAT GOVERNOR'S TOP LIEUTENANTS TO COMMIT THEMSELVES AND THEIR TROOPS TO FIGHTING THE TALIBAN -- PARTICULARLY ONCE IT BECAME CLEAR THAT THE TALIBAN WERE WINNING. AT GIRISHK, ISMAEL KHAN'S FORCES LARGELY HAD CONSISTED OF PASHTUN COMMANDERS (AMIR, LALAI, KHAN MOHAMMED, GHAFFAR AKHUNDZADA AND OTHERS) AND MASOOD'S PANJSHIRI TAJIKS. [redacted] SAID THE MOST FAMOUS OF ISMAEL KHAN'S LOCAL COMMANDERS, ALIENATED FROM THE GOVERNOR BY HIS INCREASINGLY CAPRICIOUS BEHAVIOR (ALMOST RANDOM PROMOTING AND DEMOTING OF HIS CHIEFTAINS, "IDIOTIC" POLITICAL PRONOUNCEMENTS, CONTINUED VERBAL BATTLES WITH AHMED SHAH MASOOD, ETC.) STAYED IN HERAT, NOT AT THE FRONT.
CLOBBERED AT GIRISHK
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5. QUOTING "PEOPLE FROM MY VILLAGE WHO WERE AT THE FRONT," [redacted] SAID ISMAEL KHAN'S FORCES, EMBOLDENED BY THEIR SUCCESS IN PUSHING THE TALIBAN BACK FROM DELARUM TO GIRISHK, HAD POURED INTO THE LATTER IN SEARCH OF LOOT. OVER-CONFIDENCE, POOR ORGANIZATION, AND THE RAPIDITY OF THE ADVANCE ALL LED ISMAEL KHAN TO IGNORE LOGISTICS AND TACTICS -- NO DEFENSIVE LINES WERE ESTABLISHED, AND COMMAND AND CONTROL WAS NON-EXISTENT. AS LARGE NUMBERS OF TROOPS FLOODED INTO GIRISHK, A PRO-ISMAEL KAHN NIFA COMMANDER WAS BRIBED BY THE TALIBAN INTO LETTING ENEMY FORCES COME IN BEHIND ISMAEL KHAN'S ARMY, THEREBY CUTTING THEM OFF INSIDE THE CITY. IN THE ENSUING CONFLICT, HUNDREDS OF ISMAEL KHAN'S TROOPS WERE KILLED, AND HUNDREDS MORE CAPTURED. THE REMAINING HERAT FORCES FLED IN DISARRAY. ACCORDING TO ONE TANK DRIVER [redacted] SPOKE WITH, THE DEMORALIZATION OF ISMAEL KHAN'S TROOPS WAS SO COMPLETE, THAT COMMANDERS ORDERED THEIR MEN TO PULL BACK AND NOT RESIST THE TALIBAN. "WE COULD HAVE FOUGHT THE TALIBAN," [redacted] REPORTED THE TANKER AS SAYING, "BUT OUR COMMANDERS TOLD US TO PULL BACK, SINCE THERE WAS NO POINT IN DYING FOR ISMAEL KHAN AND THE TALIBAN SEEMED INVINCIBLE." FURTHER CONTRIBUTING TO THE SENSE OF HOPELESSNESS ON THE PART OF THE HERATIS WAS THE REPEATED AERIAL BOMBING OF HERAT AIRPORT AND SEVERAL OTHER MILITARY TARGETS IN THE CITY.
As we mentioned in Part 7, these religious students seemed to know quite a bit about running an air force. Perhaps these madrassahs provide a more thorough education than we have perhaps been told? Or, were Pakistani military personnel, and perhaps even Pakistani military units, operating in support of the Taliban?
CHAOS REIGNS
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6. [redacted] OBSERVED THAT HERAT CITY ITSELF BECAME VERY TENSE FOLLOWING THE NEWS OF THE DEFEAT AT GIRISHK. "WE HAD THOUGHT ISMAEL KHAN WOULD BE IN KANDAHAR CITY THE NEXT DAY, AND THEN LEARNED HE WAS RETREATING BACK TOWARDS HERAT," HE NOTED. AS ISMAEL KHAN WAS PUSHED BACK, CONFUSION AND RUMOR SWEPT THE CITY, WITH HERAT RADIO AND TELEVISION BROADCASTING CHILLING PICTURES OF ISMAEL KHAN AND HIS TOP COMMANDERS KISSING THE KORAN AND EMBRACING EACH OTHER BEFORE HEADING OUT TO DO BATTLE FOR THE STRATEGIC SHINDAND AIR BASE. THE ARRIVAL OF A "RECONCILIATION COMMITTEE" FROM KABUL TO TRY TO ORGANIZE DEFENSES AND PATCH UP POLITICAL SQUABBLES ONLY ADDED TO THE CHAOS, [redacted] NOTED. "BUT SHINDAND FELL BEFORE ISMAEL KHAN COULD ORGANIZE ITS DEFENSE," HE STATED. AT THAT POINT, THE AMCIT COMMENTED, THINGS BEGAN MOVING VERY RAPIDLY. THE NIGHT OF THE FALL OF HERAT, ISMAEL KHAN EMPTIED OUT THE LOCAL BANK, AND DEPARTED ALONG WITH 1,000 OF HIS TROOPS AND SOME OF HIS HEAVY WEAPONS TO IRAN. "THAT ISMAEL KHAN AND HIS TOP COMMANDERS, INCLUDING AZIMI AND ALLAHUDDING, ABANDONED THE HERATIS IS SOMETHING THE LOCAL PEOPLE WILL NEVER FORGET -- THESE LEADERS ARE NOW FINISHED POLITICALLY," [redacted] STATED, "AND THEY WILL NEED A LOT OF TIME BEFORE THEY CAN ORGANIZE A COUNTER-ATTACK FROM IRAN." [redacted] ADDED THAT ONLY IF THE TALIBAN ALIENATED THE PEOPLE WOULD AN ISMAEL KHAN/ALLAHUDDIN/GENERAL AZIMI OPERATION HAVE ANY CHANCE OF SUCCESS.
These predictions of Ismail Khan's political demise due to his abandonment of Herat ultimately didn't wash; as we saw in Part 13, he became Minister of Energy after the Taliban were expelled in the aftermath of 9/11.
We shall finish reviewing this cable in Part 16.
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