INDIAN SUPPORT FOR RABBANI CONTINUES
8. (C) DURING THE RABBANI COMPAIGN TO SECURE RECOGNITION AS THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT, NEW DEHLI REOPENED ITS EMBASSY IN KABUL. IN FACT, THIS REPRESENTED NO CHANGE IN POLICY AS INDIA HAS ALWAYS RECOGNIZED WHOMEVER HELD KABUL AND HAS LONG SUPPORTED THE RABBANI/MASOOD REGIME. AS HAS BEEN THE CASE SINCE INDIAN INDEPENDENCE, NEW DELHI'S PRIMARY FORIEGN POLICY OBJECTIVE IN AFGHANISTAN IS TO COUNTER PAKISTAN. AS WAS EVIDENT DURING A/S RAPHEL'S VISIT, THE GOI SHARES TEHRAN'S DISTASTE FOR THE TALIBAN AND BELIEVES THAT THE U.S. AS WELL AS PAKISTAN IS BEHIND THE TALIBAN. WHILE THERE HAS PROBABLY BEEN SOME INCREASE IN INDIAN ASSISTANCE TO THE RABBANI/MASOOD REGIME, THAT ASSISTANCE HAS ALWAYS BEEN MARGINAL. MORE IMPORTANT HAS BEEN THE GALVANIZING EFFECT ON ISLAMABAD OF INDIA'S MORE OPEN SUPPORT OF THE KABUL REGIME.
Why is it that even India thought the United States was, together with Pakistan, behind the Taliban?
PAKISTAN BECOMES OPENLY ANTI-RABBANI
9. (C) THE GOP ADOPTED A MORE OPENLY ANTI-RABBANI STANCE IN 1995 AND IS GENERALLY SEEN AS FOLLOWING A "RABBANI MUST GO AT ANY PRICE" POLICY, A PRICE INCLUDING A TALIBAN TAKEOVER OF KABUL. DURING THE SUMMER ASSEF ALL TOLD US EXPLICITLY THAT THE GOP WOULD TRY TO UNITE ALL PARTIES OPPOSING RABBANI. A MAJOR MOTIVATION WAS PAKISTAN'S FEAR OF AN EMERGING "TEHRAN-MOSCOW-NEW DELHI AXIS" SUPPORTING KABUL AND OPPOSING THE TALIBAN. PAKISTAN'S AVERSION TO THE RABBANI REGIME UNDERSTANDABLY INTENSIFIED AFTER A MURDEROUS MOB ATTACK FOLLOWING THE FALL OF HERAT ON THE PAKISTAN EMBASSY AND PERSONNEL IN KABUL WHICH COULD NOT HAVE TAKEN PLACE WITHOUT ACTIVE REGIME INVOLVEMENT. HOWEVER, PAKISTAN'S WELL-KNOWN ATTEMPTS TO BRING ABOUT A MILITARY AND POLITICAL ALLIANCE BETWEEN THE TALIBAN, DOSTAM, HEKMATYAR AND MINOR SCC (SUPREME COALITION COUNCIL) MEMBERS HAVE SERVED TO FURTHER HARDEN MOSCOW'S AND TEHRAN'S SUPPORT OF RABBANI.
Is it any surprise that India and Pakistan are on opposite sides in this matter?
We already saw in Part 18 how Pakistan had no equivocations - the Kabul regime had to go.
GOP ATTEMPTS TO UNITE OPPOSITION UNFRUITFUL, COUNTERPRODUCTIVE
10. (C) AFTER THE FALL OF HERAT, THERE HAVE BEEN FEW SIGNS THAT ANY REAL AGREEMENT IS NEAR AMONG RABBANI'S OPPONENTS AND THE TALIBAN. DOSTAM WAS NOT OPTIMISTIC DURING HIS EARLY NOVEMBER MEETING WITH A/S RAPHEL. THE TALIBAN CONSIDER DOSTAM, LIKE OTHER FACTION LEADERS, AS PART OF THE PROBLEM AND SEE NO ROOM FOR "PRIVATE ARMIES" AFTER THEY TAKE KABUL. MOREOVER, PASHTUNS IN SOUTHERN AFGHANISTAN HAVE STRONG MEMORIES OF DOSTAM DURING THE SOVIET OCCUPATION. CONVERSELY, DOSTAM APPEARS CONTEMPTUOUS OF THE UNSOPHISTICATED TALIBAN AND THEIR RELIGIOUS IDEAS. THERE ARE ALSO RECENT SIGNS THAT HEKMATYAR MAY BE COOPERATING WITH THE KABUL AUTHORITIES. WE CONSIDER IT INCREASINGLY UNLIKELY THAT PAKISTAN WILL BE ABLE TO CEMET TOGETHER RABBANI'S FOES. PAKISTAN'S CONTINUING EFFORTS ARE HAVING THE EFFECT OF ENCOURAGING FURTHER INVOLVEMENT WITH RABBANI BY MOSCOW, TEHRAN AND NEW DELHI, EVEN THOUGH ISLAMABAD POINTS TO THIS INVOLVEMENT AS REASON TO CONTINUE ITS EFFORTS.
The "unsophisticated Taliban" - does this description not contrast with how we saw Taliban troops behave after the fall of Herat in Part 16?
WHAT IF THE TALIBAN TAKE KABUL
11. (C) ISLAMABAD APPARENTLY BELIEVES THE TALIBAN CAN STILL DISLODGE RABBANI AND MASOOD FROM KABUL, BUT WE DOUBT THE TALIBAN CAN SINGLE-HANDEDLY TRIUMPH MILITARILY OVER MASOOD'S FORCES. IF DOSTAM WERE TO JOIN IN A MILITARY CAMPAIGN, THERE WOULD LIKELY BE UNACCEPTABLE FURTHER CARNAGE VISITED ON THE POPULATION OF KABUL. [redacted] FURTHER, WE WOULD SEE LITTLE MOVEMENT TOWARD AN END OF THE AFGHAN CONFLICT IF A TALIBAN VICTORY RESULTED IN MASOOD AND HIS TROOPS RETREATING TO THE PANJSHIR TO RETURN AND FIGHT FOR KABUL ANOTHER DAY. [redacted] WE SEE LITTLE LIKELIHOOD THE TALIBAN WOULD BE WILLING TO TRANSFER POWER TO A TRANSITIONAL BODY ACCEPTABLE TO OTHER AFGHAN POWERS. IF SO, THEN AN UNREPRESENTATIVE TAJIK REGIME IN KABUL WILL HAVE BEEN TRADED FOR AN UNREPRESENTATIVE PASHTUN AUTHORITY. ALTHOUGH PAKISTAN HAS REPORTEDLY ASSURED TEHRAN AND TASHKENT THAT IT CAN CONTROL THE TALIBAN, WE REMAIN UNCONVINCED. PAKISTAN SURELY HAS SOME INFLUENCE ON THE TALIBAN, BUT IT FALLS SHORT OF BEING ABLE TO CALL THE SHOTS.
[Paragraph 12 redacted in its entirety.]
We saw already in Part 1 how the Taliban was spinning out of control.
13. (C) THE GOP DISENCHANTMENT WITH THE SPECIAL MISSION MAY ALSO REFLECT UNHAPPINESS WITH PAKISTAN'S LIMITED ABILITY TO AFFECT THE UN PROCESS. IN HIS NOVEMBER 16 PRESS CONFERENCE CRITICIZING MESTIRI'S PLAN, FONMIN ASSEF ALL COMPLAINED THAT PAKISTAN HAD NOT BEEN CONSULTED. SIMILARLY, [redacted].
PAKISTAN'S MANEUVERS UNDERCUT U.S. CREDIBILITY
14. (C) AS NOTED, TEHRAN, MOSCOW AND NEW DELHI ASSUME INCORRECTLY THAT THE U.S. IS PARTY TO PAKISTAN'S SUPPORT FOR THE TALIBAN AND SHARES ITS ANTIPATHY FOR RABBANI AND MASOOD. AS WAS PLAIN DURING A/S RAPHEL'S MEETING WITH MASOOD ON OCTOBER 30, THE KABUL AUTHORITIES CLEARLY FEEL ALIENATED FROM THE U.S. MOREOVER, AS PARTISAN SUPPORT IS CONTRARY TO THE PRECEPTS OF THE UN MISSION, PAKISTANI POLICY HAS UNDERMINED THE CREDIBILITY OF OUR SUPPORT OF THE UN SPECIAL MISSION.
As we indicated at the end of Part 21, perhaps certain elements in the U.S. were a party to Pakistan's support for the Taliban.
Notice below the highlighted part - Pakistan staked everything on the Taliban winning.
TALKING POINTS
15. (C) GIVEN BELOW ARE TALKING POINTS WHICH, TAKEN IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE ABOVE DISCUSSION, MAY SERVE TO RE ENGAGE PAKISTAN IN A SERIOUS DIALOGUE ON AFGHAN POLICY. AS SEEN FROM WASHINGTON, ISLAMABAD HAS PURSUED A RISKY POLICY AND APPEARS TO HAVE NO EXIT STRATEGY SHOULD THE TALIBAN FAIL TO TAKE KABUL. WE WOULD LIKE TO ENGAGE THE GOP CONSTRUCTIVELY WITH THE UN SPECIAL MISSION WHICH WOULD BE DIFFICULT IF THE GOP CANNOT MODERATE ITS ANTI-RABBINI POLICY OR FORESEE ANY ROLE FOR RABBANI AND MASOOD IN FUTURE GOVERNING ARRANGEMENTS. THE EMBASSY HAS MADE MANY OF THESE POINTS PERSUASIVELY ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS. A/S RAPHEL TOUCHED ON SEVERAL OF THEM IN A DISCUSSION WITH PAK PERMREP KAMAL DECEMBER 19 (SEPTEL). HOWEVER, WWE BELIEVE THAT FURTHER ITERATION IS NEEDED.
-- WE SHARE PAKISTAN'S CONCERN OVER THE CURRENT IMPASSE IN AFGHANISTAN AND ITS HOPES THAT PROGRESS CAN BE ACHIEVED ON MOVING FORWARDS TOWARD A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT.
-- WE CAN APPRECIATED PAKISTAN'S FRUSTRATION WITH THE RECENT ACTIONS OF THE MESTIRI MISSION, BUT PUBLIC CRITICISM OF MESTIRI'S LATEST PLAN WAS NOT HELPFUL. ALL CONCERNED PARTIES MUST WORK WITH MESTIRI RATHER THAN AGAINST HIM TO ACHIEVE A PEACE.
-- WE WISH TO WORK CLOSELY WITH YOU AND OTHER GOVERNMENTS TO HELP THE UN MISSION ACHIEVE ITS OBJECTIVES.
-- WE RECOGNIZE THAT PAKISTAN HAS LEGITIMATE CONCERNS ABOUT THE CONTINUING CONFLICT AS DO AFGHANISTAN'S OTHER NEIGHBORS. PAKISTAN NEEDS TO REALIZE THAT THE TALIBAN MOVEMENT IS AN UNKNOWN QUANTITY TO MANY OF AFGHANISTAN'S NEIGHBORS AND THEREFORE MORE FRIGHTENING THAN THE STATUS QUO. WHATEVER INFLUENCE PAKISTAN HAS WITH THE TALIBAN SHOULD BE USED TO INFLUENCE THEM TO ACT IN RESPONSIBLE WAYS SUCH AS FREEING THE RUSSIAN PLANE CREW AND OBSERVING BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS.
-- WE RECOGNIZE THAT PAKISTAN FACES A DIPLOMATIC AND POLITICAL BARRAGE OF CRITICISM FROM THE KABUL AUTHORITIES. NONETHELESS, EVERYONE MUST WORK TOWARDS AN END GAME FOR AFGHANISTAN THAT ENVISIONS THE FUTURE FOR THE COUNTRY BEYOND THE TIME WHEN RABBANI AND MASOOD LEAVE KABUL.
-- WE HAVE NOTED FOREIGN MINISTER ASSEF ALL'S RECENT DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SAUDIS ON AFGHAN PEACE EFFORTS WE VIEW THE JOINT DECLARATION AS INDICATING BOTH SAUDI ARABIA AND PAKISTAN HOPE THAT MESTIRI WOULD FOCUS ON OTHER ELEMENTS BESIDES THE INTERIM COUNCIL, SUCH AS DEMILITARIZING KABUL AND CREATING THE NEUTRAL SECURITY FORCE.
-- MESTIRI IS AT THIS POINT PURSUING A STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH. ACCORDING TO THE UN RESOLUTION WHICH ESTABLISHED THE MANDATE FOR MESTIRI'S MISSION, IT IS THE INTERIM COUNCIL WHICH HE IS TRYING TO ESTABLISH THAT WILL HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO NEGOTIATE A TRANSFER OF POWER AND A CEASEFIRE, AND TO CREATE A NATIONAL SECURITY FORCE WHICH WOULD COLLECT HEAVE WEAPONS. ONE WAY TO BRIDGE THE GAP IS TO DEFINE THE INTERIM COUNCIL'S AUTHORITY CONCURRENTLY WITH PROPOSING MEMBERS FOR THE COUNCIL.
-- WE VIEWED MESTIRI'S LIST OF 28 NAMES FOR AN INTERIM COUNCIL AS A PROPOSAL, NOT A FINAL LIST. WE WOULD ENCOURAGE ALL PARTIES TO CONSIDER THE LIST AS A BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION, RATHER THAN A LIST THEY EITHER HAD TO ACCEPT OR REJECT. ALL PARTIES SHOULD FEEL THAT THEY CAN DISCUSS ADDING NEW NAMES AND DELETING THOSE NOT GENERALLY ACCEPTABLE.
-- IN ANY CASE, WE WISH TO CONTINUE TO WORK CONSTRUCTIVELY AND POSITIVELY WITH PAKISTAN TO ACHIEVE OUR MUTUAL OBJECTIVES IN AFGHANISTAN.
TALBOTT
No comments:
Post a Comment