8. (C) PAKISTAN WANTS TO COOPERATE WITH U.S.
ALL STATED THAT PAKISTAN SHARED THE U.S. VIEW THAT A MILITARY SOLUTION IN AFGHANISTAN WAS NOT POSSIBLE AND THAT FURTHER FIGHTING IN KABUL WOLD NOT DISLODGE MASOOD BUT CAUSE GREATER SUFFERING, DEATH AND DESTRUCTION. WHAT WAS NEEDED WAS GREATER U.S. POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT, WHICH NEED NOT INVOLVE GREAT SUMS OF MONEY. THE PROBLEM WITH THE MESTIRI MISSION WAS THAT IT IS NOT GIVEN PRIORITY BY MAJOR COUNTRIES SUCH AS THE U.S. AND RUSSIA. PAKISTAN DID NOT WANT TO INVOLVE THE U.S. IN DETAILS BUT RATHER BROAD PRINCIPLES FOR THE COMPOSITION OF A TRANSITION GOVERNMENT AND THE CONDITIONS TO MAKE IT POSSIBLE. CRITERIA FOR THE COMPOSITION OF A TRANSITION SHURA (COUNCIL) SHOULD INCLUDE "REALITIES ON THE GROUND" I.E. THE AMOUNT OF TERRITORY CONTROLLED BY EACH FACTION, AND THE DEMOGRAPHICS OF THOSE AREAS SUCH AS POPULATION AND ETHNICITY. MOREOVER, KABUL WOULD HAVE TO BE DEMILITARIZED AND A NEUTRAL SECURITY FORCE CREATED THAT WOULD NOT BE BOUND TO INDIVIDUAL FACTION LEADERS. IF THE U.S. AGREED TO THIS APROACH, THE DETAILS COULD BE WORKED OUT AND THE PLAN PRESENTED TO THE AFGHANS BY THE UN.
9. (C) U.S. COOPERATION DEPENDS ON PAKISTANI ACTION
THE ACTING SECRETARY RESPONDED THAT THERE IS NO DISAGREEMENT ON FUNDAMENTALS AND THAT THERE ARE MANY REASONS FOR THE U.S. TO SEEK STABILITY IN AFGHANISTAN, NOT LEAST THE THREAT WHICH CURRENT INSTABILITY POSES FOR PAKISTAN, A COUNTRY IMPORTANT TO THE U.S. TALBOTT SAID THE U.S. CONSIDERS MUCH OF THE RECENT INCREASE IN FOREIGN SUPPORT FOR RABBANI TO BE A BACKLASH TO PAKISTANI SUPPORT FOR THE TALIBAN WITH WIDELY PRESUMED APPROVAL BY THE U.S. SINCE SUPPORT FOR THE TALIBAN UNDERCUTS ALL OUR SHARED GOALS, PAKISTAN SHOULD RETURN TO A POSITION OF NEUTRALITY AND RESTORE ITS RELATIONS WITH THE KABUL REGIME. THE VISCERAL REACTION TO THE TALIBAN BY MOSCOW MIGHT BE MODERATED IF THEY WERE TO RELEASE THE RUSSIAN AIRCREW OF THE PLANE THEY FORCED DOWN IN KANDAHAR. PAKISTAN SHOULD CONTINUE TO PUSH THE TALIBAN TO DO SO. TALBOTT AGREED THAT THE UN SPECIAL MISSION NEEDS TO BE ENERGIZED AND PROMISED TO LOOK FOR WAY TO STRENGTHEN MESTIRI, INCLUDING ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT. TALBOTT TOLD ALL THAT HE HAD RECOMMENDED TO THE SECRETARY THAT THE ISSUE OF OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE BE RAISED WITH PRIMAKOV DURING THEIR DINNER IN HELSINKI THAT EVENING.
10. (C) PAKISTANI MILITARY SUPPORT FOR THE TALIBAN DENIED
WELCOMING U.S. WILLINGNESS TO RAISE INTERFERENCE WITH RUSSIA, ALL STRONGLY DENIED THAT PAKISTAN PROVIDED MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO THE TALIBAN. HE ASSERTED THAT IN ADDITION TO RELIEF SUPPLIES WHICH PAKISTAN HAS PROVIDED TO ALL FACTIONS, PAKISTAN'S HELP FOR THE TALIBAN CONSISTED OF PHONE LINES AND COMMUNICATION LINKS AND SOME FUNDS FOR RECONSTRUCTION IN KANDAHAR. THIS THEME WAS FURTHER ELABORATED BY LTG RANA IN A DISCOURSE ON THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE TALIBAN MOVEMENT TO WHICH PAKISTAN GAVE "NOT ONE BULLET". POINTS OF INTEREST INCLUDED HIS ASSERTION THAT PAKISTAN'S ATTEMPTS TO BROKER AN ALLIANCE BETWEEN THE TALL BAN AND GENERAL DOSTAM WERE AIMED AT MODERATING THE VIEWS OF THE TALIBAN WHOSE "SIMPLE, RIGID, AND ANTIQUE" BELIEFS WERE FURTHER CONFUSED BY A LACK OF STRUCTURE AND LEADERSHIP WITHIN THE MOVEMENT. SIMILAR TO ALL'S TREATMENT OF IRANIAN MOTIVATION, RANA ASSERTED THAT MOSCOW NEEDED INSTABILITY IN AFGHANISTAN TO JUSTIFY A MILITARY PRESENCE ON ITS OLD BORDERS AND TO BLOCK ALTERNATIVE TRADE ROUTES TO CENTRAL ASIA. THE DIFFERING U.S. VIEW OF RUSSIAN AIMS IN CENTRAL ASIA AND AFGHANISTAN WAS DISCUSSED DURING FOREIGN MINISTER ALL'S LUNCH WITH A/S RAPHEL (SEPTEL).
11. (C) UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF SUPPORTING MILITANTS
WITHOUT CONCEDING PAKISTANI ASSERTIONS CONCERNING MILITARY AID TO THE TALIBAN, TALBOTT NOTED AGAIN THAT PERCEPTIONS OF PAKISTANI AND U.S. SUPPORT WERE PARTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE INCREASE IN OUTSIDE MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO RABBANI AND MASOOD. SUCH INTERFERENCE COULD NOT BE DECREASED WITHOUT COUNTERING THOSE PERCEPTIONS AND THIS NECESSARILY INVOLVED CHANGES IN PAKISTANI POLICY. AS THE MEETING CLOSED, THE ACTING SECRETARY DREW AN ANALOGY BETWEEN PAKISTANI SUPPRT FOR THE TALIBAN IN AFGHANISTAN AND THE MILITANTS IN INDIAN CONTROLLED KASHMIR. WHILE SUCH SUPPORT WAS UNDERTAKEN TO SERVE PAKISTANI INTERESTS, THERE WERE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES CONTRARY TO PAKISTAN'S AND THE REGION'S LARGER INTERESTS. ULTIMATELY SUCH GROUPS COULD NOT BE CONTROLLED AND INDULGED IN ACTIONS SUCH AS THE KIDNAPPING OF FOREIGNERS IN KASHMIR.
12. (U) ALL WAS ACCOMPANIED BY LTG NASIM RANA, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE INTER-SERVICES INTELLIGENCE (ISI) WHICH IS TRADITIONALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR DEALING WITH THE AFGHAN FACTIONS, AME MALEEHA LODHI AND NOTETAKERS. FOR THE U.S. SIDE SA A/S RAPHEL, INR PDAS KURTZER, AND SA/PAB DIRECTOR COLDREN (NOTETAKER) ATTENDED.
13. (C) COMMENT: [redacted in its entirety]
CHRISTOPHER
ADMIN
END OF MESSAGE
The law of unintended consequences... Islamabad seems to have become hostage to its own policy, and in fact now runs the very real risk of having its goose roasted over the fire Islamabad helped kindle.
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