[redacted -- subtitle?]
6. (C) THE DEPUTY GOVERNOR CLAIMED THAT THE PROBLEM FACING MODERATES WITHIN THE TALIBAN MOVEMENT WAS THAT THEY DID NOT RECEIVE MUCH OUTSIDE SUPPORT, WHILE THE "MORE CONTROLLABLE NOBODIES" WERE GIVEN "EVERY FACILITY." SUPPORT FOR THE MOVEMENT MOSTLY CAME FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN AND WEALTHY AFGHAN TRADERS, [redacted] AVERRED. THIS AID USUALLY WAS IN THE FORM OF CASH, HE STATED, AND THE GOP HAD ONLY GIVEN THE TALIBAN AMMUNITION ONCE, "AT THE VERY BEGINNING OF THE MOVEMENT IN 1994." [redacted] SAID THE TALIBAN, PARTICULARLY SINCE THE SEIZURE OF HERAT AND SHINDAND AIR BASE, DID NOT REQUIRE MUCH FUEL OR AMMUNITION. LARGE FUEL STOCK WERE TAKEN AT SHINDAND AND HERAT, AND A "HUGE AMOUNT OF WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION" WAS RECOVERED FROM HEKMATYAR'S BASE AT CHARASIAB. [redacted] COMMENTED THAT "WHEREVER YOU DIG IN HEKMATYAR'S AREAS, THERE YOU FIND A WEAPONS DEPOT." ASKED HOW THE GOP PROVIDED ITS FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO THE TALIBAN, [redacted] ALLEGED THE PAKISTANI GOVERNMENT USED AFGHAN TRADERS TO CHANNEL MONEY TO THE TALIBAN, AVOIDING WHEREVER POSSIBLE A DIRECT LINK WITH THE MOVEMENT.
"The deputy governor claimed that the problem facing the moderates within the Taliban movement was that they did not receive much outside support, while the 'more controllable nobodies' were given 'every facility'. Support for the movement mostly came from the Government of Pakistan and wealthy Afghan traders".
Even back in the 1940's, when Muslims in what was then British India were agitating for a Muslim nation upon independence, they were fueling political Islam. Since then, the ruling elite in Pakistan have seen Islam as a rallying point for Pakistan -- an artificial nation -- against "Hindu India". Contrasted to this focus have been sentiments of tribal nationalism, which have been deemed not only treasonous, but un-Islamic. In other words, either you're with the militant Islamists, or you're with Hindu India.
With this in mind, it is little wonder that the Pakistani sponsors supported the more extreme Islamists.
WATCH FOR FIGHTING TO START IN WEST FIRST
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7. (C) [redacted] SAID HE BELIEVED AN ATTACK AGAINST THE TALIBAN WOULD HAPPEN FIRST IN WESTERN AFGHANISTAN AND THEN WOULD SPREAD TO KABUL. [redacted] WHO SAID HE HAD JUST VISITED HERAT AND WOULD BE RETURNING THERE AFTER A BRIEF STOP IN [redacted] REMARKED THAT THE TALIBAN WERE IN THE PROCESS OF FORTIFYING THEIR POSITIONS ALONG THE IRANIAN BORDER, PARTICULARLY NEAR ISLAM QALEH IN HERAT PROVINCE. HE CLAIMED THE TALIBAN HAD RECENTLY CAPTURED NINE AFGHANS BELONGING TO THE TRIBE OF PRO-KABUL COMMANDER ALLAHUDIN, WHO WERE TRYING TO INFILTRATE INTO HERAT FROM IRAN. THE NINE INDIVIDUALS WERE IN JEEPS WHICH CONTIANED SUPPLIES OF AK-47 ASSAULT RIFLES AND A "LARGE AMOUNT OF CASH." [redacted] SAID THE GROUP HAD PLANNED TO DISTRIBUTE THE WEAPONS AND MONEY TO ALLAHUDIN'S TRIBE, AND THEN WOULD ATTACK SHINDAND AIR BASE "ON A SIGNAL FROM TEHRAN."
8. (C) TO RESPOND TO THESE IRANIAN PROVOCATIONS, [redacted] SAID THE TALIBAN HAD PLACED HEAVY WEAPONS, INCLUDING ROCKET LAUNCHERS AND ARTILLERY, ALONG THE IRANIAN BORDER. THE HERAT SHURA HAD ANNOUNCED PUBLICLY, AND CALLED IN THE IRANIAN CONSUL IN HERAT TO CONVEY PROVATELY, THAT IN THE EVENT OF AN IRANIAN-SUPPORT ATTACK AGAINST THE TALIBAN, THE TALIBAN WERE FULLY PREPARED TO RESPOND AGAINST IRAN. "WE HAVE TOLD THE IRANIANS THAT WE ARE FULLY PREPARED TO GO INSIDE IRAN AND FIGHT," [redacted] COMMENTED GRIMLY. "WE HAVE GONE INTO IRAN BEFORE TO SEIZE WEAPONS AND BLANKETS FROM ISMAEL KHAN'S PEOPLE AND HAVE NOT HAD PROBLEMS DOING SO. THIS TIME OUR FORCES WILL BE MUCH BIGGER," HE BOASTED.
No wonder the concern that the instability might spread, and spill over into neighboring countries.
WHO'S WHO IN THE TALIBAN
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9. (C) [redacted] SAID HE WAS CONFIDENT THAT THE TALIBAN COULD TAKE KABUL, "BUT ONLY IF WE CAN RESOLVE OUR INTERNAL DIFFERENCES." HE DIVIDED THE TALIBAN INTO THREE GROUPS: HARD-LINERS, THOSE WHO COULD GO EITHER WAY, AND MODERATES, AND PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING LIST OF NAMES, POSITIONS AND TRIBAL AFFILIATIONS FOR EACH CATEGORY:
HARDLINERS: MOHAMMED OMAR, LEADER OF THE MOVEMENT AND TALIBAN SHURA MEMBER, KHOTAK TRIBE; MOHAMMED HASSAN, KANDAHAR GOVERNOR AND TALIBAN SHURA MEMBER, BALBUL TRIBE; ABDUL WAKHEEL AHMED, FOREIGN AFFAIRS CHIEF AND TALIBAN SHURA MEMBER, KAKAR TRIBE; AKHTAR MOHAMMED, REGIONAL FIELD COMMANDER, ACHAKZAI TRIBE; MULLAH KHAIRULLAH, TALIBAN SHURA MEMBER, KAKAR TRIBE; MULAH YARANNAH, NO POSITION GIVEN, NOORZAI; MULLAH BRADER, FIELD COMMANDER, NOORZAI TRIBE; MULLAH OBAIDULLAH, TALIBAN SHURA MEMBER, NOORZAI TRIBE.
SWING VOTES: MULLAH ABBAS, MAYOR OF KANDAHAR AND TALIBAN SHURA MEMBER, ACHAKZAI TRIBE; MULLAH INSANULLAH, TALIBAN "INSPECTOR GENERAL AND TAX COLLECTOR (SEE BELOW), TALIBAN SHURA MEMBER, ALIZAI TRIBE; MULLAH RABBANI, MILITARY COMMANDER AND TALIBAN SHURA MEMBER, KAKAR TRIBE; MULLAH GHAUS, FOREIGN AFFAIRS DEPUTY, KAKAR TRIBE; MULLAH JALIL, ASSISTANT TO GHAUS, TRIBAL AFFILIATION UNKNOWN; MULLAH TURRABI, POSITION NOT GIVEN, ACHAKZAI; MULLAH BURJAN, FORMERLY OVERALL MILITARY CHIEF, SOMETIMES MEMBER OF TALIBAN SHURA, KAKAR TRIBE.
MODERATES: MULLAH NASEEM, GOVERNOR OF ZABUL, ALIZAI TRIBE; MAULAVI ABDUL HADI, ZABUL DEPUTY GOVERNOR [redacted] ALIZAI TRIBE; MULLAH ABDUL KARIM, HELMAND GOVERNOR, ALIGOZAI TRIBE; MULLAH ABDUL SALAAM, HELMAND CORPS COMMANDER, NOORZAI TRIBE; MULLAH ZAINULLAH, GRISHK CORPS COMMANDER, NOORZAI TRIBE; MULLAH MOHAMMED HASSAN (NOT THE SAME AS THE GOVERNOR OF KANDAHAR), P+OSITION NOT GIVEN, BARAKZAI TRIBE; HAJI ABDUL SAMAD, KANDAHAR MILITIA CHIEF, ACHAKZAI TRIBE; HAJI MULLAH SAYYED MOHAMMED, FARAH GOVERNOR, ALIZAI TRIBE; MULLAH MOHAMMED, FARAH MILITIA CHIEF, BARAKZAI; YAR MOHAMMED, GOVERNOR OF HERAT, POPALZAI TRIBE; SAYYED JANAN AGHA, HERAT CORPS COMMANDER, TRIBE NOT GIVEN.
10. (C) [redacted] ADMITTED THAT THE MODERATE ELEMENTS, NONE OF WHOM WAS A MEMBER OF THE TALIBAN SHURA, WERE "LOSING OUT" TO THE HARD-LINERS. AS AN EXAMPLE OF THE PROBLEMS FACING THE MODERATES, HE CLAIMED THAT HERAT GOVERNOR YAR MOHAMMED HAD AGREED TO REOPEN SCHOOLS FOR GIRLS IN THE FACE OF PRESSURE FROM LOCAL RESIDENTS, BUT HAD BEEN OVERRULED BY THE SHURA IN KANDAHAR. HOWEVER, EVEN [redacted] CHARACTERIZED THE DARI-SPEAKING POPULATION OF HERAT AS "POTENTIAL TRAITORS" WHO SHOULD BE CLOSELY WATCHED TO ENSURE THAT THEY WERE NOT SUBVERTED BY THE IRANIANS -- ALTHOUGH HE APPEARED TO HAVE NO PROBLEM WITH THESE POTENTIAL FIFTH COLUMNISTS GOING TO SCHOOL, EVEN THE GIRLS. AS AN EXAMPLE OF THE WAY POLITICS WAS CONDUCTED WITHIN THE TALIBAN, [redacted] SAID MULLAH IHSANULLAH HAD EFFECTIVELY LOST HIS POSITION AS A SHURA MEMBER BECAUSE KANDAHAR GOVERNOR MOHAMMED HASSAN HAD LEARNED THAT IHSANULLAH, PREVIOUSLY THE MILITARY CHIEF FOR EASTERN AFGHANISTAN, HAD TRIED TO ORGANIZE A 3,000 MAN PRIVATE ARMY, OSTENSIBLY TO "BACK-UP THE TALIBAN" IN PAKTIA. FEARFUL THAT IHSANULLAH'S AMBITION MADE HIM DANGEROUS TO THE TALIBAN, THE SHURA HAD FIRST TRANSFERRED HIM TO HERAT, WHERE GOVERNOR YAR MOHAMMED HAD REFUSED TO COOPERATE WITH HIM, THEN, CONCLUDING THAT IT COULD NOT TRUST IHSANULLAH WITH A SPECIFIC REGIONAL COMMAND, HAD APPOINTED HIM AS A ROVING INSPECTOR GENERAL AND TAX COLLECTOR -- DEPRIVING HIM OF A REGIONAL BASE AND EFFECTIVELY PREVENTING HIM FROM CONTRIBUTING TO SHURA MEETINGS.
COMMENT: ALL MIXED UP
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11. (C) [redacted] PAINTS A PICTURE OF A DIVIDED AND CONFUSED TALIBAN MOVEMENT -- WHICH TRACKS CLOSELY WITH OTHER INFORMATION WE HAVE RECEIVED. WE HAVE HEARD FROM NUMEROUS SOURCES THAT THE LEAST REACTIONARY LEADERS WITHIN THE TALIBAN -- INCLUDING THOSE INTERESTED IN COOPERATING WITH THE U.N. PEACE MISSION -- APPEAR TO BE LOSING OUT TO MORE HARD-LINE ELEMENTS. HOWEVER, WE CANNOT CONFIRM [redacted] THESIS THAT THE MODERATES ARE LOSING BECAUSE "MORE CONTROLLABLE HARD-LINERS" ARE BEING BACKED BY PAKISTAN AND AFGHAN TRADERS; NONE OF THE TALIBAN, AS FAR AS WE CAN MAKE OUT, IS VERY CONTROLLABLE AND GOP FOREIGN MINISTRY SOURCES CONSISTENTLY COMPLAIN ABOUT THE WILLFULNESS OF TALIBAN LEADERS. END COMMENT.
These fissures exist even today, and could be exploited to isolate the terrorist-supporting extremists and bring some peace to the region -- but, one would need an enlightened administration that is not hostage to the interests of big oil and big heroin, cloaked behind its own simplistic world view.
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