When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, the response from Afghanistan was one of declaring Holy War against the Soviets. Since this was happening as new American leadership was looking for a way to hotly prosecute the Cold War, the Reagan Administration saw this as an opportunity to bog the Kremlin down in its own version of a "Vietnam". That, plus other Reagan strategic initiatives, were designed to bankrupt the Soviet economy and increase domestic pressure on the Politburo, to ultimately cause the downfall of the Soviet Union. The strategy worked like a champ.
Key to prompt success, however, was a sound defeat of Soviet military forces in Afghanistan. "Bleeding" the Red Army would cause domestic pressure on Soviet leadership, and would limit the Kremlin's ability to employ its military forces elsewhere.
The Kremlin, of course, understood the risks. Consequently, Soviet leadership developed a strategy of using Soviet maneuverability and firepower to inflict casualties on the Mujahideen, while minimizing casualties among Soviet forces, and allowing them to retain the ability to disengage as needed.
This resulted in an operational-tactical situation, wherein the Mujahideen were often seeking cover in rugged, mountainous terrain. That, in turn, led to an operational-tactical approach by the Soviets of surrounding Mujahideen forces, then bringing firepower to bear.
To do this, the Soviets first located concentrations of Mujahideen forces in the mountains. They then infiltrated elite special forces units, known as SPETsNAZ, behind the Mujahideen, to block their withdrawal through the harder-to-traverse mountainous terrain. Meanwhile, powerful mechanized forces would move along the valleys, approaching the Mujahideen positions as if for a frontal assault. As the mechanized forces drew near, helicopter-borne airmobile and air assault units would block the Mujahideen's left and right flanks, to prevent them from maneuvering laterally from between the heavy, mechanized forces in the valley, and the SPETsNAZ behind them, to a position from which they could escape. At that point, the Soviets would just start blasting.
While some elements of this were new to Soviet/Russian military thought, the reliance on firepower had deep roots in Soviet military operations, as it does in American military operations.
The firepower was provided by 1) direct and indirect fire weapons from the ground forces, mainly the heavy mechanized units facing the Mujahideen's front; 2) airstrikes by fixed-wing aircraft, relying predominantly on unguided air-to-ground munitions (rockets, "dumb" bombs); and 3) helicopter gunships, which, in Soviet military circles, were considered to be flying tanks, and were built accordingly. Deployment of the flanking units, as well as of the SPETsNAZ, was accomplished by helicopters.
Consequently, the operational-tactical approach was heavily reliant on 1) helicopters for maneuver and firepower, and on 2) fixed-wing aircraft for firepower. As long as the Soviets could operate aircraft in Afghanistan with some degree of impunity, they could continue the war. Colateral damage and civilian casualties caused by heavy use of firepower (and by landmines) were less of a consideration in the Soviet Union, a country that controlled the press reports both coming from the battlefield in Afghanistan, and propogating to the public at home.
The Reagan Administration correctly identified the critical node as the Soviet reliance on the ability to use its airpower, and targeted that node by provision of Stinger missiles to the Mujahideen.
The Stinger missile of the 1980's was a passive infrared (IR) homing ("heat-seeking"), man-portable surface-to-air missile (SAM), with a high probability of kill (pK). It was provided as a "certified round"; no maintenance was needed in the field. It was fairly simple to use, and, because it could be carried by an individual soldier and launched from his shoulder, it gave any unit of Mujahideen, no matter how small the unit, the ability to successfully defend itself against attack from the air.
Armed with Stingers, the Mujahideen air defense was suddenly much more lethal to the attackers. Reconnaissance aircraft now might not make it back to base with their intelligence data; fighter-bombers now had to employ their weapons from higher up and farther out, decreasing their accuracy and effectiveness; helicopters now had to do the same, as well as drop their ground troops at a greater distance from the battle. This not only decreased the effectiveness of the firepower being employed against them, but allowed the Mujahideen more freedom of maneuver on the battlefield.
Worse than that for the Soviets, the Mujahideen soon were able to launch guerrilla-style attacks on airborne aircraft. A small unit of Mujahideen -- perhaps half a dozen, essentially undetectable in the rugged vastness of Afghanistan -- could wait for unsuspecting Soviet aircraft flying along a valley on a reconnaissance, resupply, or attack mission. Soon, Soviet aircrews found that the Mujahideen could shoot them down not just in the battle area, but anywhere between the battle area and the Soviet base, as well; nowhere was safe.
The Mujahideen began to infiltrate in near Soviet bases. Heavy transport aircraft were now in danger taking off and landing; they had to drop immense quantities of flares in hopes of foiling the IR guidance of the Stingers. Soon, helicopter gunships had to drop flares on a path parallel to the heavy aircraft's flight path during take-off or landing. The Mujahideen, under the protective umbrella of their US-supplied Stingers, were now on the offensive.
Ultimately, Soviet forces withdrew from Afghanistan in defeat. This, plus the pressure of trying to compete militarily with the industrial powerhouse of Reagan's America, while trying to match America's technological initiatives in space-based missile defense and other fields, all coupled with growing unrest and a desire for reform within Soviet borders, led to the collapse of the Soviet Union amid real concerns of a new Russian Civil War shortly after Reagan left office.
Comrade V. I. Lenin established the world's first socialist nation, the vanguard of the struggle of the workers and peasants, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and set its army, the Red Army, the Army of World Revolution, on a course for world conquest. But, like for so many conquering armies in the past, Afghanistan proved to be one place where the Red Army couldn't prevail. Like the Soviet aircraft flying in its name, Lenin's movement went down in flames in battle against Afghanistan's holy warriors equipped with Stinger missiles. The Kremlin faced American technology and a cowboy President who wasn't afraid to use it; Reagan's America and the Mujahideen proxies rocked the Politburo like a Category V hurricane.
It was a case of Love at First Sting.
It’s early morning
The sun comes out
Last night was shaking
And really loud
My cat is purring
It scratched my skin
So what is wrong
With another sin
The night is calling
I have to go
The wolf is hungry
He runs the show
He’s licking his lips
He’s ready to win
On the hunt tonight
For love at first sting
Here I am, rocked you like a hurricane
Here I am, rocked you like a hurricane
Here I am, rocked you like a hurricane
Here I am, rocked you like a hurricane
Here I am
Rock You Like a Hurricane
1 comment:
I like that one. That's pretty good.
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