A key article in the series addresses Taliban preparations for operations this spring: Taliban line up the heavy artillery.
KARACHI - The battle lines have been drawn on the Afghan chessboard for what is likely to be a decisive confrontation between foreign forces and the Taliban-led tribal resistance. Both sides have fine-tuned their strategies, have engaged their pawns, and are poised for action.
The Taliban's efforts are focused on next spring, after the harsh winter weather eases, while North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces aim to "nip this evil in the bud", using the province of Kandahar as their strategic base.
From there, they want to contain and encircle the Taliban in their bases all over southwestern Afghanistan, according to a source familiar with NATO who spoke to Asia Times Online on condition of anonymity.
Central to this plan is the use of air power, even though the Taliban have come down from the mountains and entrenched themselves in civilian populations in carefully chosen pockets. They also have a headquarters in the rugged mountains of Baghran Valley in Helmand province.
"Central to this plan is the use of air power...." Where have I heard something like that before? (Hint: The Soviets in Afghanistan: Love at First Sting.) We'll be hearing about this again, too....
On the Taliban side, Taliban leaders are talking to local people, making them what are essentially campaign promises, but for a different kind of campaign. They are promising the people that if they return to power, they will share everything with the people. After they get enough people convinced in their political campaign, they will begin a mass mobilization for the military campaign.
A key locality will be Baghran. Baghran is in the last Pashtun-speaking province before one gets to the Persian-speaking provinces. It is sort of a border-town between Tajiks and Pashtuns. In some ways, the area may be symbolic to the Taliban for unifying different factions loyal to them. Shortly after the Soviets invaded in 1979, they left Baghran, and were never able to return; it became a stronghold for the Mujahideen. Surrounded by rugged terrain traversed by mountain passes, if the Taliban can hold it, it could be a key victory not just operationally, but politically as well. It should be noted that Baghran has a reputation for being a Taliban hotbed, and there have been high-profile assassinations of local leaders loyal to the regime in Kabul.
One key weakness of the Taliban may be their focus on ideological reliability, rather than competence or experience. In an area rich in veteran Mujahideen who battled the Soviet forces and won, including veteran military leaders, these "old hands" are conspicuously absent; Taliban leadership positions often go to graduates of the madrassa, despite their youth, inexperience, and mistakes.
In an article at EurasiaNet.org entitled THE OTHER WAR: THE UNITED STATES GEARS UP FOR SPRING OFFENSIVE IN AFGHANISTAN, the operations coming up this spring are addressed from the US/NATO side:
Instead of the Taliban, it will be the US Army and NATO that will be seizing the initiative this spring, Bush vowed. "The snow is going to melt in the Hindu Kush Mountains, and when it does, we can expect fierce fighting to continue," Bush said. "Our strategy is not to be on the defense, but to go on the offence. This spring there is going to be a new offensive in Afghanistan, and it’s going to be a NATO offensive."
President Bush has promised aid to help build Afghanistan's military and national police forces; reliable results will take years, though. Meanwhile, NATO troops must fill the gaps. Currently, the new NATO commander, US Army Gen. John Craddock, feels that more NATO troops are needed for the contingent to effectively do its job until relieved by rebuilt Afghani forces. Unfortunately, political constraints from their governments prevent the NATO forces in Afghanistan from being as unified as one might hope:
In addition to the overall troop shortfall, NATO operations have been hampered by "national caveats" that limit the ability of various troop contingents to participate in ISAF’s operations. Some of these caveats restrict the locations where their troops can operate; others limit the type of operations in which they can engage. Many are rooted in domestic political considerations back home. For example, France, Germany, Italy and Spain presently are reluctant to deploy their respective troop contingents in areas where they would become engaged in heavy fighting against Islamic militants. Instead, they want their troops primarily to assist in reconstruction and stabilization efforts.
As addressed previously, one key feature of coalition operations is the use of firepower, especially airpower. Airstrikes bring a great deal of firepower to bear on a target, very suddenly; however, there are costs associated with this:
American, British, Canadian, and Dutch forces currently have had to bear the brunt of the fighting against the Taliban, mainly in southern Afghanistan. Hard-pressed coalition ground forces have had to rely increasingly on air strikes, which have resulted in increased civilian casualties, thus threatening to undermine popular support for ISAF and the allied Afghan government under President Hamid Karzai.
So, what is going to happen this spring? Let's analyze some different aspects of the upcoming campaign:
1) Parallel to the Soviet experience in Afghanistan, excessive reliance on airpower could become a handicap militarily if the Taliban gain an effective means of air defense. This is unlikely, however, as the Taliban have no high-tech backers, and without them would probably not be able to acquire adequate, new-generation air defense missiles (man-portable SAMs) in sufficient numbers to make a difference.
2) Excessive use of firepower, including airstrikes, could have a long-term negative impact if civilian casualties become too high. The surviving family members of victims of coalition firepower might be motivated to help the Taliban, or at least put political pressure on Kabul. On the other hand, inadequate use of firepower would likely result in increased coalition casualties, and there could be a political cost for that at home in coalition countries.
The NATO and US forces there are foreign armies. They need significant help from the local people to succeed. Without a large critical mass of support from Afghani people, their mission is doomed to failure.
Interestingly, and to a surprising extent, the Taliban are also a foreign army. During the 1990's, they began to have heavy backing from Saudi Arabia. This included monetary support, but came with ideological strings attached -- the Taliban had to adopt Saudi Wahhabism. To the extent that Afghanis dislike this extremist, foreign ideology, they may support those who fight agianst the Taliban.
The Taliban's passing over of experienced Mujahideen from the Soviet era in favor of a younger generation trained in Wahhabi madrassas leaves a militarily and politically significant segment of society available. Which way does that segment lean?
These last points emphasize a key feature of this war, a feature that seems to be missed in Western capitals: more than anything else, this is an ideological war, yet the talk in the West is about military operations.
One thing is for sure: Each side considers the other a problem in Afghanistan, and each side is determined to clean out pockets held by the other this spring.
It will be interesting to see who does spring cleaning better.
Let's keep the NATO and US forces, and the innocent among the Afghani people, in our prayers.
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